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ABSTRACT

Many Holocaust victims have expressed uneasiness or even shame regarding
the actions they took to stay alive in the death camps. These acts of self-preservation
were usually humiliating and often came at the expense of their fellow victims. This
comes out most clearly in the testimonies of the members of the Sonderkommando in
Auschwitz and Treblinka. Writers such as Filip Müller, Zalmen Gradowski, and Richard
Glazar recount how they survived the lethal environment of the camp by appropriating
the food, clothing, and valuables of the people murdered in the gas chambers. Although
most scholars have interpreted these testimonies, and the acts of self-preservation they
describe, as a form of resistance, I argue that the writings reflect an awareness of
enslavement to the body and the imperative of self-preservation, which Arthur
Schopenhauer calls the “will-to-live.” For the victims are not only lamenting the
degrading things they had to do to preserve their lives; they are also questioning selfpreservation itself. By reducing the victim to little more than a body, which never ceases
in its physical demands until death, the death camp cruelly exploited the human
enslavement to the will-to-live. The writers of these testimonies are critical of their own
servitude to the imperative to survive at all costs and tend to admire, perhaps even envy,
their fellow inmates who have the courage to resist the Nazis or commit suicide, which
they view as the only true liberation from their bondage to the will-to-live.
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INTRODUCTION

Many Holocaust victims have expressed a sense of shame regarding the actions
they took to survive in the camps. These acts of survival were usually humiliating and
sometimes came at the expense of their fellow victims. This was the case particularly for
the Sonderkommando (“special unit”) in death camps such as Auschwitz-Birkenau and
Treblinka. Comprised entirely of Jewish prisoners, who were often the sole survivors of
their transports, these work squads were forced to perform some of the most degrading
tasks in the camp. In their testimonies, members of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando
describe how they assisted the victims in the undressing rooms, collected their clothing
and possessions, pulled the corpses from the gas chambers, cut off their hair and
extracted gold teeth, and cremated the bodies in open-air pits or ovens. They admit that
they performed these tasks because they wanted to live; refusal to cooperate meant death.
They also had access to many items unavailable to the average prisoner, such as extra
food, clean clothes, money and valuables, and religious articles, all of which helped them
to prolong their lives and even stage an uprising. Survivors of the Treblinka death camp
tell a similar story in their memoirs. They recount how, as part of a small labor force
spared from immediate gassing, they had to sort the property of hundreds of thousands of
murdered Jews. Like the Sonderkommando in Auschwitz, these men became involved in
the extermination process through material enrichment, as they appropriated the food,
clothing, and valuables of the dead in order to improve their desperate living conditions.
In fact, they depended on the arrival of new transports of victims to justify their
continued existence to the SS, who needed their labor. Survival at all costs governed their
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actions. Like the Auschwitz Sonderkommando uprising, the Treblinka revolt occurred as
late as it did in part because it was only then, facing imminent extermination as their
usefulness to the SS came to an end, that the prisoners were able to overcome their fear of
death and their attachment to an otherwise miserable, humiliating life.
Scholars who have written on such sources tend to view the testimonies as a form
of resistance against the Nazis. In their studies of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando,
Nicholas Chare and Dominic Williams insist that many of these prisoners’ activities,
especially their writing, “can be conceived of as kinds of rebellion against Nazi
oppression.”1 They believe that the Sonderkommando manuscripts “should be understood
as active rather than passive artefacts” because the writings supposedly “involve a
conscious effort to bear witness to Nazi atrocity.” 2 According to Chare and Williams,
“each word the Sonderkommando authors committed to paper, each character, as a sign
of life, life writing, resisted Nazi efforts at destruction.”3 Chare and Williams claim that
the Sonderkommando members “knowingly exploited language’s capacity for
maintaining something of their life after death. Writing…promised posthumous escape
and a substantial victory over Nazi efforts to erase all traces of their crimes.” 4 Moreover,
Williams argues that “the knowledge that members of the SK gained by ‘adapting’, or
‘getting used’, to their situation was experienced as moral contamination, but also gave

1

Nicholas Chare and Dominic Williams, introduction to Testimonies of Resistance: Representations of the
Auschwitz-Birkenau Sonderkommando, eds. Nicholas Chare and Dominic Williams (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2019), 20, Kindle.
2
Ibid., 28.
3
Nicholas Chare and Dominic Williams, Matters of Testimony: Interpreting the Scrolls of Auschwitz (New
York: Berghahn Books, 2017), 19.
4
Ibid., 20.
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some possibility of moral action, as their own words testify.” 5 Conforming to one’s
environment “makes actions within that environment possible.”6 Thus, Williams claims,
the Sonderkommando’s daily proximity to the SS “provide[d] them with knowledge that
could be used, at times, to attempt to make a difference.” 7 While the Sonderkommando
members expressed self-accusation in their testimonies, they also felt they were in a
position to take revenge on the Nazis and ease the suffering of the victims. Williams does
not believe that this is merely “an excuse,” although he admits that “many moral
compromises are made in this form.”8
Like Chare and Williams, Israeli historian Gideon Greif argues that, even in the
crematoria of Auschwitz-Birkenau, the Sonderkommando prisoners “had some room for
moral action.”9 Greif notes that many members of the Sonderkommando continued to
practice their Jewish faith, which was forbidden in the death camp. He believes that the
Sonderkommando’s religious observance “is the most compelling proof that they
managed to remain human under the most inhumane conditions.” 10 For example,
religious members such as Leib Langfus avoided direct contact with corpses in order to

Dominic Williams, “What Makes the Grey Zone Grey? Blurring Moral and Factual Judgements of the
Sonderkommando,” in Testimonies of Resistance: Representations of the Auschwitz-Birkenau
Sonderkommando, eds. Nicholas Chare and Dominic Williams (New York: Berghahn Books, 2019), 101,
Kindle.
6
Ibid., 112-113.
7
Ibid., 113-114.
8
Ibid., 116.
9
Gideon Greif, We Wept Without Tears: Testimonies of the Jewish Sonderkommando from Auschwitz (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 67.
10
Gideon Greif, “The Religious Life of Sonderkommando Members inside the Killing Installations in
Auschwitz-Birkenau,” in Testimonies of Resistance: Representations of the Auschwitz-Birkenau
Sonderkommando, eds. Nicholas Chare and Dominic Williams (New York: Berghahn Books, 2019), 194,
Kindle.
5
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maintain ritual cleanliness according to the Torah. 11 The Sonderkommando obtained
prayer shawls, phylacteries (tefillin), and other religious items from the possessions of the
gas chamber victims so that they could perform the daily prayers and conduct Shabbat
services.12 On Passover, they “organized” flour to bake unleavened bread (matzah). On
Sukkot, they built a temporary dwelling (sukkah) outside the crematorium. 13 Greif
describes these acts of religious appropriation without any sense of irony, insisting that
the Sonderkommando “derived a special will to survive” from Judaism, which was “a
strong source of hope…because it enabled prisoners to set something against their
German tormentors.”14 This faith helped the prisoners “to distance themselves from the
brutal reality of daily life in the camp and enabled them to maintain some sort of
autonomy against the brutal regime of the camp.”15 On the other hand, he notes that, for
the nonreligious members of the Sonderkommando, the practices “seemed cynical due to
the daily confrontation with mass murder and their own role in it.” 16 There were also
some religious prisoners who believed in the principle of Kiddush haShem
(“sanctification of the Name”), according to which Jews must sacrifice their own lives
before transgressing God’s commandments. These prisoners preferred to commit suicide
rather than carry out the work in the crematoria. Greif admits that “the daily life of the
SK could be interpreted as such a great sin,” but he does not accept this interpretation.17
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In fact, a rabbi in the Warsaw Ghetto had developed a different principle called Kiddush
haChayyim (“sanctification of life”), which “emphasized the physical life as a holy thing
and proclaimed the sustainment of life as the highest principle.”18 In other words, Jews
glorified God by staying alive and resisting Hitler’s plan of extermination. Some
prisoners agreed with this principle, while others began to doubt their faith and lost “their
individuality and emotionality.” When that happened, suicide was the only “option left in
order to escape the brutal life of the camp.”19
In his analysis of Richard Glazar’s memoir, linguist Peter Davies recognizes the
corrupting effect that Treblinka had on the prisoners but sees Glazar’s narrative as one of
“self-assertion, survival, and resistance.” 20 According to Davies, Glazar’s memoir
contains “a specific political narrative of increasing solidarity and unity, overcoming
differences and crossing cultural boundaries in order to create the conditions for
resistance and revolt.”21 For example, Glazar could not use his native German “as a
resource for resistance” because it was “compromised by its closeness to the language of
the perpetrators.” Therefore, he resorted to irony, which “expresses a striving for distance
without being able to achieve it.”22 While Davies recognizes the sarcasm of the Jewish
prisoners as “self-aware, an active response to a situation…where there is no space for
uncorrupted speech,” he also believes that it was a “deliberate undermining and parody of

18

Ibid., 202.
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the language and gestures of the SS.”23 In fact, the SS unwittingly created the figures that
mocked them. The so-called Scheißkapo (“shit kapo”) was such a figure. Dressed “in a
grotesque parody of a synagogue cantor,” he ensured that his fellow prisoners spent no
more than two minutes in the latrines. 24 Although it is unclear how the Scheißkapo
mocked the SS rather than the Jews, Davies insists that the prisoners “exploit[ed] the
oppressive, defining gaze of the SS as a way of developing resistance strategies. They
perform[ed] in ways that the SS expect[ed] of them; in order to survive, they adopt[ed]
the characteristics of anti-Semitic caricature.” For instance, Hans Freund “play[ed] the
obsequious Jewish shopkeeper, exaggerating his Prague accent and servile manners.” 25
Davies considers Freund to be “a negative foil for Glazar’s autobiographical narrator,”
since Glazar supposedly did not share Freund’s “cynicism and self-hatred.”26 Davies
mentions the fact that Freund fell into despair after the murder of his family and longed
for death, which he found during the uprising. Ignoring Glazar’s own despair throughout
the memoir, Davies argues that Freund “represents the side of Glazar that has to die so
that Glazar can find a way of living.”27 Finally, Davies claims that Glazar “re-establishes
a sense of identity and agency” after liberation, in spite of the fact that Glazar offers no
such redemptive outlook.28
Although most scholars have interpreted these testimonies, and the acts of selfpreservation they describe, as a form of resistance, I argue that the writings reflect an
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awareness of enslavement to the body and the imperative of self-preservation, which
Arthur Schopenhauer calls the “will-to-live.” For the victims are not only lamenting the
degrading things they had to do to preserve their lives; they are also questioning selfpreservation itself. By reducing the victim to little more than a body, which never ceases
in its physical demands until death, the death camp cruelly exploited the human
enslavement to the will-to-live. The writers of these testimonies are critical of their own
servitude to the imperative to survive at all costs and tend to admire, perhaps even envy,
their fellow inmates who have the courage to resist the Nazis or commit suicide, which
they view as the only true liberation from their bondage to the will-to-live.
Hannah Arendt discussed this issue in her early postwar writings. Arendt believed
that the reduction of the human being to “a specimen of the animal-species man” was the
primary aim of the death camps, which otherwise had no utilitarian purpose. To achieve
its goal of the “total domination of man,” the Nazi regime had to transform “the human
person, who somehow is always a specific mixture of spontaneity and being
conditioned,…into a completely conditioned being whose reactions can be calculated
even when he is led to certain death.” 29 The camps served as “laboratories in training
people to become bundles of reactions, in making them behave like Pavlov’s dog, in
eliminating from the human psychology every trace of spontaneity.” 30 The camps were
designed “to manipulate the human body—with its infinite possibilities of suffering—in

Hannah Arendt, “Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps,” Jewish Social
Studies 12, no. 1 (January 1950): 60, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4464856.
30
Ibid., 63.
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such a way as to make it destroy the human person as inexorably as do certain mental
diseases or organic origin.”31
According to Arendt, the “total domination of man” occurred in three stages: first
came the annihilation of the juridical person, then the murder of the moral person, and
finally the destruction of the individual. After depriving the juridical person of all rights,
the Nazis destroyed the moral person by making martyrdom impossible. 32 In the camps,
death was anonymous and meaningless, and victims were often faced with the “hopeless
dilemma” of whether to send their family members to death, or to assist in the
extermination of their fellow victims. In this way, “the distinguishing line between
persecutor and persecuted, between murderer and victim, is constantly blurred.” 33 While
a person’s conscience might still have opposed this assault on morality, the regime
rendered “decisions of conscience absolutely questionable and equivocal.” Self-sacrifice
and even suicide could result in the death of others.34 In the final stage, the Nazis
attempted to destroy the individual through the elimination of spontaneity, which Arendt
defined as “man’s power to begin something new out of his own resources, something
that cannot be explained on the basis of reactions to environment and events.” 35 With the
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Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland, OH: Meridian Books, 1968), 453.
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Ibid., 453.
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loss of spontaneity, humans become “ghastly marionettes with human faces, which all
behave like the dog in Pavlov’s experiments, which all react with perfect reliability even
when going to their own death, and which do nothing but react.” 36
As Israeli scholar Michal Aharony points out, Arendt did not state unequivocally
whether she believed that the Nazis had ever achieved “total domination” in the camps. 37
In her 1950 essay, “Social Science Techniques and the Study of Concentration Camps,”
Arendt wrote that “we can only guess” to what degree it is possible to eliminate human
spontaneity, although she feared that “the terrible docility with which all people went to
their certain death under camp conditions as well as the surprising small percentage of
suicides” indicated that the Nazis had carried their experiment in total domination “to the
limits of the possible.”38 In The Origins of Totalitarianism, published one year later,
Arendt stated that the death camp “is the only form of society in which it is possible to
dominate man entirely.”39 However, she also argued that “spontaneity can never be
entirely eliminated, insofar as it is connected not only with human freedom but with life
itself, in the sense of simply keeping alive.”40 Likewise, in a 1953 speech entitled
“Mankind and Terror,” Arendt said that it is not possible to achieve total domination
“even under the conditions of totalitarian terror. Spontaneity can never be entirely

spontaneity is part and parcel of the human condition. Its mental organ is the Will” (Vol. 2, 110). Hannah
Arendt, The Life of the Mind, combined 2 vols., ed. Mary McCarthy (New York: Harcourt, 1981).
36
Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 455.
37
Michal Aharony, Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Total Domination: The Holocaust, Plurality, and
Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2015), 104, https://doiorg.libproxy.clemson.edu/10.4324/9780203795668.
38
Arendt, “Social Science Techniques,” 63.
39
Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 456.
40
Ibid., 438.
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eradicated, because life as such, and surely human life, is dependent on it. In
concentration camps, however, spontaneity can be eradicated to a great extent; or, at any
rate, the most careful attention and effort is expended there on experiments for that
purpose.”41 For Arendt, then, the success of the Nazi experiment was less important that
the mere fact that it had been undertaken, with horrific results. Even if the Nazis did not
(and perhaps could not) succeed in eliminating human spontaneity, Arendt could not
otherwise explain at the time “why millions of human beings allowed themselves to be
marched unresistingly into the gas chambers,” or why so few prisoners committed suicide
or revolted against the SS.42
Although Arendt’s description of prisoners as conditioned, bestial organisms finds
echoes in victim testimonies, the destruction of “spontaneity” does not adequately explain
the prisoners’ reduction to this state. As I will show in the following, the Nazis did not
want to dominate the camp inmates in a total manner, as Arendt suggests, but to exploit
the prisoners’ will-to-live. It was not primarily the destruction of their individual
spontaneity that prevented the victims from resisting Nazi extermination or committing
suicide, but the desire to live and the underlying fear of death.
Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman is one of the few scholars who has identified selfpreservation as the key to understanding why many Jewish victims became involved in
the process of their own destruction. In his book Modernity and the Holocaust, he

Hannah Arendt, “Mankind and Terror,” in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and
Totalitarianism, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1994), 304.
42
Arendt, “Social Science Techniques,” 63; Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 455.
41
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describes the Nazi regime as a “modern, rational, bureaucratically organized power.”43
In emphasizing the rational nature of the Nazi regime, Bauman rejects the idea of the
Holocaust as “the failure of civilization (i.e. of human purposive, reason-guided activity)
to solve the “Hobbesian problem,” that is, “to contain the morbid natural predilections of
whatever has been left of nature in man.”44 “The Holocaust was not an irrational outflow
of the not-yet-fully-eradicated residues of pre-modern barbarity,” he argues. “It was a
legitimate resident in the house of modernity; indeed, one who would not be at home in
any other house.”45 In fact, the Holocaust is “unthinkable” without modern civilization. 46
As a product of modern bureaucratic procedures, the Final Solution did not come into
conflict with the principles of rationality on which such procedures are based. The
behavior of the perpetrators and the victims of the Holocaust originated within the
Western civilizing process, which “subordinate[d] the use of violence to rational
calculus” and emancipated rationality from the “interference of ethical norms and moral
inhibitions.”47 “Except for the moral repulsiveness of its goal,” he writes, the
extermination of the Jews “did not differ in any formal sense…from all other organized
activities designed, monitored and supervised by ‘ordinary’ administrative and economic
sections.”48 In this sense, there was nothing unusual about the way the bureaucracy of
genocide incorporated the victims themselves “into an integral part of the chain of
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Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 122.
Emphasis in original.
44
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command, an area subject to the strictly disciplinary rules and freed from moral
judgment.”49 Indeed, the cooperation of the victims was “an indispensable part of the
total operation and a crucial condition of its success.”50
According to Bauman, the Nazis successfully enlisted the cooperation of their
Jewish victims because modern society had already elevated rationality to the most
important criterion for action. As “rational beings,” the Jews could be relied upon to
follow “the same behavioural principles as those promoted by their bureaucratic gaolers:
efficiency, higher gain, less expense.” 51 This made the victims’ behavior “predictable and
hence manipulable and controllable.”52 In the Hobbesian world of the ghettos and camps,
the most rational action was the calculative one that increased one’s chances of remaining
alive, and the Nazis made the Jews believe that the best chance for survival was
obedience. Thus, “everything the Jews did to serve their own interest brought the Nazi
objective somewhat nearer to full success.” 53 Rational people, who have just emerged
from a long journey in a suffocating cattle car, “will go quietly, meekly, joyously into a
gas chamber, if only they are allowed to believe it is a bathroom.” 54 They will also allow
their friends and neighbors to be sacrificed, if only they can live a little longer. “Once
self-preservation had been chosen as the supreme criterion of action,” Bauman writes,
“its price could be gradually yet relentlessly increased–until all other considerations have
been devalued, all moral or religious inhibitions broken, all scruples disavowed and

49
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disallowed.”55 As “moral insensitivity and callousness” increased, the victims turned
“more and more into a company of accomplices to murder,” and “all brakes that normally
constrain the pressure of the naked instinct of self-preservation” were eroded. 56 Bauman
notes that the “irresistible compulsion to live pushed aside moral scruples and, with them,
human dignity. Amidst the universal scramble for survival, the value of self-preservation
was enthroned as an uncontestable legitimation of choice. Everything that served the selfpreservation was right.”57
Like Arendt in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963), Bauman cites the
Judenräte as a prime example of moral compromise. The Nazis tasked the ghetto leaders
with drawing up lists for “resettlement in the East,” which meant deciding who among
the ghetto population should be sacrificed so that the others might live. It was “rational”
to amputate a limb to save the body. There was always “the comforting thought that it is
not my turn yet, thank God: by lying low, I can still escape.” 58 According to Bauman, the
tragedy of the ghettos illustrates that, in “a situation that does not contain a good choice,
or renders such a good choice very costly,” most people will “argue themselves away
from the issue of moral duty (or fail to argue themselves towards it), adopting instead the
precepts of rational interest and self-preservation.”59 While Bauman believes that “No
one can be proclaimed guilty for the sheer fact of breaking down under such pressure,” he
also argues that “no one can be excused from moral self-deprecation for such surrender.”

55
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For Bauman, “putting self-preservation above moral duty is in no way predetermined,
inevitable and inescapable.” Evil can be resisted. “The testimony of the few who did
resist shatters the authority of the logic of self-preservation. It shows it for what it is in
the end–a choice.”60 For example, ghetto leaders Adam Czerniakow in Warsaw and Dr.
Bergman in Rovno, as well as the entire Judenrat of Bereza Kartuska, committed suicide,
which Bauman considers a “dignified departure.” 61 On the other hand, those “cowardly
enough or bold enough to live…badly needed an answer; an excuse, a justification, a
moral or rational argument” for staying alive. Most settled for the latter. 62
Bauman’s discussion of self-preservation in the Holocaust is helpful because it
challenges the Hobbesian view of reason as a tool to aid in one’s survival. According to
Hobbes, modern society originated from the desire of individuals to avoid the “continual
fear and danger of violent death” that they would face “without a common power to keep
them all in awe.” Such a condition “is called war, and such a war as is of every man
against every man.” In this state of nature, human life was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short.”63 Hobbes believed that passions such as “fear of death, desire of such things
as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them,”
inclined human beings to seek peace. Reason then revealed to them “convenient articles
of peace”: laws of nature which placed limitations on one’s natural right to use any
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means necessary to preserve one’s life. 64 Significantly, Hobbes defined a law of nature as
“a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that
which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to
omit that by which he thinketh it may best be preserved.” 65 According to this rule, it is
irrational and foolish to commit suicide or to put one’s life at risk in a situation other than
self-defense.
As Thomas F. Tierney points out, “for Hobbes there was never a good reason to
abandon one’s life.”66 For example, Hobbes believed that if a Christian subject can obey
their sovereign’s command without forfeiting eternal salvation, then it would be “unjust”
for them not to do so. On the other hand, if the sovereign issues a command that “cannot
be obeyed without being damned to eternal death, then it were madness to obey it.” Yet
Christian subjects must be “taught to distinguish well between what is and what is not
necessary to eternal salvation.” And all that is necessary for salvation, according to
Hobbes, is to have faith in Christ and to obey laws.67 Therefore, it is unreasonable to
expect Christian subjects to risk their lives in defiance of earthly laws, for the “laws of
God…are none but the laws of nature, whereof the principal is that we should not violate
our faith, that is, a commandment to obey our civil sovereigns, which we constituted over
us by mutual pact one with another.”68
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While Hobbes’s “stance toward death as something fearsome, which should be
deferred as long as possible, marks a crucial divergence” from the philosophical and
religious traditions of the West, Tierney notes that Hobbes’s “position on martyrdom, like
his concern with health and longevity, has left its mark on modern western subjects.”69 In
fact, Tierney argues, “the Hobbesian subject is perfectly suited, if not a prerequisite, for
the exercise of bio-power in a system of governmentality.”70 French philosopher Michel
Foucault coined the term “biopower” to describe a new, modern form of power in which
“the ancient right [of the sovereign] to take life or let live was replaced by a power to
foster life or disallow it to the point of death.”71 Although Foucault dismissed Hobbes as
“at best a classical theorist of sovereignty who was on the way toward governmentality,
and…at worst an opponent of the warlike conception of power that was developed by
other early-modern theorists,” Tierney finds Hobbes “most illuminating” precisely in the
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context of Foucault’s theory of how relations of subjugation can manufacture subjects. 72
“For such Hobbesian subjects,” argues Tierney, “could be counted upon to take whatever
steps were required to defer death and prolong their lives, and were precisely the sort of
individuals who were fit for the exercise of bio-power.”73
While Tierney does not connect this idea to the Holocaust, he would likely agree
with Bauman that the Nazis would not have achieved such efficiency in the extermination
process without being able to rely on the victims as Hobbesian subjects: reasonable
people who would not risk their lives unnecessarily. Prior to their extermination, the
victims also resembled Foucault’s “docile bodies,” human beings which “may be
subjected, used, transformed and improved” through modern disciplinary methods of
“uninterrupted, constant coercion.”74 It is important to note here that Foucault did not
believe that the achievement of docility required the “costly and violent” appropriation of
bodies through slavery or physical punishment. Modern discipline “was directed not only
at the growth of [the body’s] skills, nor at the intensification of [the body’s] subjection,
but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes [the body] more
obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely.”75 In other words, modern relations
of power “defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so that they
may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques,
the speed and the efficiency that one determines.”76 In the case of the Holocaust, the
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Nazis wanted their victims to obediently participate in the process of their own
destruction. However, while some of this “training” in docility may have occurred in the
“laboratories” of the camps, as Arendt posited, Bauman shows that the victims already
lived in a Hobbesian society based on self-interest, which the Nazis could exploit for
their own purposes.
For Bauman, the Holocaust revealed the fragility of the Hobbesian society; it
showed that self-interest leads to servile, cowardly acts and has a corrosive effect on a
community. Yet while Bauman points out the moral consequences of the Hobbesian view
of self-preservation as rational and calculative, he does not otherwise question or think
about it. To clarify this issue, let us now turn to one of the most interesting thinkers of
self-preservation in Western history: Arthur Schopenhauer.
In his book The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer argues that all
biological life is governed by an irrational, groundless will, which he calls the “will-tolive.” He characterizes this will as “a blind, irresistible urge,” an endless “craving for life
and existence.”77 In humans, the will-to-live “appears as a living body with the iron
command to nourish it.” Consequently, the human is “the most necessitous of all beings.
He is concrete willing and needing through and through; he is a concretion of a thousand
wants and needs.” Concern for the maintenance of one’s existence occupies all of human
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life.78 However, Schopenhauer emphasizes that our “boundless attachment to life” has
nothing to do with “any objective knowledge of the value of life,” which is doubtful at
best.79 On the contrary, this attachment “is irrational and blind,” based less on the love of
life than the fear of death.80 As the embodiment of the will-to-live, every individual
believes that they are the whole will and that all other things are mere representations of
their will. Thus, it appears to them that their will (the “I” or ego) perishes with the
phenomenon (their body) and this fills the will “with horror, because it is contrary to its
original nature, which is a blind craving for existence.” 81 This explains why the human
being “loves above everything else an existence which is full of want, misery, trouble,
pain, anxiety, and then again full of boredom…and that he fears above everything else
the end of this existence.”82 When one views one’s own death “as if in this single
phenomenon the whole world were to be annihilated for ever,” life appears “as the
highest good, however embittered, short, and uncertain it may be,” while death seems the
“greatest of evils, the worst thing that can threaten anywhere.” 83 Therefore, the human
being is prepared “to sacrifice everything else; he is ready to annihilate the world, in
order to maintain his own self, that drop in the ocean, a little longer.” 84
Schopenhauer notes that humans are often not aware of their bondage to the willto-live. Due to the free, groundless nature of the will itself, the individual does not realize
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that they are but a single phenomenon of this will, which necessitates all their actions. A
person therefore “considers himself a priori quite free,” and “imagines he can at any
moment enter upon a different way of life, which is equivalent to saying that he can
become a different person.” However, through experience the individual discovers “that
he is not free, but liable to necessity; that notwithstanding all his resolutions and
reflections he does not change his conduct, and that from the beginning to the end of his
life he must bear the same character that he himself condemns.” 85 Prior to the knowledge
we acquire through experience, “we are all innocent,” for “neither we nor others know
the evil of our own nature.” Unfortunately, we often come to the alarming realization that
we are “quite different from what a priori we considered ourselves to be.”86 It is painful
and humiliating to be reminded of one’s weaknesses. Therefore, we often conceal our
desires and fears from our intellect, “since the good opinion we have of ourselves would
inevitably suffer thereby.”87 As Schopenhauer aptly remarks, “The prayer, ‘Lead me not
into temptation’ means ‘Let me not see who I am.’” 88
According to Schopenhauer, the greatest humiliation comes from giving oneself
up wholly to the will-to-live. This would not be so if life were good, but knowledge
reveals “life’s worthlessness” and thus the foolishness of clinging to it unconditionally.
Thus, we praise the person in whom knowledge triumphs “over the blind will-to-live
which is nevertheless the kernel of our own inner being,” who “accordingly faces death
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courageously and calmly.” On the other hand, “we despise him in whom knowledge is
defeated in that conflict, who therefore clings unconditionally to life, struggles to the
utmost against approaching death, and receives it with despair.” Indeed, almost every
religion regards “the boundless love of life and the endeavour to maintain it in every way
as long as possible…as base and contemptible.” 89 We call a person “bad” who “not only
affirms the will-to-live as it appears in his own body, but in this affirmation goes so far as
to deny the will that appears in other individuals.” 90 Such a person seeks to alleviate their
own suffering by witnessing or causing the suffering of others, who appear “wholly
foreign to him, separated from [him] by a wide gulf.” At the same time, however, such
intense willing is “a constant source of suffering,” for all willing is based on “need, lack,
and hence pain,” and “the will is much more often crossed than satisfied.” 91 The inner
torment of a particularly “vehement” will can even lead to disinterested pleasure in the
suffering of others: “this is wickedness proper, and rises to the pitch of cruelty,” where
“the suffering of another is no longer a means for attaining the ends of its own will, but
an end in itself.”92
Schopenhauer believes that only the knowledge that we are all phenomena of the
same will can liberate us from our bondage to the will-to-live. This knowledge opens our
eyes to the universality of suffering. The individual who “no longer makes the egoistical
distinction between himself and the person of others, but takes as much interest in the
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sufferings of other individuals as in his own,” will not only exhibit benevolence and
charity, but will “even [be] ready to sacrifice his own individuality whenever several
others can be saved thereby.”93 Whoever “knows the whole” of earthly existence,
“comprehends its inner nature, and finds it involved in constant passing away, a vain
striving, an inward conflict, and a continual suffering.”94 Such knowledge then “becomes
the quieter of all and every willing. The will now turns away from life; it shudders at the
pleasures in which it recognizes the affirmation of life. Man attains to the state of
voluntary renunciation, resignation, true composure, and complete willlessness.”95 The
denial of the will-to-live reaches its highest degree in the ascetic person, who does not
obey the impulse for propagation (chastity), relinquishes all their possessions (poverty),
and provides their body with only minimal nourishment (fasting), even to the point of
deliberate starvation, all in order to break the will-to-live in themselves.96 Moreover, such
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a person will not resist when someone denies their will (i.e., wrongs them) because they
have already denied their own will. “Therefore, every suffering that comes to him from
outside through chance or the wickedness of others is welcome to him; every injury,
every ignominy, every outrage.”97 While asceticism involves the “deliberate breaking of
the will…the voluntarily chosen way of life of penance and self-chastisement, for the
constant mortification of the will,” there is also another, more common way of achieving
denial of the will-to-live. For most people, “the will must be broken by the greatest
personal suffering before its self-denial appears.” Yet even here, complete resignation
often does not occur until “the approach of death.” Only after being “brought to the verge
of despair” does the individual “know himself and the world, change his whole nature,
rise above himself and above all suffering…willingly renounce everything he formerly
desired with the greatest vehemence, and gladly welcome death.” 98
As we will see, however, the fear of death remains a formidable barrier even for
those to whom personal suffering has revealed earthly life as utterly worthless and
degrading. The Sonderkommando prisoners in Auschwitz and Treblinka asked
themselves—just as many of their fellow victims and, later, scholars asked of them—how
they kept living and working in such horrible conditions in the gas chambers and
crematoria. There are various motives that these men gave or could have given for their
actions, or that historians would like to ascribe to them. But ultimately we cannot explain
the force that compels us and them to live at all costs. “We ourselves are the will-to-live,”
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says Schopenhauer; “hence we must live, well or badly.”99 We cling to life not because it
is good, but because we are the will-to-live itself, which wills life and “struggles with all
its might” against death.100 As Schopenhauer notes, we would like to quiet this will,
“deprive desires of their sting, close the entry to all suffering, purify and sanctify
ourselves by complete and final resignation.” But the egoistic illusion that privileges our
individual life above everything else “soon ensnares us again, and its motives set the will
in motion once more; we cannot tear ourselves free. The allurements of hope, the flattery
of the present, the sweetness of pleasures, the well-being that falls to the lot of our person
amid the lamentations of a suffering world governed by chance and error, all these draw
us back to it, and rivet the bonds anew.”101 In the death camps, these allurements came in
the form of surviving the next selection, acquiring an extra ration of food, or cherishing
the hope of getting revenge on the Nazis.
The Nazis exploited this attachment to life to facilitate the extermination process.
They also despised it as stereotypically “Jewish.” By conscripting Jews to assist in the
destruction of their own people, the Nazis mocked what they considered to be the
“Jewish” pursuit of survival at all costs. The fact that few members of the
Sonderkommando resisted or committed suicide seemed to confirm them as worthy of
contempt in the eyes of the Nazis. Chapter One explores the intellectual origins of the
Nazi stereotype of “Jewish” self-preservation by situating it historically within the
broader tradition of German nihilism. In his first treatise in On the Genealogy of
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Morality, Friedrich Nietzsche argues that Jews seek power and revenge by imposing
upon society their own values of security, survival, and self-preservation. Nietzsche
laments the enervating effect of such values on the noble “Aryan” warrior who is
naturally reckless and cruel. Adolf Hitler draws on Nietzsche in Mein Kampf, depicting
“Jewish” egoism as a parasitical disease responsible for the collapse of Germany at the
end of the First World War. Like Nietzsche, Hitler praises the “Aryan” as the epitome of
self-sacrifice, but he also calls for the physical and spiritual extermination of the “Jewish”
servitude to the will-to-live, which has corrupted the German Volk.102 In his speech to SS
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leaders on 4 October 1943 in Posen, Heinrich Himmler acknowledges that some SS men
have succumbed to the disease of “Jewish” self-interest, taking for themselves some of
the confiscated property of the murdered Jews, but he states unequivocally that these men
will be executed to prevent the spread of the contagion.
Chapters Two and Three focus on the testimonies of the Sonderkommando in
Auschwitz and Treblinka. Some writers, such as Zalman Lewental and Zalmen
Gradowski, were killed during or after the uprising of 7 October 1944. They are the
authors of the so-called “scrolls of Auschwitz,” manuscripts which they composed
secretly in Yiddish and buried near the crematoria. Scholars have been able to transcribe
and translate much of the text, but there are also illegible sections where the manuscripts
have been damaged. Other members of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando, such as Filip
Müller and Shlomo Venezia, survived until liberation. A Slovakian Jew, Müller wrote his
memoir in German. It was later published in English as Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three
Years in the Gas Chambers. Venezia was an Italian Jew from Greece. His memoir was
published in English as Inside the Gas Chambers: Eight Months in the Sonderkommando
of Auschwitz. In the case of Treblinka, the only survivors were those who escaped before
or during the camp uprising. Richard Glazar and Samuel Willenberg both participated in
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the revolt of 2 August 1943 and managed to survive until liberation. A Czech Jew, Glazar
wrote his memoir in German as Die Falle mit dem grünen Zaun, which was later
translated into English as Trap with a Green Fence. Willenberg’s memoir Revolt in
Treblinka was first published in his native Polish.
Chapter Two explores the Sonderkommando prisoners’ perception of their
enslavement to the will-to-live. They loathed their work escorting the victims to death,
lying to them about their fate, collecting and sorting their possessions, and handling their
corpses as though they really were the waste products the Nazis considered them to be.
But the writers are also quite honest about the fear of death that kept them chained to
such a miserable life and prevented them from rising up against the Nazis.
Chapter Three examines the issue of suicide, which was rare in the
Sonderkommando and among death camp prisoners in general. Many testimony writers
express the wish that they had the courage to end their lives by joining the victims in the
gas chambers or attacking the SS guards in a desperate act of resistance. They view
suicide as the only true liberation from their enslavement to the body and the will-to-live.
However, such a “dignified” death remained elusive, for every act of self-preservation
merely confirmed one’s enslavement, and the Nazis delighted in finding new ways to
expose the depths of “Jewish” degradation.
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CHAPTER ONE
“WE WILL BURN IT OUT TOGETHER”: THE NAZI MOCKERY OF SELFPRESERVATION AS “JEWISH”
The Nazis’ mockery and exploitation of their Jewish victims’ will-to-live in the
death camps was part of a broader, nihilistic assault on the self-interest they saw as the
core of modern society. As Leo Strauss explains in his 1941 lecture on German nihilism,
the Nazis desired the destruction of modern civilization, which, they believed, aimed to
create an amoral society “in which everyone would be happy and satisfied…a world in
which no great heart could beat and no great soul could breathe, a world without real,
unmetaphoric, sacrifice.” They saw this prospect not as man’s dream fulfilled, but “as the
greatest debasement of humanity, as the coming of the end of humanity, as the arrival of”
of Nietzsche’s last man.103 For the Nazis, the only truly “moral” society was one that “is
constantly confronted with, and basically oriented toward, the Ernstfall, the serious
moment, M-day, war. Only life in such a tense atmosphere, only a life which is based on
constant awareness of the sacrifices to which it owes its existence, and of the necessity,
the duty of sacrifice of life and all worldly goods, is truly human.” 104 Rejecting the idea
that “self-interest, however enlightened” is morally good, the Nazis insisted on the
difference between “the noble and the useful, between duty and self-interest.” This
difference was “most visible” in the case of courage, which is “the ability to bear any
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physical pain, the virtue of the red Indian.” Every other virtue may be rewarded, but the
courage of self-sacrifice “is never rewarded.” For the Nazis, courage was “the only
unambiguously unutilitarian virtue,” and indeed, “the only virtue left” in a corrupt
civilization.105 However, Strauss fails to note that the Nazis tended to describe the
opposing concepts of self-preservation and self-sacrifice in terms of “Jewish” and
“Aryan,” respectively.
Few scholars have addressed the Nazi mockery of the allegedly Jewish primacy of
self-interest and self-preservation. In Modernity and the Holocaust, Bauman astutely
observes that the elevation of the rationality of self-preservation during the Holocaust
acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts. The Jews were first proclaimed
immoral and unscrupulous, selfish and greedy detractors of values, who used their
ostensible cult of humanism as a convenient cover for naked self-interest; they
were then forced into an inhuman condition where the definition promoted by
propaganda could become true. The cameramen of Goebbels’s ministry had many
a field day recording the beggars dying of famine in front of luxurious restaurants
[in the ghettos].106
Unfortunately, Bauman does not elaborate on this point. More recently, David Nirenberg
explores the issue in his book, Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition. He argues that “the
Holocaust was inconceivable and is unexplainable” without the historical encoding of
“the threat of Judaism into some of the basic concepts of Western thought.” 107 According
to Nirenberg, “Judaism” is not only a religion, “but also a category, a set of ideas and
attributes with which non-Jews can make sense of and criticize their world. Nor is ‘antiJudaism’ simply an attitude toward Jews and their religion, but a way of critically
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engaging the world.”108 One of the ways that non-Jews, beginning with the early
Christians, engaged with their world was through dualisms such as human and animal,
love (or self-sacrifice) and self-interest, spirit and matter, freedom and slavery, and life
and death. In their rejection of Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah, the Jews became for the
early Christians “emblematic of the particular, of stubborn adherence to the conditions of
the flesh, enemies of the spirit, and of God.”109 Paul was especially influential in this
regard. Although the apostle was “a moderate dualist,” he did believe “that misplaced
attention to the world of law, letter, and flesh was exceedingly, even lethally,
dangerous.”110 He identified such “excessive attention to the ‘flesh’” with “Judaism” and
“Jewishness,” which became “a key term of epistemological and ontological critique.” 111
Paul’s followers magnified this association, using Judaism “to make the flesh and its
tools appear in their most dangerous, most infectious…and most explicitly stigmatized
guise.”112 Over the course of the first four centuries of Christianity, “hypocrisy, carnality,
literalism, and enmity were strategically distilled into the figure of the Jew.” 113
As Nirenberg makes clear, the development of these concepts did not require
contact with real, living Jews. However, it did affect the existence of those Jews living in
Christendom. As “hyper-carnal” beings, Jews were “channeled” into particular functions
in society, such as money lending and tax collecting, which Christians considered to be
sinful and inappropriate for believers to practice. Christians were not supposed to profit
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from lending money to fellow believers; nor were they to act like the tax collectors
depicted in the Gospels who enriched themselves at the expense of hard-working citizens.
Over the centuries, these occupations “came to be associated with Jews, and even thought
of as ‘Jewish,’ although Jews rarely predominated in them, and then only for short
periods of time.”114 At the same time, allegedly condemned to wander the earth like Cain
(a view put forward by Augustine), Jews had the political status of slaves, the property of
Christian rulers who tolerated their presence in certain economic functions and physical
spaces.115 This toleration had its limits. Some early political thinkers feared the loss of
Christian sovereignty to the “tyrannical materialism” of Jewish financiers and sought to
purify their communities through the exile, forced conversion, and killing of Jews.116
“Jewishness” also became a potent weapon of religious reform. Martin Luther portrayed
his Catholic opponents as even more “Jewish”—that is, more venal, hypocritical, and
legalistic—than the Jews, who clung infuriatingly to their laws and traditions. As for the
Jews themselves, Luther judged them to be “a useless, indeed a polluting, waste
product.”117 In one of his later polemics, he called for the destruction of Jewish homes
and synagogues, the concentration of Jews into one place, the confiscation of their wealth
and religious books, the prohibition of their teaching and money lending, forced manual
labor for young Jews, and, as a last resort, their extermination. Nirenberg notes that
Luther’s words provoked the expulsion of Jews from many parts of Germany. 118
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The association of Jews with materialism continued into the Enlightenment and
beyond. For example, Immanuel Kant distinguished between “Jewish ‘slavery’ based on
fear of the law, self-love, and formal ritual, and a Christian ‘freedom’ based on love of
God and neighbor and an inner yearning for morality.”119 For Kant, the empiricist dogma
of Judaism made the human being subject to the laws of nature, “a slave to necessity,” “a
mere creature, eking out existence within a deterministic universe.” His “critique of pure
reason” was intended to liberate human reason from “this bondage to the material
world.”120 At the same time, the opponents of the Enlightenment “saw in Jews and
Judaism the source and most horrific example of the hyperrationality, self-interest,
atheism, and stubborn materialism with which they believed the Enlightenment
threatened the world.”121 With the rise of industrialization and urbanization in the
nineteenth century, many philosophers “worried that the result would be an egoistic,
materialistic world of self-love and self-interest in which only the desire for property and
the circulation of money linked man to man.”122 They imagined this threat as Jewish. For
example, Karl Marx believed that human beings—both Jews and Christians—had
become alienated from the products of their labor and from their fellow humans through
the Judaization of modern society. This occurred because “the worldly basis of Judaism”
was “practical need, individual utility”; the “worldly cult of the Jew” was “haggling,” and
the worldly Jewish god was money. In fact, Jewish “emancipation” had actually resulted
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in enslavement: through the Jew, “money has risen to world power and the practical
Jewish spirit has become the practical spirit of the Christian peoples.” Thus, for Marx, the
question was not how to achieve the emancipation of the Jews, but how to liberate society
from Judaism.123
While Nirenberg’s treatment of the long Western tradition of condemning
“Jewish” self-interest and materialism is quite thorough, his discussion suffers from two
major lacunae. First of all, he scarcely mentions Friedrich Nietzsche, who, Strauss
argues, “exercised a greater influence on postwar German thought” and “was more
responsible for the emergence of German nihilism” than any other philosopher. 124
Nirenberg also leaves out the leader of the Nazi movement, Adolf Hitler, who was
influenced by Nietzsche. This chapter seeks to correct this omission by contextualizing
the Nazi assault on “Jewish” self-preservation within the broader tradition of German
nihilism. It begins with an analysis of Nietzsche’s first treatise in On the Genealogy of
Morality, followed by a discussion of Hitler’s Mein Kampf and of Himmler’s speech to
SS leaders in Posen on 4 October 1943. Through an examination of these sources, the
intellectual basis of the Nazis’ contempt for their Jewish victims in the death camps will
become clear. In the eyes of the Nazis, the individual who sought to preserve their life at
all costs and cowered in the face of death exhibited the contemptible egoism of the
Jewish “parasite” and did not deserve to live. By contrast, the one who sacrificed their
self-interest and even their life for the sake of the Volk, who endured all physical
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suffering with equanimity, demonstrated the highest virtue, the courage of Nietzsche’s
Aryan warrior.
In the first treatise of On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche tells the myth of
the Jewish “slave revolt,” in which “that priestly people,” the Jews, gained political
power over the aristocratic warrior class. Nietzsche recalls the noble races of the past
such as the “Roman, Arab, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian
Vikings,” and especially the Aryan: “the splendid blond beast who roams about lusting
after booty and victory.”125 He praises the boldness of these races, “their indifference and
contempt toward all security, body, life, comfort; their appalling light heartedness and
depth of desire in all destruction, in all the delights of victory and of cruelty.” 126 By
contrast, the Jewish priests were “unhealthy” people who maintained strict purity laws
regarding hygiene, sexual intercourse, and diet; as those “turned away from action,” who
had no taste for blood or war.127 As the least powerful caste, the Jewish priests developed
an intense hatred for the aristocratic warrior class, whose values included “a powerful
physicality, a blossoming, rich, even overflowing health, together with that which is
required for its preservation: war, adventure, the hunt, dance, athletic contests, and in
general everything which includes strong, free, cheerful-hearted activity.”128 This priestly
hatred grew “into something enormous and uncanny, into something most spiritual and
most poisonous.”129 Due to their political weakness, however, the Jews “were only able
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to obtain satisfaction from their enemies and conquerors through a radical revaluation of
their values, that is, through an act of spiritual revenge.”130 According to Nietzsche, the
Jews achieved this revenge through the invention of Christianity, which declared: “‘the
miserable alone are the good; the poor, powerless, lowly alone are the good; the
suffering, deprived, sick, ugly are also the only pious, the only blessed in God…whereas
you, you noble and powerful ones, you are in all eternity the evil, the cruel, the lustful,
the insatiable, the godless, you will eternally be the wretched, accursed, and damned!’”131
Thus, argues Nietzsche, the Christian “Gospel of Love” grew “out of the trunk of that
tree of revenge and hate, Jewish hate” and reached out “for victory, for booty, for
seduction,” even as its roots “sunk themselves ever more thoroughly and greedily down
into everything that had depth and was evil.” The Jews seduced the world through Jesus
Christ, who promised “blessedness and victory to the poor, the sick, the sinners.” 132
According to Nietzsche, the Jews used Christianity to replace the values of the
aristocratic warrior class with their own values of security, survival, and selfpreservation. Like all powerless and oppressed peoples, the Jews had become “more
prudent than any noble race” and honored prudence “as a primary condition of
existence.”133 Therefore, they displayed the shrewdness of lambs who declare that their
predators, because they prey on them, are evil, while they themselves, because they are
victims, are good. They said to themselves: “‘let us be different from the evil ones,
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namely good! And good is what everyone is who does not do violence, who injures no
one, who doesn’t attack, who doesn’t retaliate, who leaves vengeance to God, who keeps
himself concealed, as we do, who avoids all evil, and in general demands very little of
life, like us, the patient, humble, righteous.”134 In this way, the Jewish “lambs” elevated
their natural weakness, which is a “unique, unavoidable, undetachable reality,” into “a
voluntary achievement, something willed, something chosen, a deed, a merit.” They also
gained the right to hold their predators “accountable” for acting according to their
nature.135 In a fictional dialogue, Nietzsche derisively enumerates the new Christian
ideals:
Weakness is to be lied into a merit…and the powerlessness that does not retaliate
into kindness; fearful baseness into ‘humility’; subjection to those whom one
hates into ‘obedience’ (namely to one whom they say orders this subjection—they
call him God). The inoffensiveness of the weak one, cowardice itself, which he
possesses in abundance, his standing-at-the-door, his unavoidable having-to-wait,
acquires good names here, such as ‘patience,’ it is even called virtue itself; not
being able to avenge oneself is called not wanting to avenge oneself, perhaps even
forgiveness.136
Not only do Christians think that they are “better than the powerful, the lords of the earth,
whose saliva they must lick,” they also think they are “‘better off,’ at least will be better
off one day.”137 For someday “their ‘kingdom’ too shall come,” but to experience it “they
need to live long, beyond death—indeed they need eternal life so that in the ‘kingdom of
God’ they can also recover eternally the losses incurred during that earth-life ‘in faith, in
love, in hope.’”138 Christianity became successful “because it made possible for the
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majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every kind, that sublime self-deception of
interpreting weakness itself as freedom, of interpreting their being-such-and-such as a
merit.”139 With the enshrinement of weakness and suffering in modern society, argues
Nietzsche, the once-noble human being has become sickeningly “more good-natured,
more prudent, more comfortable, more mediocre, more apathetic.” 140
The influence of Nietzsche’s profound contempt for “Jewish” self-preservation
can be seen in Adolf Hitler’s memoir Mein Kampf. In the book, Hitler asserts that “All
human culture, all the results of art, science, and technology that we see before us today,
are almost exclusively the creative product of the Aryan.”141 The Aryan “alone was the
founder of all higher humanity, therefore representing the prototype of all that we
understand by the word ‘man.’”142 For Hitler, the “genius” of the Aryan lies not in his
intellectual gifts, but in the expression of his instinct of self-preservation. “The will to
live,” he writes, “is everywhere equal and different only in the form of its actual
expression.” For example, in the most primitive organisms, “the instinct of selfpreservation does not go beyond concern for their own ego.”143 Such an animal “lives
only for itself, seeks food only for its present hunger, and fights only for its own life.” 144
The formation of a family or community requires the extension of the instinct of selfpreservation to others and the development of a sense of self-sacrifice. While the “lowest
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peoples of the earth” rarely exhibit this quality, the Aryan exemplifies the “selfsacrificing will to give one’s personal labor and if necessary one’s own life for others.” In
the Aryan, “the instinct of self-preservation has reached the noblest form, since he
willingly subordinates his own ego to the life of the community and, if the hour demands,
even sacrifices it.”145 Hitler uses the term “idealism” to refer to “the individual’s capacity
to make sacrifices for the community, for his fellow men.” 146 According to Hitler,
idealism brought forth the concept of “man” and elevated the Aryan race to the highest
level.147 He notes that the Aryan does not use the word work (Arbeit in German) to
describe “an activity for maintaining life in itself, but exclusively a creative effort that
does not conflict with the interests of the community.” Any human activity that “serves
the instinct of self-preservation without consideration for his fellow men,” the Aryan
instead calls “theft, usury, robbery, burglary, etc.” Even more admirable than work is the
sacrifice of “giving one’s own life for the existence of the community,” which is
described “magnificently” by the German word Pflichterfüllung (fulfillment of duty).148
In contrast to the Aryan, Hitler believed that the instinct of self-preservation
appears in its lowest expression in the Jew. In fact, the so-called solidarity of the Jewish
people “is based on the very primitive herd instinct that is seen in many other living
creatures in this world. It is a noteworthy fact that the herd instinct leads to mutual
support only as long as a common danger makes this seem useful or inevitable.” 149 As
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examples Hitler mentions the wolfpack which disperses after the individual wolves have
satisfied their hunger, and the horses which come together for mutual protection “but
scatter again as soon as the danger is past.” 150 Likewise, Hitler says, the Jew’s “sense of
sacrifice is only apparent.” His description of what happens when this solidarity breaks
down is worth quoting at length, as it resembles the scenario the SS later attempted to
create in the death camps:
The Jew is only united when a common danger forces him to be or a common
booty entices him; if these two grounds are lacking, the qualities of the crassest
egoism come into their own, and in the twinkling of an eye the united people turns
into a horde of rats, fighting bloodily among themselves.
If the Jews were alone in this world, they would stifle in filth and offal; they
would try to get ahead of one another in hate-filled struggle and exterminate one
another, in so far as the absolute absence of all sense of self-sacrifice, expressing
itself in their cowardice, did not turn battle into comedy here too. 151
Hitler insists that the fact that the Jews “stand together in struggle, or, better expressed, in
the plundering of their fellow men,” does not indicate that they possess “any ideal sense
of sacrifice.” On the contrary, the Jew is always “led by nothing but the naked egoism of
the individual.”152
Hitler believed that Jewish egoism is particularly apparent in the parasitical nature
of the race. Lacking idealism, which is “the most essential requirement for a cultured
people,” the Jew has always been “a parasite in the body of other peoples.”153 The Jew is
“a sponger who like a noxious bacillus keeps spreading as soon as a favorable medium
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invites him. And the effect of his existence is also like that of spongers: wherever he
appears, the host people dies out after a shorter or longer period.”154 In order to preserve
his parasitic existence, the Jew must “lie perpetually.” Denying his inner nature, he must
convince the host people that he “is really a Frenchman or an Englishman, a German or
an Italian, though of a special religious faith.” This is a great lie, says Hitler, because it is
not possible for the Jew to have a religion, “if for no other reason because he lacks
idealism in any form, and hence belief in a hereafter is absolutely foreign to him. And a
religion in the Aryan sense cannot be imagined which lacks the conviction of survival
after death in some form.” Indeed, the Jewish Talmud “is not a book to prepare a man for
the hereafter, but only for a practical and profitable life in this world.” 155 “The Jewish
religious doctrine consists primarily in prescriptions for keeping the blood of Jewry
pure,” which is a form of self-preservation, “and for regulating the relation of Jews
among themselves, but even more with the rest of the world.” 156 Like Nietzsche, Hitler
believes that the Jew regards religion as “nothing but an instrument for his business
existence.” Unlike the philosopher, however, Hitler sees otherworldly salvation not as a
tool of Jewish revenge on the aristocratic warrior class, but as a defining feature of Aryan
religion which distinguishes it from Judaism. Thus, he presents Christ as an opponent of
the Jews. When Christ drove “this adversary of all humanity” from the Temple, the Jews
took revenge by nailing him to the cross.157

154

Ibid., 305.
Ibid., 305, 306. See note 102 above on Schopenhauer.
156
Ibid., 306.
157
Ibid., 307.
155

40

Hitler attributed the collapse of Germany at the end of the First World War to the
insidious influence of Jewish egoism. The military defeat was only “the first
consequence, catastrophic and visible to all, of an ethical and moral poisoning, of a
diminution in the instinct of [national] self-preservation and its preconditions, which for
many years had begun to undermine the foundations of the people and the Reich.” 158
According to Hitler, this poisoning took many forms: greed, servility, physical weakness,
cowardice, and half-heartedness. He witnessed its consequences in himself and others
during the war. As a soldier in the trenches, he
struggle[d] between the instinct for self-preservation and the admonitions of
duty…Always when Death was on the hunt, a vague something tried to revolt,
strove to represent itself to the weak body as reason, yet it was only cowardice,
which in such disguises tried to ensnare the individual. A grave tugging and
warning set in, and often it was only the last remnant of conscience which decided
the issue.159
However, it supposedly took only until the winter of 1915-16 for him to win this internal
battle. “At last my will was undisputed master,” he writes proudly. “I was now calm and
determined. And this was enduring. Now Fate could bring on the ultimate tests without
my nerves shattering or my reason failing.” While most of the army underwent a similar
transformation from “young volunteers” to “old soldiers,” there were some men “who
could not stand up under the storm” and “were broken.”160
The situation was different on the home front. When Hitler was wounded in
October 1916 and sent back to Germany, he heard for the first time “men bragging about
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their own cowardice!” He admits that the soldiers at the front complained about their lot,
but such “beefing” was “never an incitement to shirk duty or a glorification of the
coward.” The coward was held in contempt just as the “real hero” was admired. At the
hospital, however, “the most unscrupulous agitators” made fun of “the decent soldiers”
and held up “the spineless coward as an example.” 161 In fact, “to be a slacker passed
almost as a sign of higher wisdom, while loyal steadfastness was considered a symptom
of inner weakness and narrow-mindedness.” He noticed that the Jews seemed to have
taken all the safe jobs, far away from the front lines. “The offices were filled with Jews.
Nearly every clerk was a Jew and nearly every Jew was a clerk. I was amazed at this
plethora of warriors of the chosen people and could not help but compare them with their
rare representatives at the front.”162 The Jews were not only unwilling to sacrifice their
lives for the Fatherland, they were actively enriching themselves at the expense of the
nation. In the economic sphere, “the Jewish people had become really ‘indispensable.’
The spider was slowly beginning to suck the blood out of the people’s pores.” Hitler
claims that by 1916-17, “nearly the whole of production was under the control of Jewish
finance.”163
Hitler saw a great danger not only in the spread of “Jewish” self-interest and
cowardice, but also in the government’s failure to root out the “Jewish” doctrine of
Marxism. Hitler detested Marxism as a form of collective egoism, in that it appealed to
and affirmed material satisfaction as the basic aim of human life. He also considered
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Marxism to be a Jewish plot to exploit the resentments of the lower classes to gain
political power. While the Jew “organizes capitalistic methods of human exploitation to
their ultimate consequence, he approaches the very victims of his spirit and his activity
and in a short time becomes the leader of their struggle against himself.” 164 The Jew
pretends to sympathize with the worker’s fate, and even displays “indignation at his lot of
misery and poverty, thus gaining his confidence.” “With infinite shrewdness,” the Jew
“fans the need for social justice, somehow slumbering in every Aryan man, into hatred
against those who have been better favored by fortune.” In this way, the Jew “establishes
the Marxist doctrine.”165 This movement “of manual workers under Jewish leadership”
claims to want “to improve the situation of the worker,” but in fact it plans “the
enslavement and with it the destruction of all non-Jewish peoples.”166 Slavery was
abhorrent to Hitler. “Any man who wants to be a cowardly slave can have no honor,” he
writes in an earlier chapter. “[G]enerations of rabble without honor deserve no freedom”;
the loss of their independence “is only the result of a higher justice.” He reiterates: “The
most unbeautiful thing there can be in human life is and remains the yoke of slavery.”167
Only “a racially pure people which is conscious of its blood” can avoid such
enslavement.168 Unfortunately, the German nation “sin[ned] against the will of eternal
Providence” by losing its racial purity, which is “the sole right which gives life in this
world.”169 Failing to recognize the Jewish “inner enemy,” Germany entered the First
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World War only out of fear due to “the progressing pacifist-Marxist paralysis of our
national body.” As a result, “Providence did not bestow her reward on the victorious
sword, but followed the law of eternal retribution.” 170
In Hitler’s opinion, Marxism was an existential threat that warranted the most
extreme measures. “All the elements of military power should have been ruthlessly used
for the extermination of this pestilence,” he writes. “The parties should have been
dissolved, the Reichstag brought to its senses, with bayonets if necessary, but, best of all,
dissolved at once…For the life and death of a whole nation was at stake!”171 However, he
warns against attempting to eradicate a doctrine like Marxism through the application of
force alone, “without the impetus of a basic spiritual idea as the starting point.” Such an
effort “can never lead to the destruction of an idea and its dissemination, except in the
form of a complete extermination of even the very last exponent of the idea and the
destruction of the last tradition.” While this process of extermination may eventually
succeed, it will drain “all the truly valuable blood” out of the people. 172 The successful
use of naked force against an inimical idea such as Judeo-Bolshevism requires “steady
and constant application,” but this persistence must “always and only arise from a
definite spiritual conviction. Any violence which does not spring from a firm, spiritual
base, will be wavering and uncertain. It lacks the stability which can only rest in a
fanatical outlook.”173 Indeed, “The fight against a spiritual power with methods of
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violence remains defensive…until the sword becomes the support, the herald and
disseminator, of a new spiritual doctrine.”174
Hitler intended the Nazi ideology to be such a spiritual doctrine. As Strauss notes
in his lecture, this doctrine was founded on the principle of military virtue, which the
Nazis believed was the only virtue left in modern civilization. In Hitler’s eyes, the army
represented the last hope for the nation because it “trained men in personal courage in an
age when cowardice threatened to become a raging disease and the spirit of sacrifice, the
willingness to give oneself for the general welfare, was looked on almost as stupidity, and
the only man regarded as intelligent was the one who best knew how to indulge and
advance his own ego.”175 Thus, the new National Socialist state would be founded on the
military virtues of “Loyalty, spirit of sacrifice, discretion.”176 As for “the cowardly
egotist, who in the hour of his people’s distress sets his own life higher than that of the
totality,” Hitler states emphatically that there is only one way to deal with such a
“spineless weakling.” Since the coward “at all times naturally shuns nothing so much as
death,” he “must know that his desertion brings with it the very thing that he wants to
escape. At the front a man can die, as a deserter he must die.”177
Speaking to a group of SS officers in Posen twenty years later, on 4 October
1943, Heinrich Himmler echoes his Führer’s words. He notes that it is a simple matter to
talk about the extermination [Ausrottung] of the Jews, but much more difficult to carry it

174

Ibid., 172.
Ibid., 280.
176
Ibid., 416.
177
Ibid., 524.
175

45

out. Most Germans are reluctant to accept the necessity of annihilation, for “each one has
his decent Jew. They say: all the others are swine, but here is a first-class Jew.” But
“none of them has seen it, has endured it,” as have the SS officers in Himmler’s audience.
They have been on the front lines of the Final Solution. The elite men of the SS “know
what it means when 100 bodies lie together, when 500 are there or when there are 1000.
And…to have seen this through and—with the exception of human weakness—to have
remained decent [anständig], has made us hard and is a page of glory never mentioned
and never to be mentioned.”178 However, some SS men have disobeyed Himmler’s order
concerning the “riches” of the Jews: that “he who takes even one Mark of this is a dead
man.”179 There are only a few offenders, Himmler says, but “they will be dead men—
WITHOUT MERCY [GNADELOS]!” he shouts. “We have the moral right, we had the
duty to our people to do it, to kill this people who would kill us. We however do not have
the right to enrich ourselves with even one fur, with one Mark, with one cigarette, with
one watch, with anything.” This is because, as Hitler emphasized in Mein Kampf, selfinterest is a parasitic, “Jewish” disease that can infect anyone, even the “Aryan,” and it is
fatal. Himmler explains:
…we don’t want, at the end of all this, to get sick and die from the same bacillus
[Bazillus] that we have exterminated. I will never see it happen that even one...bit
of putrefaction [Fäulnisstelle] comes in contact with us, or takes root in us. On the
contrary, where it might try to take root, we will burn it out together. But
altogether we can say: We have carried out this most difficult task for the love of
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our people. And we have suffered no defect [keinen Schaden] within us, in
our soul, or in our character.180
Like Hitler, Himmler condemns acts of self-interest as symptoms of a spiritual,
specifically “Jewish” disease. It was not enough to exterminate millions of real Jews for
being the alleged carriers of this dangerous “bacillus.” The SS had to aggressively
combat this highly contagious disease within their own bodies and minds.
In the foregoing analysis, I have traced the development of the Nazi stereotype of
Jewish self-preservation and the Nazi attempt to eliminate its “spiritual” root. A close
reading of Nietzsche’s first treatise in On the Genealogy of Morality reveals the
“spiritual” aspect of this view within the larger tradition of German nihilism. In his hatred
of Jewish “slave morality,” which elevates servitude to the will-to-live above the courage
of the aristocratic “beast of prey,” Nietzsche anticipates Hitler’s contempt for Jewish selfpreservation and egoism compared to the self-sacrificing “idealism” of the Aryan. In
Mein Kampf, Hitler agrees with Nietzsche that such “Jewish” egoism has produced an
enervating, indeed a poisonous effect on the Aryan warrior, who frequently became a
“slacker” and deserter in the First World War. However, Hitler goes further than
Nietzsche, declaring that the national body of the German people must be physically and
spiritually purged of this “Jewish” disease. On the surface, this effort appeared to be
successful. By the time Himmler addressed his SS officers in Posen on 4 October 1943,
the Nazis had already murdered millions of European Jews. Yet, as Himmler’s speech
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reveals, even the elite SS had not always kept themselves clean of the “bacillus” of
Jewish self-interest.
We will see in the next chapter that this fact had tragic consequences for Jewish
prisoners in the death camps. As if out of revenge for their own enslavement to the
imperative of self-preservation, the Nazis mocked and exploited the will-to-live in their
Jewish victims. They derived a certain pleasure from exposing the supposedly boundless
selfishness of the Jews by placing them in situations where they had to perform the most
humiliating activities in order to survive. Since the Jews allegedly valued their lives
above all, the Nazis believed they could be made to do anything, even to assist in the
extermination of their own people, just to live a little longer. In a vicious cycle of
degradation, the Jewish victims felt themselves becoming the very creatures that their
oppressors despised. The tragedy was that the concern for self-preservation was not a
“Jewish” trait at all, but a human weakness. The Nazis cruelly punished in the Jews what
they hated in themselves.
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CHAPTER TWO
“THE MASTER OF YOUR EGO AND THE OWNER OF YOUR SOUL”: VICTIM
PERCEPTIONS OF ENSLAVEMENT TO THE WILL-TO-LIVE
A common theme in Holocaust testimonies is the victim’s feeling that the death
camp has reduced them to nothing but a body, which never ceases in its physical
demands until death. They perceive themselves as enslaved to their own body, forced to
privilege its needs above all thoughts of resistance and escape. They describe themselves
as beings who consume their food like animals; perform their work robotically; do not
resist when they or their fellow victims are beaten or killed; and no longer exhibit human
emotions. As we saw in the Introduction, Hannah Arendt believed that the primary aim of
the camps was to transform human beings into precisely such “bundles of reactions that
behave in exactly the same way,” into “marionettes without the slightest trace of
spontaneity.”181 Although Arendt was unsure whether the Nazis ever achieved “total
domination” in the camps, most scholars accept her view that such domination could
never occur under “normal” circumstances. In other words, they agree with Arendt that
the kind of enslavement that Holocaust victims describe in their testimonies is the result
of a specific historical system. Yet in order for the Nazis to have achieved any measure of
domination inside the camps, there must have been something that existed outside and
prior to the victim’s entry into the camp system that the Nazis could use as “raw
material” for their experiment. Domination requires successful exploitation of one or
more of a victim’s vulnerabilities. This chapter argues that the primary vulnerability of
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the prisoners was what Schopenhauer calls the “will-to-live,” or the imperative of selfpreservation. The camp system could not have functioned in all its horrific cruelty
without this enslavement to the will-to-live.
Although she does not explicitly identify the will-to-live as an object of Nazi
exploitation, Michal Aharony takes some important steps in this direction in her book,
Hannah Arendt and the Limits of Total Domination. Aharony agrees with Arendt and
sociologist Wolfgang Sofsky that the camps “created an environment aimed at reducing
prisoners to automatons functioning blindly as part of a herd, while simultaneously
isolating them from their families, neighbors, and friends.” Elements of this environment,
such as the daily roll call, which could last for hours in all kinds of weather; the nervewracking selections; the arbitrary and absurd camp rules; the grueling forced labor; and
especially the lack of food and water and the poor sanitary conditions, combined “to
terrorize the prisoners, strip them of their human characters, destabilize their sense of
control, and confront them with the weakness and ineptitude of their physical body to
withstand the conditions” (emphasis added).182 I have called attention to the final part of
this passage because it shows that Aharony recognizes the vulnerability of the human
body as a significant aspect of victim suffering in the camps. Indeed, she writes, the
testimonies reveal that “the prisoners’ confrontation and preoccupation with the physical
body intensified in direct proportion to the denial of their most basic human needs.” 183
Hunger was “one of the most difficult torments to cope with in Auschwitz,” as well as “a
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main source of humiliation for the prisoners,” while thirst could be “even more
agonizing.”184
In identifying hunger as a significant source of humiliation, Aharony makes an
important connection between self-preservation and shame. She notes that, in oral
interviews, survivors are often reluctant to talk about their experience of starvation. She
suspects that it is difficult for them not only because it requires them to “re-live” such an
extreme sensation, but also because of their “feelings of shame and guilt, as prisoners’
attempt to overcome hunger, the will to survive and the struggle to remain alive
sometimes drove them to a certain behavior that involved very difficult dilemmas of
conscience.”185 Here she has in mind an inmate’s stealing bread from a fellow prisoner,
which “was a violation of an unwritten law of block comradeship.” According to inmate
moral codes, “bread theft was the equivalent of murder” and those found guilty were
invariably beaten, sometimes to death. 186 On the other hand, she looks more favorably on
“organizing,” which was “the camp slang for stealing, buying, exchanging, or somehow
getting hold of some article necessary for survival from persons other than prisoners.”187
Although “organizing” was not considered theft because it “meant acquiring something
that was needed without wronging another prisoner,” Aharony does not mention the fact
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that those she calls “persons other than prisoners” were not always the SS or civilian
workers, but often fellow Jews who had been murdered in the gas chambers.
This was particularly the case with the Sonderkommando. Aharony notes that the
members of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando “did not suffer from hunger” like the
majority of inmates because they “had access to the various articles of food that were
found in the victims’ clothing.”188 While these prisoners “acted in different ways with
regard to the belongings of the murdered victims,” most of the survivors “testify without
any reservations that they ate the food belonging to the victims.”189 However, like Primo
Levi, Aharony does not believe that one should pass moral judgment on the
Sonderkommando members for these acts of survival. “In my own view,” she writes,
“confusing between the victims who were forced to do what they must do in order to
survive with the Nazis who had designed the imposition of the situation of the camp is
both morally and analytically problematic.”190 Following Gideon Greif, Aharony asserts
that “many of the Sonderkommando inmates retained their sanity and continued to act as
moral human beings,” particularly in their maintenance of religious life in the
crematoria.191 While some of the prisoners’ “actions would be considered ethically
questionable” according to ordinary moral standards, “the fact that the inmates struggled
with their implications suggests that they were able to retain their sense of morality.” 192
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In examining the Sonderkommando testimonies, Aharony makes the astute
observation that “the most human common denominator was the will to survive, the
instinct of preserving one’s life.”193 However, in keeping with previous scholarship, she
does not see the prisoners’ will-to-live as a potential vulnerability, but as a source of
resistance. She asserts that “any conscious choice by prisoners to live must be considered
an act of resistance.”194 She argues that each of the prisoners’ acts of survival “was a
manifestation of one’s dignity, that is, an exercise of one’s will.” Although some of these
actions involved “highly complicated moral dilemmas,” they allowed the prisoners “to
change, albeit minimally or symbolically, the reality in which they lived; they were all
part of an arsenal of individual and collective defenses and thus elements of resistance”
(emphasis in original).195 Thus, in spite of acknowledging the primacy of the will-to-live
in determining victim behavior, Aharony views the prisoners’ attempts at selfpreservation as expressions of “spontaneity” or free will. Equating biological life with
freedom, she asserts that “freedom cannot be extinguished, even in extreme
circumstances, unless a person is physically on the verge of death. To be alive—even in
the concentration camps—was to be free, to have choices, to have the potential capacity
to behave spontaneously.”196 We will return to the issue of free will in Chapter Three, but
for now it is sufficient to note that Aharony’s argument reflects the scholarly consensus
that self-preservation represents agency rather than servitude. However, a close reading
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of the Sonderkommando testimonies indicates that many victims perceived the
imperative to preserve their lives not as liberating, but as enslaving.
Before turning to the testimonies, it will be helpful to revisit Schopenhauer’s view
of self-preservation, which finds an echo in many of the victim accounts. In The World as
Will and Representation, Schopenhauer argues that all life is governed by a single will,
which blindly and incessantly craves life and existence. This will objectifies itself in the
world as various phenomena, such as plants, animals, and human beings. The
phenomenal world is thus “the mirror, the objectivity, of the will.” Since “what the will
wills is always life,” Schopenhauer uses the term “will-to-live” instead of simply
“will.”197 In its constant striving, the will-to-live is at variance with itself, for each of its
phenomena “keeps up a permanent struggle” against the others, and its higher grades of
objectification strive to subjugate the lower ones. 198 Thus, humans must consume plants
and animals to stay alive, and “every animal can maintain its own existence only by the
incessant elimination of another’s.” In this way, the will “generally feasts on itself, and is
in different forms its own nourishment, till finally the human race, because it subdues all
the others, regards nature as manufactured for its own use.”199 The will must feed on
itself because “nothing exists besides it, and it is a hungry will. Hence arise pursuit,
hunting, anxiety, and suffering.”200
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This struggle also occurs within the human body itself, which, as the highest
objectification of the will-to-live, strives against the “lower” physical and chemical forces
that have a prior claim to it. The body experiences a “comfortable feeling of health” when
it is victorious over these forces. However, “this comfortable feeling is often interrupted,
and in fact is always accompanied by a greater or lesser amount of discomfort, resulting
from the resistance of those forces; through such discomfort the vegetative part of our life
is constantly associated with a slight pain.” This explains “the burden of physical life, the
necessity of sleep, and ultimately of death.” Death occurs when “those subdued forces of
nature win back from the organism, wearied even by constant victory, the matter
snatched from them, and attain to the unimpeded expression of their being.” 201 Thus,
human existence is nothing but “a constantly prevented dying, an ever-deferred
death…Every breath we draw wards off the death that constantly impinges on us. In this
way, we struggle with it every second, and again at longer intervals through every meal
we eat, every sleep we take, every time we warm ourselves, and so on.”202 While
Schopenhauer is clearly speaking of everyday life in this passage, he would likely agree
that we usually do not become acutely aware of the fragility of our existence until the
approach of our own death reveals it to us. To paraphrase Aharony, the death camp
confronted the prisoners with the vulnerability of the human body, which the security and
comfort of ordinary life conceals from us. Faced with their own nakedness in the face of
death, which in the camp threatened from every direction, the inmates seized every scrap
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of food and every article of clothing as a defense against that death, even if they could
only obtain those items at the expense of others.
Although the maintenance of one’s existence is a “wearisome,” losing battle, what
enables us to endure it is the overwhelming fear of death. 203 Since we are the objectified
will-to-live itself, death appears to us not merely as the extinction of an individual
phenomenon, but as the annihilation of the entire world. This explains our “boundless
attachment” to “an existence which is full of want, misery, trouble, pain, anxiety, and
then again full of boredom.”204 To the human being, who is the embodiment of the willto-live, life appears “as the highest good, however embittered, short, and uncertain it may
be,” while death seems the “greatest of evils, the worst thing that can threaten
anywhere.”205 Hence the individual’s “awful alarm and wild rebellion” when death
approaches “with distinct consciousness”; “the entire inner nature of a living being thus
threatened is at once transformed into the most desperate struggle against, and resistance
to, death.”206 Indeed, the individual is willing “to sacrifice everything else; he is ready to
annihilate the world, in order to maintain his own self, that drop in the ocean, a little
longer.”207 As Schopenhauer notes, “We see not only how everyone tries to snatch from
another what he himself wants, but how one often even destroys another’s whole
happiness in life, in order to increase by an insignificant amount his own well-being.”208
Thus, the affirmation of the will-to-live in one individual “very easily goes beyond this
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affirmation to the denial of the same will appearing in another” and “either destroys or
injures this other body itself, or compels the powers of that other body to serve his
will.”209 Viewed in the context of the Holocaust, the Nazis affirmed their own will-to-live
through the denial of the same will in the prisoners, some of whom then denied the willto-live in their fellow victims.
Due to the fear of death, human beings can become enslaved to the imperative of
self-preservation, or, as Schopenhauer calls it, the body’s “the iron command to nourish
it.”210 Schopenhauer emphasizes the humiliation that one feels for clinging to such a
worthless, miserable existence as though it were “the highest good.” For the
Sonderkommando prisoners in Auschwitz and Treblinka, this humiliation was
particularly acute. In order to preserve their lives, they had to assist in the extermination
process of their own people. They participated in the deception of the gas chamber
victims and helped them to undress for the “showers.” Afterwards, they removed the
corpses from the gas chambers, cut the women’s hair and extracted any gold teeth, and
burned the bodies in ovens or outdoor cremation pits. In order to stay alive, they had to
treat the bodies of their fellow Jews like so much waste matter to be incinerated. Their
own existence depended directly on the continuous arrival of transports of victims to be
murdered. They could ward off death from starvation, disease, or exposure only by
appropriating the food, clothing, and valuables of the dead. Schopenhauer notes—and the
Sonderkommando testimonies confirm—the extreme difficulty of denying the will-to-live
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in ourselves. Whenever we try to break free, various “allurements,” such as temporary
relief from pain, or our hopes for the future, enslave us to it again. 211 In the death camps,
the Nazis mocked and exploited the will-to-live of the Sonderkommando prisoners,
forcing them to perform increasingly degrading tasks to stay alive.
The Nazis particularly exploited the body’s need for nourishment. Most
conscripts arrived in the Sonderkommando in Auschwitz or Treblinka already
malnourished from the long train journey and their time in the ghettos or other camps. It
was therefore nearly impossible for such hungry men to resist the enticement of better
rations in their new “assignment.” In one of the manuscripts that he wrote during his time
in the Sonderkommando, Zalmen Gradowski describes the hunger that tormented him
and the other deportees when they arrived in Auschwitz on 8 December 1942. “Our
enemy of the spirit has come to life,” he writes. “Hunger has begun to plague us. And
men grow weak in the face of their greatest internal enemy, who will leave you no peace,
will not let you think, until you pay him his due.” When the new prisoners received some
food, they experienced “momentary relief. They have partly assuaged their bodily
needs.”212 However, hunger continued to dominate the lives of the prisoners. After their
first day of forced labor in Auschwitz:
Hunger takes the broken-spirited, exhausted men in its grip. Hunger, the
tormenter, the pitiless enemy, who is immune to sorrow. [— —] always demands
his due [— —] The ruthless stomach [— —] takes no account of grief and
sorrow.
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[— —] if you want to go on living, whether in pleasure or in pain, then [you
must] pay the tribute to your ruler. [— —] to able to think, whether of life, joy
and happiness, or [— —] gruesome thoughts of death and destruction [— —] be
obedient and not torture your stomach too much. [Your master] can wait, but not
for long. He can [— —] the moment of reckoning. But remember, if you [— —]
and if you treat him lightly, he will break you. He will sink his claws into you and
you will have to ﬁnd a way to be either with him or against him. You will become
his slave. Your brain will think of nothing else, only of him and how to satisfy
him. You will have to put your whole intellectual apparatus at his command.
Nothing else will exist for you. He will be the master of your ego and the owner
of your soul. You will have to do everything, ﬁnd a way to make peace with him,
or else bid farewell to the world, end everything and break with everything. And
disappear into eternity.213
In this passage Gradowski personifies the stomach as a slave master, a merciless tyrant
who demands tribute (food). The prisoner can ignore his “master” only at his own peril. It
is an illusion that one can hold out against the demands of the stomach. In fact, not taking
hunger seriously will only result in one’s further enslavement to it. Gradowski perceived
hunger as an obsession to which all thoughts become subordinated. The starving man
thinks only of food.
Slovakian survivor Filip Müller begins his memoir with a description of the
hunger he experienced in Auschwitz prior to being transferred to the Sonderkommando.
One Sunday, in May 1942, the prisoners were forced to watch some of their fellow
inmates participate in exhausting physical exercises called Sport, but the arrival of the
midday meal quickly made them forget the “harassment, torture and violent death” of the
victims. “All our senses were concentrated on the muck in the cauldrons, a mess of
mangel-wurzel and overcooked rotting potatoes,” writes Müller. “…Soup was our elixir
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of life: and any prisoner considered himself very lucky if now and then he managed to
wangle a second helping.”214 When, “[t]rembling with hunger,” Müller finally received
his helping of soup, he “did not bother about a spoon, but drank my soup slowly and
noisily, savouring each mouthful. I could feel my vital energy being restored. My greedy
tongue searched the bowl for every last drop.”215 But he was still thirsty. “Crazed with
thirst,” Filip and his block mate Maurice decided to drink the tea that had been left in the
yard for later in the day. Müller says that he “drank, greedily, slowly, rapturously, the
tepid refreshing tea. I came up for air briefly, then I propped my hands on the rim and
drank and drank.”216 Unfortunately, the Kapo caught them and tried to drown them in the
vats of tea. As punishment for this “theft,” which they likely saw as a blatant example of
“Jewish” servitude to self-preservation, the SS transferred Filip and Maurice to the
Sonderkommando.
In the oven room of the crematorium, Filip, Maurice, and several other new
Sonderkommando conscripts encountered a scene of unimaginable carnage: countless
human corpses lay strewn all over the floor. The people had evidently died recently, but
Müller could not figure out how so many had been killed at once. The SS ordered the
prisoners to strip the clothes off the corpses. 217 Still in shock, they did not think of
refusing. “I was like one hypnotized and obeyed each order implicitly,” Müller writes.
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“Fear of more blows, the ghastly sight of piled-up corpses, the biting smoke, the
humming of fans and the flickering of flames, the whole infernal chaos had paralysed my
sense of orientation as well as my ability to think.” 218 Müller admits that he could not
keep up with the frenetic pace. Due to his stay in Auschwitz he “was weakened by
starvation, my feet were swollen and the soles raw from wearing rough wooden clogs.”
He snatched a moment of rest when the SS supervisor, Stark, went into another room. It
was then that Müller made a fateful discovery:
Out of the corner of my eye I noticed a half-open suit-case containing food.
Pretending to be busy undressing a corpse with one hand, I ransacked the suitcase with the other. Keeping one eye on the door in case Stark returned suddenly I
hastily grabbed a few triangles of cheese and a poppyseed cake. With my filthy,
blood-stained fingers I broke off pieces of cake and devoured them ravenously. I
had only just time to pocket a piece of bread when Stark returned. 219
Driven by hunger, Müller did not immediately make the connection between the suitcases
and the corpses; he did not realize that the food belonged to human beings who had been
alive only a short time ago. The realization came suddenly and shockingly. Seizing
another chance when Stark was not looking, Müller found a suitcase with “a round box of
cheese and several boxes of matches with Slovakian labels.” However, “as I looked a
little more closely at the faces of the dead, I recoiled with horror when I discovered
among them a girl who had been at school with me. Her name was Yolana Weis.” He
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also recognized another woman who had been his family’s neighbor in their hometown of
Sered’.220 But the discovery of his murdered neighbors was not enough to overcome
Müller’s will-to-live. When Stark ordered the prisoners to shove the naked corpses,
including Yolana’s, into the blazing ovens, Müller obeyed. “At that moment,” he recalls,
“I had only one chance to stay alive, even if only for a few hours or days. I had to
convince Stark that I could do anything he expected from a crematorium worker. And
thus I carried out all his orders like a robot.”221
Greek survivor Shlomo Venezia also recalls that hunger played a significant role
in his adaptation to the work of the Sonderkommando. Upon his arrival in Auschwitz on
11 April 1944, Venezia, his brother, and his cousins were confined for three weeks in the
quarantine area of the men’s camp. He had known hunger as a boy in Salonika, but by the
time his transport reached Auschwitz, he had endured eleven days on the train with very
little food and water. Therefore, he devoured the camp rations (tea, soup, and black bread
with margarine or Blutwurst), regardless of the taste. 222 Once, in order to receive a double
ration of soup, Venezia volunteered to do some “extra” work for the Kapo. To his horror,
this work turned out to involve transporting decomposing corpses from the quarantine
sector to the crematorium to be burned. “If I’d known that our ‘extra’ work was going to
consist of bringing those bodies out and taking them to the Crematorium,” says Venezia,
“I’d rather have died of hunger. But by the time I realized, it was already too late.” 223
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However, Venezia made the same mistake soon afterwards. When some SS
officers came to the quarantine barracks in search of “workers,” Venezia claimed to be a
hairdresser. “I thought that I’d join the prisoners working in the Zentralsauna,” he recalls.
“I saw that the work wasn’t too difficult and one was warm there.” 224 Entering the men’s
camp the next day, Venezia “saw a prisoner, by himself, who seemed to be waiting for
us.” This man, who Venezia later discovered was Sonderkommando member Abraham
Dragon, asked the young Greek where he was from and if he was hungry. “Of course I
was hungry!” says Venezia. “I’d always been familiar with hunger, but this was now an
obsession, an illness. So he went to get me some food and came back with a big hunk of
white bread and some jam. There was enough bread for me to share it with my brother
and my cousins. For us, it was like eating caviar; an unimaginable luxury in this hell.” 225
Dragon then asked Venezia if he knew what kind of work he would be doing. “I replied
that I didn’t much care. As far as I was concerned, the main thing was being able to eat
and so survive. He told me that wouldn’t be a problem—there’d be enough to eat.” When
Venezia wondered how there could be “enough” to eat in Auschwitz, Dragon “explained
that, in addition to the food we received in the normal course of affairs, there would be
other things. But he didn’t tell me what, or how.”226 In the course of their conversation,
Dragon revealed why this work detail was “special” (sonder): “Because you have to work
in the Crematorium…where the people are burned.” Venezia was not dismayed. “As far
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as I was concerned,” he recalls, “one job was the same as any other; I’d already got used
to camp life. But at no time did he tell me that the corpses to be burned were those of
people who were still alive when they entered the Crematorium…” 227
The SS initiated Venezia and the other Sonderkommando conscripts gradually
into the work. On the first day, they did not enter the crematorium building until the
afternoon. While they caught a horrifying glimpse of a pile of bodies waiting to be
cremated, they initially did not have direct contact with the dead. They simply collected
the clothing the victims had left behind in the undressing room.228 In the evening,
however, they were forced to witness the gassing of a transport of Polish Jews in Bunker
2, also called “the white house.” Then the SS ordered the prisoners to carry the bodies to
large outdoor pits for cremation. “It’s difficult to imagine now,” recalls Venezia, “but we
didn’t think of anything—we couldn’t exchange a single word. Not because it was
forbidden, but because we were terror-struck. We had turned into robots, obeying orders
while trying not to think, so we could survive for a few hours longer.” 229 The cremation
work continued non-stop for twenty-four hours. Though exhausted, Venezia could not
sleep that night. The next day, the Kapo gave Venezia a pair of tailor’s scissors and
instructed him to cut the hair of the women’s corpses before they were cremated. His
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friend Leon Cohen, who had claimed to be a dentist, had to extract any gold teeth found
in the victims’ mouths.230
Venezia seems to have had more difficulty than Müller in adapting to life in the
Sonderkommando. At first, the horror of what he witnessed in the crematorium
dampened Venezia’s appetite. “During the first days,” he recalls, “in spite of the hunger
that was tormenting my belly, I found it hard to touch the hunk of bread we were given.
The stench stuck to my hands; I felt sullied by those deaths.” Over time, however, he and
his comrades got used to the work. “It became a kind of routine that we couldn’t think
about.”231 “Your only choice was to get used to it,” Venezia repeats later in the memoir.
“Very quickly, too. On the first days, I wasn’t even able to swallow my bread when I
thought of all those corpses my hands had touched. But what could you do? A person had
to eat…After a week or two, you got used to it.”232 On the other hand, Müller remembers
that, even on the first day, the sight and smell of food was enough to make the prisoners
forget about the horrible work they were doing. Although their hands were “filthy with
blood and excrement,” Müller and his fellow conscripts devoured their bread rations. “I
broke off small pieces, holding them in my mouth until they were soaked with saliva.
Then I chewed them slowly and deliberately as though savouring a great delicacy.”233
Hunger was also a driving force for the Sonderkommando prisoners in the
Treblinka death camp. In his memoir, Trap with a Green Fence, Richard Glazar recounts
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what happened when his transport arrived in Treblinka from Theresienstadt on 10
October 1942. Glazar and about twenty other Czech Jews were taken out from the group
of naked men and ordered to get dressed again. They were sent to work in a barracks,
sorting clothing. In his confusion, Glazar approached the foreman and asked in German,
“what’s going on here? Where are all the others, the naked people?” The foreman replied:
“‘Deead, all deead—maybe not yet, but real soon, in a couple of minutes. This is a death
camp. Jews are killed here, and we’ve been selected to help them get their work
done.’”234 In the bustle of the work, amid the yelling and cracks of the whip, Glazar did
not immediately comprehend the horrible meaning of the foreman’s words.235 But then he
recalled a scene when the train passed by an open field as it entered the forest. In the field
was a farm boy tending cattle, and one of the passengers had called out to him in a vain
attempt to learn what would happen to them. In response, the boy had “grabbed his neck
with both hands, aped strangulation, rolled his wide-open eyes back, and stuck out his
tongue—the way boys play their games.”236 Now Glazar realized that the boy was not
just playing a game, but conveying an awful truth to them: Treblinka was a trap.
However, as with Müller in Auschwitz, the horrifying realization that most of his
fellow deportees had been murdered could not overcome Glazar’s immediate concern for
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his own physical needs. He asked the foreman where the prisoners would sleep and what
they would eat. “‘The way things are now,’” said the foreman, “‘you could drown in the
food. After two, three days, if you’re still alive and finally come to, then you’ll know that
Treblinka has everything—everything but life.’”237 In the evening the prisoners were
given some bread and a bowl of ersatz coffee. Like Venezia, Glazar had difficulty eating
at first. In an interview with Gitta Sereny, he remembers, “That night I wasn’t hungry. I
mean, there was food—there was always food after the arrival of ‘rich’ [Western]
transports—but I couldn’t eat. I was terribly terribly thirsty, a thirst that continued all
evening, all night…”238 In his memoir, Glazar also mentions that, overcome with
“terrible thirst,” he “greedily” drank the coffee. “I can’t tear myself away from the bowl,”
he recalls bitterly. He wondered if thirst was the reason why “my head is so empty,
leached so dry.”239 No, he thought to himself, it was because the Nazis now had control
over him, like a puppet, because they knew that he wanted to live at all costs. He felt as if
his head had “been pierced by a beam, a rod, and if they pick up the rod by both ends,
they can lift me up until my feet are dangling in the air; they can shove me to the ground,
twist me back and forth.”240
Samuel Willenberg describes a similar experience in his memoir Revolt in
Treblinka. He arrived in Treblinka with a transport of 6,500 Polish Jews from the recently
liquidated Opatów ghetto on 20 October 1942, ten days after Glazar. Like Glazar, he was
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one of the few selected for work, ordered to sort the property left behind by thousands of
murdered Jews. “There I stood,” he recalls, “the only one in clothes, the only man not to
have been beaten. I had left only my shoes in the yard.”241 His childhood friend Alfred
Boehm, who had arrived in Treblinka before him, entered the barracks and explained the
situation to him: “‘You see, Samek, you were privileged in being taken out of the
transport. Everyone else marched to the gas chambers on a path the Germans call the
Himmelstrasse—the “Road to Heaven”. We call it Death Avenue. That’s how it is,
Samek. Now we’ve got to try to hold on.’” Immediately Boehm introduced Willenberg to
what “holding on” meant: appropriating the property of the dead for one’s own survival.
“From under the blankets he pulled out a pair of large boots, which I laced over my bare
feet, and we walked out.”242 Like Glazar, Willenberg mentions his first meal at Treblinka
as a significant experience. “Lunch,” he recalls, was “a thick soup, well-cooked and
delicious. Astoundingly, Treblinka’s food was better than that available to us in the
ghetto.”243 At the time, he was unaware that he was eating the food brought by the gas
chamber victims. Yet this knowledge taints the memory: “I raised a spoonful of egg
barley which had undoubtedly been prepared by a worried Jewish housewife, perhaps
with her few last coins. Rich in oil and eggs, it had a high caloric value. Someone was
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supposed to have used this nourishment to hold out a little longer somewhere in the East,
where it was thought he was going.”244
It did not take long for the Sonderkommando’s appropriation of the victims’
belongings to go beyond mere subsistence. Once they had given in to the will-to-live out
of sheer hunger, they began to seek more ways to meet its demands. As Schopenhauer
explains, the will-to-live “is a hungry will,” characterized by an endless striving. 245
Müller reports that, after a few days of working in the crematoria, the prisoners no longer
“ravenously attack[ed]” their camp rations, but instead feasted on the items they had
“organized” from the belongings of the gas chamber victims. “One after the other we laid
bread, sugar, saccharine, tobacco and other goodies in front of our foreman,” Fischl, who
distributed them evenly to the prisoners.246 “Almost every prisoner in the
Sonderkommando spent a great deal of energy on organizing,” recalls Müller, “partly
because it helped alleviate the harsh living conditions, but also because it drew our minds
off the horrors around us.”247 Venezia writes similarly that “organizing” helped the
prisoners to “salvage various things and not suffer too much from hunger. We also took
advantage of the situation to change our clothes when they got too ragged. We just had to
throw the old ones onto the pile of clothes to be sent to the Kanada and then to help
ourselves, discreetly, from the heap left by the victims.”248 While prisoners like Müller
and Venezia were aware of the moral implications of appropriation, they learned in
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Auschwitz that the living took precedence over the dead. “Every day,” says Müller,
prisoners from the main camp visited “their business partners in the Sonderkommando
with cigarettes and alcohol in exchange for diamonds, dollars, watches, gold teeth and
other valuables organized after gassings. There developed an illegal trade of undreamedof dimensions where anyone who still had hopes of staying alive bartered anything that
would sustain life.” Müller acknowledges that these items “had been the property of those
who, in their innocent credulity, had undressed for the last time in the crematorium’s
changing rooms,” but their belongings were now needed by “others who were determined
to survive.”249
Prisoners in Treblinka also helped themselves to the food and clothing of the
murdered Jews. With the continuous flow of “rich” transports coming in from the West,
the Sonderkommando discarded the camp rations in favor of food packages from the
trains.250 “When I start to get hungry,” writes Glazar, “I wait for the right moment, and
then, with a bundle on my back, I run behind a pile of foodstuffs and jam my mouth full.
Never in these past two years of war has my mouth been so full of butter, chocolate,
sugar. From another pile I take a shirt, every day a clean one, every day a shirt from
another dead man.”251 It was forbidden for prisoners to take things from the sorting piles.
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A prisoner caught in the act faced severe punishment, possibly execution. “But it doesn’t
always have to be like this,” says Glazar. “It depends on which one of the SS catches you,
what mood he’s in, or whether by chance he’s not alone.”252 One night, Glazar noticed
that his silk pajamas were “covered with spots of blood from all the fleas. Maybe I’ll find
another pair tomorrow,” he muses. “Maybe my next pair of pajamas hasn’t arrived in
Treblinka yet; maybe it’s still in transit. Maybe I won’t need any pajamas tomorrow.
No—if I do everything correctly and well, I don’t have to be afraid that some SS officer
is simply going to have me for lunch.”253 “One never had to wash his clothes in
Treblinka,” recalls Willenberg; “you just picked up some more from the limitless supply
in the yard.”254 “Prisoners’ attire in general was very eclectic,” he writes; “each man
picked what he needed out of the clothing he had sorted, and each was dressed
differently. To fend off the cold, most wore high-cut shoes and various and sundry
caps.”255 For example, one day in late autumn 1942, Willenberg “felt the cold wind cut
me to the bone.” In one of the piles of clothing he found “a genuine Russian hat of
karakul—Persian lamb’s wool—which had come in some transport from the east.” The
Cossack-style hat earned Willenberg the nickname “Katzap” (Polish slang for a Russian).
“Even here, we wanted to look right,” he admits. He and his friend Alfred “dressed in
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warm, clean clothes; we were apprehensive about getting sick in a camp where even a
common cold represented mortal peril. Just the same, we tried not to be flashy.” 256
In Auschwitz, though less so in Treblinka, some members of the
Sonderkommando appropriated the religious articles of the dead. These observant Jews
were determined to obey God’s commandments even in the crematoria. For example,
Fischl, the foreman of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando, did not have the necessary
tefillin (phylacteries) to perform the daily prayers. For a while, he mimed the ritual of
putting the leather straps around his hands and forehead. Müller thought it was “sheer
madness to pray in Auschwitz, and absurd to believe in God in this place…But here, on
the border-line between life and death, we obediently followed his example, possibly
because we had nothing else left or because we felt strengthened by his faith.” 257 One
day, while the prisoners were sorting the belongings of the victims, Fischl “organized” a
velvet bag of tefillin from the “large mound” of religious articles.258 Fischl was very
satisfied with his find. “The Lord Adonai had hearkened to him,” says Müller
sarcastically; “now he owned a prayer-book in Hebrew and a set of Tephillim…He
prayed so fervently and humbly that God—if He existed—must surely have heard his
voice; for it rose from a place where men and women, who like himself believed in the
Eternal One and who adored the Almighty Lord, were daily slaughtered like cattle.” 259
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Müller marveled that Fischl had “never once in his innermost soul renounced the faith of
his fathers.” At the time, Müller mused, Fischl must have been the only Jew on earth who
“praise[d] God’s name in a place where that name was desecrated in the vilest possible
manner. To me Fischl seemed a creature from another world, a world solely ruled and
embodied by a God whom I sought in vain to comprehend in Auschwitz.” 260
There was also a group of fifteen “strictly Orthodox Jews” in the Auschwitz
Sonderkommando who avoided contact with the dead. Instead, they worked solely at
cleaning and drying the hair cut from the women’s corpses, which the Germans “used in
the manufacture of industrial felts and threads.” According to Müller, these prisoners
“devoted their entire free time to prayers for the dead and to the study of Jewish religious
writings.” Although they “shunned the habits of the place and were not prepared to pay
the tribute customary here in order to survive,” they still benefited from the property of
the victims. As Müller notes bitterly, “Their books once belonged to fellow Jews who,
like themselves, had believed in the justice of God before they were herded into the gas
chambers.”261 He recalls that this “small group of pious people…were generally treated
with respect,” but “They had no influence in the Sonderkommando for the simple reason
that they had nothing to offer for survival but God. And that was not enough.” 262
In describing their appropriation of the victims’ belongings, the authors of the
Sonderkommando testimonies waver between the desire to acknowledge their
humiliating enslavement to the will-to-live and the need to rationalize their affirmation of
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that will. Müller writes that the fight for survival had corrupted the majority of the
Sonderkommando members.
The way we lived gave only the present any meaning, the past meant nothing and
the future not much either. This appalling, detestable and brutal life had already
dulled the emotions of many prisoners to such a degree that they were growing
more and more indifferent to the crimes which were committed all around them
day after day. The camp made people vicious and selfish. Anybody who did not
know how to use his elbows sank like a stone. The sight of people suffering, sick,
tortured and murdered had become commonplace and scarcely any longer moved
anybody.263
Over time, some of the prisoners came to resemble the SS. For example, there was a
practice known as “Auschwitz fashion,” where “many members of the Sonderkommando
attempted to blind themselves to their desperate situation. In order to make themselves
look more like human beings they imitated their torturers by aping their way of
dressing.”264 Like the SS men, who were greedy for “gold, diamonds and dollars,” the
prisoners went through the victims’ clothing “with the agility of pickpockets.” 265
However, Müller argues that the prisoners “needed to steal in order to survive.”266
Indeed, the “organizing” of valuables was “absolutely vital” for the revolt. “Without
valuables,” he explains, “it would have been impossible to plan an uprising, support the
Resistance, corrupt the SS, get more arms and ammunition, and many other things.”
Moreover, their leaders needed to make “contingency plans” in the event the uprising
failed. They wanted to preserve the memory of the victims and of their own suffering as
witnesses to Nazi atrocities. They also hoped that the SS perpetrators could one day be
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brought to justice. Using writing materials they found in the victims’ luggage, a few men
“prepared a handwritten account of the Sonderkommando which was placed in tins and
buried.”267
Venezia felt a similar need to defend the “organizing” activities of the Auschwitz
Sonderkommando. He notes that “some people were jealous of the fact we sometimes got
extra. Others held us partly responsible for what happened in the Crematorium. But that’s
completely wrong,” he insists; “only the Germans killed. We were forced, whereas
collaborators, in general, are volunteers. It’s important to write that we had no choice.
Those who refused were immediately killed with a bullet through the back of the neck.”
If the threat of execution was not enough, he says, there was the imperative of selfpreservation, which could not be disobeyed: “For us, we had to survive, get enough to
eat…there was no other possibility. Not for anybody.” He admits that the
Sonderkommando prisoners “may have had better conditions of day-to-day survival; we
weren’t as cold, we had more to eat, suffered less violence,” but that could not
compensate for the fact that “we had seen the worst, we were in it all day long, at the
heart of hell.”268 Nevertheless, it is telling that, when asked whether he would have traded
places with another prisoner in the camp if given the chance, Venezia replies,
“Immediately–like a shot! Even though I realized that, in that instance, I might not have
enough to eat. I’d have done it immediately, without hesitating for a second, at the risk of
suffering a slow death. And yet,” he admits, “I know how terrible it is to be hungry and
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the appalling pain it involves, but never mind.” Ultimately, he felt “relieved” when he left
Auschwitz during the death march in January 1945 and “suffered like the other prisoners”
in several concentration camps in Germany. 269
Like Müller, Glazar notes that the line between “masters” and “slaves” often
became blurred in Treblinka. “Everyone,” he writes, “has been besotted by growing piles
of belongings and valuables left behind by hundreds of thousands of people. Everyone
plunders and speculates. The masters of the SS and the guards are most interested in gold,
jewelry, money, fur coats…The slaves grab for food and valuables too, just in case that
one and only chance might arise.”270 As a member of the camp underground, however,
Glazar’s acts of appropriation acquired a deeper meaning than sheer personal enrichment.
He and his comrades were not simply trying to survive but preparing for an escape—an
act of resistance. Unlike the Polish Jews, who were still in their home country, the Czech
Jews were at a disadvantage, being far from home and unable to speak the language. It
was thus more difficult for them to escape Treblinka. “We find ourselves in a completely
unknown land,” writes Glazar, “in an alien world. The ones from Warsaw, or other places
in Poland, still have some slight chance. The rest of us will simply have to endure and
play for time. That means we’ll have to do a damned good job of it, to get to know the SS
and the guards and the leaders within our group. We will also have to become entirely
familiar with the camp, all the while collecting gold and valuables.” 271 As part of this
plan, Glazar’s group put on an impressive outward show for the SS by dressing in the
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finest clothes of the dead: “[b]lack boots made from highly polished fine leather,
jodhpurs, belts around our short jackets, silk scarves around our necks, and the caps on
our heads worn at a rakish angle…Fashionable young men from the realm of death and
decay,” Glazar remarks sarcastically.272 Due to their dress and demeanor, the Czech Jews
became well-known in the camp, but this “elite” status made Glazar uncomfortable, as it
was not always clear whether their actions signified accommodation or resistance.
In spite of their rationalization of their acts of self-preservation, the deterioration
of living conditions in the camp quickly reminded the Sonderkommando prisoners of
their enslavement to the will-to-live. Tragically, their existence depended upon the death
of others. The SS were aware of this fact and used it to their advantage. While transports
arrived regularly, the members of the Sonderkommando had the luxury to contemplate
escape and resistance. Venezia notes perceptively in his memoir that, unlike the majority
of inmates in Auschwitz, the Sonderkommando “could indulge in solidarity” because
they did not have compete with each other for food. 273 Müller writes similarly that, since
the Sonderkommando prisoners had plenty of food from the transports (“we were amply
supplied with Hungarian salami, goose dripping, jam and cigarettes”), they could use the
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valuables they “organized” to buy weapons and ammunition for the upcoming revolt. 274
However, there came a time when the number of transports dwindled. In late summer
1944, the SS began to carry out selections of Sonderkommando prisoners, who were no
longer needed in such large numbers. The fear of liquidation filled the men with “despair
and despondency,” recalls Müller. “What would happen to us now that fewer and fewer
transports were arriving on the ramp? As long as the death factories were still working
flat out we did not have to fear for our lives. But now no one was certain any longer
whether tomorrow might not bring another selection.”275 Another selection did occur on 7
October, but this time the SS asked the Kapos to make the decision: they were to draw up
a list of three hundred prisoners, ostensibly for a “rubble clearance team” in a bombedout town in Upper Silesia. As we will see in the next chapter, the fear of death in this
instance was strong enough to prompt the doomed men to rise up against their
executioners. However, Müller and Venezia, who were not selected, did not participate
directly in the ill-fated revolt of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando. They survived to see
the final transports arrive from Theresienstadt and Slovakia. Müller learned that he was
the sole survivor of his family.276 After the final gassing took place in November 1944,
he and Venezia assisted in the cremation of the remaining corpses and the dismantling of
the extermination facilities, all the while subject to further selections.
During this period, the living conditions of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando
“deteriorated steadily,” recalls Müller. “As, with no more transports arriving, we were
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totally dependent on the meagre fare of the camp kitchen, we were forced to use our
small hoards of diamonds, gold and the odd dollar note to barter for foodstuffs and
cigarettes until we had nothing left to offer.” To obtain food, Müller and a friend
manufactured fake gold teeth out of brass and exchanged them with an unwitting SS
guard for “bread, sausage, and cigarettes.”277 Likewise, Venezia recalls that “We on our
side didn’t have much left, since the convoys had stopped arriving and we couldn’t put
aside enough food.” He and Shaul Chazan, another Greek Jew from Salonika, searched
for valuables that other Sonderkommando members had buried in the ground around the
crematoria. Finding a bag of gold teeth, they periodically exchanged a tooth for a piece of
bread.278 Some of the prisoners, including Venezia’s brother, were hungry enough to eat
an SS guard’s dog that had strayed too close to the electrified barbed-wire fence. One
day, while demolishing the dog’s kennel, Venezia discovered “a magnificent gold
cigarette case” under the brick floor. 279 He exchanged it “for two bread rolls, a piece of
sausage, and—that was all. That tells you how expensive a bit of food was in the
camp…At least that enabled us to survive for a few days longer.” 280
When the number of transports to Treblinka diminished in the winter of 1942-43,
Glazar and his fellow inmates found themselves struggling with cold, hunger, and typhus.
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The prisoners were always disappointed to see the arrival of “miserably poor” trains of
Polish Jews. “Not a single suitcase or real backpack—just bags, bundles, and sacks with
cords sewn on so they can be carried on one’s back,” recalls Glazar. Instead of helping
themselves to food packages, the prisoners had to remove hundreds of frozen corpses and
collect filthy, lice-ridden clothing.281 On a frosty night illumined by the glow of the
cremation pyres, Glazar stood in line at the mess to receive the camp rations he had once
despised. “In my cracked bowl, two unpeeled potatoes and some peelings are floating
around in about a half liter of thickened liquid. The bowl burns my fingers. I walk away
carefully to avoid the crush of bodies. Good God,” he prays, “just don’t let this bowl be
knocked out of my hands now. You are everything I have, you are all I have to lay out on
my bunk, you, my life…”282 The prisoners struggled to fight both the lice and the cold at
the same time. It was an insoluble dilemma. “The more clothes we wear to protect
ourselves against the winter cold,” Glazar explains, “the more lice we hatch. The fewer
clothes we wear, the more we feel the bite of the winter frost.” 283 The famine in the camp
continued into March 1943. “Things went from bad to worse that month of March,”
Glazar says in his interview with Sereny.
There were no transports—in February just a few, remnants from here and there,
then a few hundred gypsies—they were really poor; they brought nothing. In the
storehouses everything had been packed up and shipped…And suddenly,
everything…went, and one day there was nothing left. You can’t imagine what
we felt when there was nothing there. You see, the things were our justification
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for being alive. If there were no things to administer, why would they let us stay
alive? On top of that we were, for the first time, hungry. We were eating the camp
food now, and it was terrible and, of course, totally inadequate [300 grammes of
coarse black bread and one plate of thin soup a day]. In the six weeks of almost no
transports, all of us had lost an incredible amount of weight and energy. And
many had already succumbed to all kinds of illness—especially typhus. It was the
strain of anxiety which increased with every day, the lack of food, and the
constant fear of the Germans who appeared to us to be getting as panic-stricken as
we were.284
It was then, when Glazar and his comrades “had reached the lowest ebb in our
morale,” that a rich transport arrived to “save” them. One evening towards the end of
March, Deputy Commandant Kurt Franz walked into the barracks with “a wide grin on
his face.
‘As of tomorrow,’ he said, ‘transports will be rolling again.’ And do you know
what we did? We shouted, ‘Hurrah, hurrah.’ It seems impossible now. Every time
I think of it I die a small death; but it’s the truth. That is what we did; that is
where we had got to. And sure enough, the next morning they arrived. We had
spent all of the preceding evening in an excited, expectant mood; it meant life—
you see, don’t you?—safety and life. The fact that it was their death, whoever
they were, which meant our life, was no longer relevant; we had been through this
over and over and over. The main question in our minds was, where were they
from? Would they be rich or poor? Would there be food or not? 285
The transport turned out to consist of 24,000 Bulgarians from Salonika. The next
morning, when Glazar ran out to the platform to assist with the unloading, he could not
believe his eyes:
I am suddenly overcome with an enormous, dazzling spectacle. The dream, the
passionate, inescapable dream of an incessantly hungry man here in Treblinka is
unfolding before me on the arrival ramp. But no, no—not one of us could have
imagined it, not in his hungriest fantasies: only about half of the cars had carried
passengers; the other half was packed full of boxes, chests, sacks, huge balls sewn
together from blankets. The Blues are carrying cases full of marmalade down to
the supply depot. Someone bumps into them, and a box breaks open—it had been
284
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helped along—and they fall down, delighted and overjoyed, into the stick dark red
morass. They get up slowly, mouths full. They swallow, and the whips are
cracking over their heads until the dark red goo is enriched with the blood from
their faces.286
At the sight of all this food, Glazar and his hungry comrades could not control
themselves:
Meat—huge pieces of dried, pale-colored meat are lying on the platform, falling
out of the cars along with any number of packs so full that they burst open upon
hitting the ground. The black cinder surface is covered with countless small
yellow cookies that are crushed underfoot as the men go back and forth to the
platform. Like a pale yellow streusel they cover the nearby luggage, the leather
suitcases, the pots of marmalade, the scattered pillows with their intricate
needlepoint. I return for the second time and immediately cram my mouth full of
the thick little golden squares—a wonder, an unimaginable delight at the first
swallow.287
At lunchtime, the prisoners’ soup bowls once again sat in discarded stacks by the mess,
and the uneaten gruel was dumped into the latrine. 288 That night in the barracks, the
prisoners celebrated their deliverance from hunger. It was a raucous scene: “Exuberant
screams. Laughter, satisfied expressions everywhere. People are stuffed, hot, and
glistening with sweat and fat. Over there someone is shoveling out plum butter with one
cookie after another. Nearby, a hand can be seen holding a piece of cornbread piled high
with cheese.”289 Echoing Glazar, Willenberg recalls that “the camp warehouses were
replenished and enriched with mutton, large quantities of oil, preserved meat and fish,
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sardines, wine, top-grade cigarettes and many other rare commodities of extremely high
quality.” The SS men “walked about in glee, faces aglow. They were so uplifted that they
pounded us on the shoulder. The bad times in the camp had finally come to an end, they
said; henceforth we would know no more hunger. Best of all, there were many such
transports still to come.”290
While the arrival of a wealthy transport in Treblinka evoked excitement in the SS
and the Sonderkommando prisoners for different reasons, the similarity of their reactions
revealed the extent to which the Nazis had successfully exploited the will-to-live of the
inmates. Kurt Franz and the other SS men could smile and clap the prisoners on the
shoulder in mock camaraderie because they knew that the prisoners were too hungry not
to partake of the “feast.” Although the SS forbade the prisoners from stealing “Reich
property,” the inadequacy of the camp rations virtually ensured that the prisoners would
have to appropriate the food of the gas chamber victims. By forcing the prisoners to
consume the food surreptitiously, the prohibition merely emphasized the shamefulness of
such “Jewish” acts of self-preservation. The prisoners were painfully aware of their
servitude to the will-to-live. As Gradowski warned his readers, hunger was the prisoner’s
true master in the camp: “He will sink his claws into you…You will become his slave.
Your brain will think of nothing else, only of him and how to satisfy him…He will be the
master of your ego and the owner of your soul.”291 For Glazar, the depths to which he and
the other prisoners had fallen became clear the night they cheered at the news of the
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Balkan transport. The mere recollection was a kind of spiritual death for him, for it
signified the victory of hunger—of the blind, irrational will-to-live, which always wills
life—over moral standards: “[I]t meant life—you see, don’t you?—safety and life. The
fact that it was their death, whoever they were, which meant our life, was no longer
relevant; we had been through this over and over and over.” 292
The next chapter will explore the Sonderkommando prisoners’ attempts to
overcome the will-to-live through resistance and suicide. Many scholars have praised the
Sonderkommando uprisings in Auschwitz and Treblinka as courageous acts of resistance
in an environment of nearly total SS domination. If they discuss the obstacles that the
prisoners faced in planning and carrying out the revolts, they focus primarily on internal
conflicts among the inmates, the difficulty of obtaining weapons, or the constant threat of
selections. Rarely do they mention the strong attachment to life, or, conversely, the fear
of death, that the prisoners had to overcome to execute their plans. With such a low
probability of surviving an uprising, it was tempting for the prisoners to “hold on,” as
they said in Treblinka, and wait until a more favorable moment, such as an attack by the
partisans outside the camp or the arrival of the Russian army. When Glazar called
Treblinka a “trap,” he meant it in a physical and psychological sense. Ultimately, the
threat of liquidation and the desire to break the bonds of their servitude—to die with
“dignity” instead of clinging to one’s own individual life—combined to spur the
prisoners into collective action. But this action came after many instances of individual
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hesitation and accommodation. The SS depended on and mocked the prisoners’ inability
to resist the will-to-live.
It was perhaps even more difficult for a prisoner to commit suicide, to deliberately
destroy the life to which human beings cling so fervently. For most prisoners, suicide
represented an act that required extraordinary courage—or, depending on one’s
perspective, profound despair—to carry out. As the testimonies show, the imperative of
self-preservation, as well as the allurements of material enrichment and the faintest hope
of survival, kept the prisoners bound to a humiliating, animalistic existence. Even the
destruction of their entire families and hometowns and the annihilation of thousands of
their fellow Jews often could not break their will-to-live. While scholars admire the
prisoners’ determination to survive, the prisoners themselves tended to envy the inmate
who dared to put an end to his life rather than continue to exist at the expense of others.
On the other hand, as we will see in the case of Filip Müller, suicide attempts were not
always successful. A prisoner’s fellow victims might push him back onto the path of life,
while the SS brutally punished anyone who tried to decide how he would die.

CHAPTER THREE
“CAPTIVE OF A STRONG DESIRE TO LIVE”: RESISTANCE AND SUICIDE IN
THE SONDERKOMMANDO

Conscious of their enslavement to the body and the will-to-live, some members of
the Sonderkommando in Auschwitz and Treblinka attempted to liberate themselves
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through acts of resistance or suicide. When these efforts failed to succeed or, in many
cases, even materialize, the prisoners felt ashamed of their apparent weakness and
searched for the reasons for their continuing servitude. Indeed, this is one of the most
significant questions of the Holocaust: why did so few victims offer resistance to the
Nazis or take their own lives? The Sonderkommando prisoners asked this not only of
themselves, but also of the masses of their fellow Jews who walked into the gas chambers
every day, for months and years on end.
Scholars have also investigated this question in the decades following the
Holocaust. As discussed in the Introduction, Hannah Arendt attributed the infrequency of
resistance and suicide in the camps to the Nazis’ elimination of human spontaneity.293
Although she later revised her definition of spontaneity, she correctly noted in The
Origins of Totalitarianism that the Nazis “made every attempt” to prevent “spontaneous
acts” among the prisoners, such as taking one’s own life, which challenged the tyranny of
fear that the Nazis hoped to establish in the camps.294 In her study of Arendt’s theory of
total domination, Michal Aharony describes suicide in similar terms as “an expression of
individual will,” of which even the smallest act constituted resistance under totalitarian
conditions.295 Echoing Arendt, Aharony notes that “Committing suicide was strictly
prohibited in the concentration camps. The SS showed extreme irritation when prisoners
attempted to take their own lives and often acted to prevent it.” As an act of selfdetermination, suicide “was a threat to the SS,” who viewed it as “equal to an escape: one
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chose to escape his or her fate, to penetrate the reality in which he or she was entangled
and thus to break the rules of the camp.” She mentions the case of Mala Zimetbaum, the
first woman to escape Auschwitz, who slashed her wrists with a razor and slapped the
face of the SS man escorting her to the gallows. She also recounts the story of the dancer
from Warsaw who shot and killed SS-Oberscharführer Josef Schillinger in the
undressing room at Birkenau.296 Likewise, in a later chapter, she describes the
Sonderkommando uprising as the desperate attempt of prisoners—subject to perhaps the
most intense SS effort of moral degradation and dehumanization—“to take revenge and
determine how they would die.”297 Aharony believes that such acts of suicide “indicate
the ability of the prisoners to resist by changing and reframing the reality in which they
were caught, if only minimally. Suicide in these cases becomes a means by which the
individual prisoner was able to affirm his or her dignity and humanity. Even under the
most extreme conditions, these prisoners retained the freedom to choose the meaning of
their own death.”298
However, like Arendt, Aharony notes that most victims who committed suicide
did so before they arrived in the camp. 299 Those who took their own lives as prisoners did
so “shortly after arrival,” and in the case of the Sonderkommando, “very soon after their
conscription” into the unit.300 Aharony acknowledges that these incidents “may be
perceived as compulsive acts of despair stemming from grief and an inability to adapt to
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the conditions of the camp,” but she believes that they still constitute “an exercise of a
decision or will, though less conscious or controlled.”301 A prisoner’s ability to overcome
the “initial shock” of camp life was crucial. “As time in the camps lengthened,” Aharony
explains, “suicidal tendencies gradually gave way to either a reviving will to live or to the
condition of the Muselmann.” For those who recovered their will to live, “death lost its
terror…and became a familiar feature of everyday life in the camp. Surrounded by
constant death and brutality, the prospect of voluntary death lost much of its
attraction.”302 However, Aharony notes that the majority of prisoners “were not able to
adapt and survive.”303 “Numerous prisoners could not resist; unable to adapt to camp
conditions, they submitted to their fate. Many became Muslemänner [sic] and
perished.”304
While Aharony’s characterization of suicide as an act of free will finds resonance
in victim testimonies, her parallel view—that not committing suicide is also an
expression of will—is more problematic. Aharony argues that, since the goal of the death
camp was “to exterminate the prisoners within a certain length of time while erasing their
humanity,” it was “an act of resistance” and “an expression of individual will” for a
prisoner not to commit suicide. 305 Thus, in contradiction to Arendt, Aharony regards the
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low suicide rate in the camps not as an indication of the prisoners’ lack of will, but as
evidence of the strength of their will to survive.306 However, her argument is inconsistent.
On the one hand, she recognizes the primacy of the will-to-live in driving victim
behavior. While many prisoners wanted to survive for a particular reason, such as bearing
witness, taking revenge, or reuniting with family, Aharony finds that “the most human
common denominator” was sheer self-preservation, “the instinct of preserving one’s
life.”307 On the other hand, she attributes a certain agency to the will-to-live—as though
the prisoners made a deliberate choice to stay alive—that does not find as much support
in the testimonies.
Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi spoke for many victims when he said that staying
alive in the camps was not the result of a conscious choice or an effort of will. In his
book, The Drowned and the Saved, he recalls that he and his fellow prisoners “had lived
for months and years at an animal level: our days had been encumbered from dawn to
dusk by hunger, fatigue, cold, and fear, and any space for reflection, reasoning,
experiencing emotions was wiped out…We had not only forgotten our country and our
culture, but also our family, our past, the future we had imagined for ourselves, because,
like animals, we were confined to the present moment.”308 Levi emphasizes that the
inmates continued to live in such horrific conditions not by choice, as an expression of
free will, but due to an irrational impulse to survive. In Auschwitz, “people lived
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precisely like enslaved animals that sometimes let themselves die but do not kill
themselves.”309 For suicide is “a meditated act, a noninstinctive, unnatural choice.” As
such, it is the act of a human being, not an animal.310 But in the camp, he says, “we are
wholly devoid of free will, as our every action is, in time and place, the only conceivable
one.”311
Camp conditions certainly lent credence to the view that free will is an illusion. In
his Essay on the Freedom of the Will, Schopenhauer explains that an individual appears
to be free to take any of several actions at a given moment because of “the fact that in his
imagination only one picture at a time can be present and that for the moment it excludes
everything else.” When he imagines a particular motive, “he feels immediately its effect
on his will, which is thereby solicited.” It becomes a wish. Then he thinks that he can
easily transform the wish into a volition, “that he can perform the proposed action.
However, this is a delusion. For soon sober realization would set in and remind him of
motives which pull in other directions or are contrary to the original one. And he would
see that the action does not take place.” 312 Schopenhauer gives the example of “a person
who, holding a loaded pistol in his hand, thinks that he can shoot himself with it.”
However, the motive to commit suicide must be “exceedingly strong…to outweigh the
love of life, or, more correctly, the fear of death,” which is the strongest of all motives.
“Only after such a motive has entered in can he really shoot himself, and must do so,”
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because what one wills follows the motive with absolute necessity. 313 Thus, a person “can
wish two opposing actions, but will only one of them. Only the act reveals to his selfconsciousness which of the two he wills.”314 To put it another way, “‘You can do what
you will, but in any given moment of your life you can will only one definite thing and
absolutely nothing other than that one thing.’”315
Schopenhauer notes that every human being reacts differently to the same
motives. No one can know how they will act in a specific situation until they have been in
it, and this experience reveals their character, which is inborn and unchangeable. 316 “[I]n
any difficult choice,” writes Schopenhauer, “our own resolve, like that of another person,
remains a mystery to us until the choice has been actually made.” The process of
deliberation “produces the illusion of the will’s freedom,” but it “yields in reality nothing
but the very frequently distressing conflict of motives, which is dominated by indecision
and has the whole soul and consciousness of man as its battlefield.” In the end, “the
decidedly strongest motive drives the others from the field and determines the will. This
outcome is called resolve, and it takes place with complete necessity as the result of the
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struggle.”317 Unfortunately, “the choice often turns out quite differently” than we
expected, and therefore “we are often disappointed with ourselves, as we are with others,
when we discover that we do not have this or that quality, like justice, selflessness, or
courage, in as high a degree as we most indulgently supposed.”318 As Schopenhauer
writes in The World as Will and Representation, “we are all innocent to begin with”
because “neither we nor others know the evil of our own nature.” We only become
acquainted with our true character through experience, “and then we are often alarmed at
ourselves.”319
For the Sonderkommando prisoners, life in the camp consisted of many such
moments of disillusionment, in which each man searched inwardly for the expected
resistance, but found only the will-to-live, which rendered him mute and passive in the
face of others’ suffering. At times the prisoners experienced this will-to-live as a positive
force, which kept them from losing hope. However, they also saw how it chained them to
their own body, which struggled with all its might against annihilation, even when
suicide or a “heroic” death in an uprising promised to liberate them from their servile
existence. The power of the will-to-live made it extremely difficult for the prisoners to
carry out the acts of resistance which they imagined and planned. Yet the fact remains
that the Sonderkommando prisoners did confront the force that enslaved them. Although
Schopenhauer’s theory of the will-to-live helps us to understand why it is so difficult for
human beings to risk their lives, even in such a repugnant environment as the death camp,
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he has trouble accounting for the fact that revolts and suicides do occur, which proves
that the will-to-live can be resisted. Therefore, before examining the testimonies, let us
turn to a philosopher who has written extensively on power relations: Michel Foucault.
Foucault challenges Arendt’s theory of “total domination,” as well as
Schopenhauer’s view of the will-to-live as natural and irresistible. For Foucault, there is
no such thing as absolute power. “Power is not a substance,” he argues. “Neither is it a
mysterious property whose origin must be delved into. Power is only a certain type of
relation between individuals...The characteristic feature of power is that some men can
more or less entirely determine other men’s conduct—but never exhaustively or
coercively.”320 While power “does not exclude the use of violence,” the latter does not
“constitute the principle or basic nature of power.” A relationship of violence “forces, it
bends, it breaks, it destroys, or it closes off all possibilities. Its opposite pole can only be
passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance it has no other option but to try to
break it down.” Of course, power “can produce as much acceptance as may be wished
for: it can pile up the dead and shelter itself behind whatever threats it can imagine.”
However, the exercise of power is essentially “a set of actions on possible actions; it
incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives,
makes more probable or less; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely, but it is
always a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being
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capable of action.”321 In other words, “Power is exercised only over free subjects...who
are faced with a field of possibilities in which several kinds of conduct, several ways of
reacting and modes of behavior are available.” Thus, there is no power relationship in
slavery when the slave is “in chains, only when he has some possible mobility, even a
chance of escape.”322 Likewise, a person “who is chained up and beaten is subject to
force being exerted over him, not power. But”—and this is crucial—“if he can be induced
to speak, when his ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue, preferring death,
then he has been caused to behave in a certain way.”323
That is the danger facing the subject of power. Indeed, we have seen its tragic
results in the Sonderkommando prisoners, whose will-to-live the Nazis exploited to elicit
their cooperation in the extermination process. However, Foucault emphasizes that the
very precondition of power—the freedom of the subject—can also subvert it. “If an
individual can remain free,” he writes, “however little his freedom may be, power can
subject him to government. There is no power without potential refusal or revolt.” 324 “At
the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance
of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential
antagonism,” he argues,” it would be better to speak of an ‘agonism’—of a relationship
that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle.” 325 Foucault stresses that “there is
no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible flight. Every power
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relationship implies, at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle.”326 Power relations cannot
exist “without points of insubordination that, by definition, are means of escape.
Accordingly, every intensification or extension of power relations intended to wholly
suppress these points of insubordination can only bring the exercise of power up against
its outer limits.”327
For modern biopower, which seeks to dominate every aspect of human life, the
outer limit is death, “the moment that escapes it.”328 Even in a “completely unbalanced”
power relationship, such as that between the SS and the camp inmates, “a power can only
be exercised over another to the extent that the latter still has the possibility of
committing suicide, of jumping out of the window or of killing the other.” 329 In an article
on the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution, Foucault marveled at “[t]he impulse by which a
single individual, a group, a minority, or an entire people says, ‘I will no longer obey,’
and throws the risk of their life in the face of an authority they consider unjust.” Such an
impulse is “irreducible,” he says, “because no authority is capable of making it utterly
impossible,” not even the Nazis who attempted to obliterate the Warsaw Ghetto during
the uprising. The individual who rebels is “inexplicable” to the authority attempting to
dominate them, because “it takes a wrenching-away that interrupts the flow of history,
and its long chains of reasons, for a man to be able, ‘really,’ to prefer the risk of death to
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the certainty of having to obey.”330 Therefore, “the power that one man exerts over
another is always perilous,” because it cannot preclude “the possibility of that moment
when life can no longer be bought, when the authorities can no longer do anything, and
when, facing the gallows and the machine guns, people revolt.” 331 It is a testament to
human courage that the Sonderkommando prisoners recognized and seized this moment
for themselves after a long internal struggle.
As noted above, the longer a prisoner stayed in camp, the more difficult it was for
them to overcome the will-to-live. The initial period in the Sonderkommando was crucial.
For example, Zalman Lewental had survived several weeks in Auschwitz and the Buna
subcamp before being transferred to the Sonderkommando on 25 January 1943. Like
most of the other conscripts, he did not yet know what had happened to his family until
he encountered the gas chambers and the crematoria. “[T]he tragedy began” when the
men returned to the barracks after work. “Everyone began to believe the dream that had
been revealed to him the previous night, that [his] family, his dear ones were no longer
alive, that he would never see them again, never, for he with his own hands had burned
them,” writes Lewental. 332 The men faced a decision. If their families had been murdered,
“why go on living, what reason could there be for life.” In this case he does not believe
that “food and drink” mattered, for even an animal, “a beast bereft of its descendants or
future descendants or those which grew up with it, when they cause it suffering, it
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protests by refusing [to eat] or drink.” In the same way, the prisoners had lost their
appetite.333 Lewental mentions that people are usually able to endure “all troubles” in the
hope of finding a living relative, but in the case of this “unparalleled tragedy, there were
no survivors. Everyone wanted “to tear his eyes out with his own fingernails” when he
imagined “the pain, the sorrow, the torture” that his loved ones had experienced. 334
Lewental wishes that he had died then. “I would have been eternally grateful,” he writes.
“How good it would have been to have died a sweet death, with tears on my lips,” for
“now there is no more life,” “no trace” of his mother and father. 335
In spite of their despair, however, Lewental and the other prisoners did not
commit suicide. “[Lacking] the courage to end our lives --- no one did it then --- why? --the question remains, and it is hard to answer now.” He wonders this especially because
“there were many people who later, after we had recovered, at the first opportunity such
as illness or an [unusual] event which shocked us a little, hurried to put an end to their
lives.” Yet why did the murder of the families not lead them to suicide? According to
psychologists, says Lewental, “a man who has lost all hope, every chance, can no longer
react or respond to even the smallest event, for he is like a dead man. Man is capable,
energetic and possessed of initiative as long as he believes that by doing a bold deed he
will attain his wish. But when his last hope, his last chance are lost, he is no longer --- he
begins to contemplate suicide.”336 However, only “the strongest, the bravest among us”
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ended their lives; they were the ones “who broke as soon as we were brought here.” 337
Later in the manuscript Lewental writes that when the prisoners “began to look around, to
see with whom we had remained, who had lived and was no longer alive,” they found
that “those who had remained were those of the second class, the inferior, the simple
people. The more refined, tender and modest had gone; they had not the strength to hold
on ---”338
In answer to his own question, Lewental believes that the prisoners did not
commit suicide because “our intelligence is subconsciously influenced by the wonderful
will to live, by the impulse to remain alive.” Behind all the reasons one can give for
staying alive, there is simply the blind attachment to life:
you try to convince yourself, as if you do not care about your own life, but want
only the general good, to go through with all of this for this and that cause, for
this and that reason; you find hundreds of excuses, but the truth is that you want
to live at any price. You desire to live, because you are alive, because the whole
world continues to live, and everything that is pleasant, everything to which you
are attached, is first and foremost attached to life itself. Without life --- that is the
real truth. And therefore, in short and clearly, should someone ask you why --- I
will answer him --- this is because --- insist, I myself an [sic] weak, captive of a
strong desire to live…339
Though writing at the time of the event, Lewental anticipated the questions that others
would ask of the Sonderkommando and that they would ask of themselves: “why do you
do [such] unsuitable labor, how do you live, what is the purpose of your life, what is your
will --- what more do you want to achieve in your life --- here hides the weak point,”
which is the will-to-live. He admits that more than one of the Sonderkommando prisoners
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“lost his human image in the passage of time; you become ashamed of yourself; they
have simply forgotten what they do, the nature of their work.” These were “normal,
average --- simple, modest people,” yet they adapted to the extermination process. The
sight of mass murder became routine: “one gets used to everything, and whatever
happens no longer makes an impression; someone screams, people look on indifferently,
as at an everyday matter, how tens of thousands of people are being wiped out.” 340 The
process of accommodation “involved much eating and drinking, things the whole camp
could only dream about --- but never see.”341 There were a few prisoners, such as the
Orthodox Jews under the leadership of the rabbinical judge from Maków Mazowiecki,
“who refused at any price to play the game of live-today-and-die-tomorrow.” Lewental
remarks that these religious men had “very little influence” within the Sonderkommando.
Unlike them, admits Lewental, “I held on at any price.” 342
Like Lewental, Treblinka survivor Richard Glazar knew the importance of one’s
first days in the camp. Glazar liked to watch the new prisoners to see how they adjusted.
One day, a Slovakian Jew named Zelo Bloch was selected from one of the transports and
joined Glazar’s group at the evening meal. Glazar waited for Zelo “to suddenly scream,
turn his hands into claws, explode, attack, tearing their flesh from their bones, roaring
with rage”—in other words, to resist. To Glazar’s relief, Zelo did nothing. “Well,” Glazar
recalls thinking to himself, “he’s a poor shit just like me, like all of us here…Okay, come
on, come along. You’re one of us…If everyone is like this, if we are all like this, then
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maybe we’re not such shits after all…” 343 As long as Zelo did not hang himself during
the night, he would become one of them. While he was dressed in his own clothes now,
“[b]y tomorrow he will be wearing a kurtka—a short Polish jacket, a pair of elegant
jodhpurs, and shiny leather boots” from the piles of the victims’ clothing.344 As we shall
see, however, Glazar had good reason to regard Zelo’s arrival as “the first spark…that
will set Treblinka ablaze.”345
In his memoir, Filip Müller admits that his first day of work in the Auschwitz
Sonderkommando was grueling and shocking, but he was not ready to die. Three of the
other conscripts, however, refused to go on. The SS supervisor, Stark, chased them
around the room, whipping them furiously. Eventually they threw themselves to the floor
and begged Stark to shoot them, which he did later that day. Meanwhile, Müller and his
comrades continued to strip the clothes off the gas chamber victims as ordered. He found
the three prisoners among the corpses. “Although they were still breathing,” he recalls,
“they were lying quite still, all their physical energy and the spiritual will to live drained
out of them. They had given up.”346 Yet Müller himself
had not yet reached that point of despair. Of course, I had no illusions: I knew
with certainty that a dreadful end awaited me. But I was not yet ready to
capitulate. The more menacing death grew, the stronger grew my will to survive.
My every thought, every fibre of my being, was concentrated on only one thing:
to stay alive, one minute, one hour, one day, one week. But not to die. I was still
young, after all. The memory of my parents, my family and my early youth in my
home town had faded. I was obsessed and dominated by the determination that I
must not die.347
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The manner in which the gas chamber victims died and the way their bodies were treated
after death particularly disgusted Müller. “[N]ot to have to lie under a heap of dead
bodies; not to be pushed into the oven, prodded with an iron fork and, ultimately,
changed into smoke and ashes. Anything but that!” he cried. He knew that there was little
chance of coming out of the Sonderkommando alive, but he was determined to live all the
same. And to do that he had to “submit and carry out every single order. It was only by
adopting this attitude that a man was able to carry on his ghastly trade in the crematorium
of Auschwitz.”348
The morning after Müller’s arrival in the Sonderkommando, the SS brought the
prisoners back out to the mass grave into which they had thrown the naked corpses the
previous night. SS men in high rubber boots were working to pump out water from the
pit. Müller remembers that he and his companions “looked at each other with fear in our
eyes.” They were certain that the SS had brought them there to execute them. “There was
every likelihood that we might wind up as the top layer in the pit” as soon as the draining
operations were complete.349 At that moment Müller “was seized by a feeling of
uncontrollable fear,” which resembles the “awful alarm and wild rebellion” that
Schopenhauer describes as occurring in any living being when it faces imminent death. 350
In such a situation, rational thoughts fail to overcome the blind rage of the will-to-live. “I
tried to recall exemplary men and women down the centuries who were put to death,”
Müller writes. “I remembered that we must all die. Death, I told myself, was, after all,
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part of our lives and we would have to face it sooner or later. Needless to say these
considerations were quite futile and failed lamentably either to stifle or to dismiss my
fears.”351 But the SS did not intend to murder the Sonderkommando prisoners that day.
They had a more horrible task in store for them: they ordered the prisoners to climb down
into the “sticky, slimy” mud of the pit and drag the corpses into a heap in the middle.
Under a rain of blows, the prisoners obeyed, but they constantly slipped and got stuck in
the slime, particularly as the water started rising again. It took all their strength to move
the slippery bodies. When two prisoners collapsed from exhaustion, the SS killed them
with a shot to the head.352 After several hours, there was a grotesque pyramid of bodies in
the center of the pit. Then the prisoners sprinkled chlorinated lime over the corpses. “The
wind blew the powder into our faces so that we could scarcely keep our burning eyes
open,” Müller recalls. “But we dared not stop. One moment’s pause would have meant
certain death, so much was clear to everyone listening to the SS men’s hysterical
yelling.” As the prisoners worked at a breakneck pace to shovel clay onto the pile of
bodies, the SS mocked them. “‘It’s quite obvious that none of you Yids has ever done a
proper job of work,’” shouted the deputy camp commandant, Hans Aumeier. “‘But now
there’ll be no more haggling for any of you.’”353
As Müller’s account illustrates, the frenetic pace of the work ensured that the
Sonderkommando prisoners had little time to consider “disobedient” acts like suicide. In
an environment of incessant threats and blows, confronted with death at every turn, most
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of the prisoners chose the simplest path forward, which was to obey orders robotically
and evade death. Indeed, the SS counted on and encouraged such cooperation, while also
mocking the lengths to which the prisoners would go to preserve their lives. For example,
Müller recalls that when SS-Hauptscharführer Otto Moll found several dollar bills on the
person of a young prisoner, he took the boy
to one of the [cremation] pits where the top layer of ashes was still red-hot. At the
edge of the pit Mill drew his pistol and remarked cynically, ‘I ought to shoot you,
you fucking Yid. But I’m not like that, I’ll give you a chance. I’ll let you go if you
run barefoot across the pit twice.’ Hoping desperately to save his life, the boy
took off his shoes and leapt into the pit. In vain he tried to run for his life: as he
collapsed into the red-hot embers Moll gave him the coup de grâce.354
According to Müller, the sadistic Moll would also entertain himself by forcing prisoners
to play “swim-frog,” where the victims had to swim around in one of the pools near the
crematoria “croaking like frogs until they drowned from exhaustion.” Moll and his SS
comrades enjoyed watching the “death struggle” of the victims and threatened to shoot
them any time they came near the edge of the pool. 355 It is important to note that SS men
like Moll could not have carried out such torture if they had not been able to rely on the
strong will-to-live of their victims.
Like Müller, Greek survivor Shlomo Venezia obeyed the orders of the SS without
thinking. On his first day in the Sonderkommando, he was forced to carry the corpses of
gas chamber victims to the large outdoor pits for cremation. When a young prisoner
“completely lost his wits” and suddenly stood still, Moll shot him to death. Moll ordered
Venezia and another prisoner to undress the dead man and carry his naked body into the
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burning ditch. Venezia recoiled from the task, “But of course, I had no choice if I was to
avoid the same fate as this poor man.”356 This mechanical performance of one’s tasks
continued beyond the initiation period, so that the prisoners seemed to resemble Arendt’s
depiction of “ghastly marionettes with human faces…which all react with perfect
reliability even when going to their own death.”357 For instance, Venezia says that,
although the prisoners feared selections, they did not wonder if a trip to the Zentralsauna
for a shower would be their last. “Some people asked me if it wouldn’t be better to get it
over with,” he recalls. “Perhaps–or even certainly. But I didn’t think of it; we had to keep
on going, day by day, without asking ourselves any questions: keep on living, even if it
was terrible.” Venezia did not remember any suicides in the Sonderkommando. On the
contrary, some men “said they wanted to live at any price. Personally, I think I’d rather
have died. But each time, some words of my mother’s used to come to my mind: ‘While
there’s life, there’s hope.’”358
The feeling that there was always hope, always a chance that they might survive,
enabled the Sonderkommando prisoners to carry on in the lethal environment of the death
camp. At the same time, this stubborn hope made them hesitant to act against the camp
regime, and every instance of hesitation made future resistance that much more difficult.
For example, the members of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando debated whether to risk
death in order to tell the gas chamber victims the truth about their fate. It seemed a futile
gesture. “We stood rooted against the wall,” writes Müller, “paralysed by a feeling of
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impotence and the certainty of their and our inexorable fate. Alas, there was no power on
earth which could have saved these poor innocent wretches.” 359 After all, it would not
have made any difference “if any of us had stepped out and, facing the crowd, had
shouted: ‘Do not be deceived, men and women, you are taking your last walk, a terrible
death in the gas chamber awaits you!’”360 The majority of the victims would not have
believed them anyway. “For death is always inconceivable,” even when one is standing
naked in a gas chamber.361 In fact, says Müller, “a warning like this would have led to a
panic, ending in a bloody massacre and our certain death. Did we have the right to take
such a risk and, in taking it, to gamble away our chance to go on living for the time
being?” Weighing the narrow possibility of their own survival against the clear
impossibility of saving the people destined for the gas chambers, the Sonderkommando
prisoners decided that it was more important to preserve themselves as “a handful of
eyewitnesses, one or two of whom might, at the price of suffering and denial of self,
survive to bear witness against the murderers some day.”362 Thus, it was better not to
cause the victims unnecessary suffering and “to regard anybody arriving at the
crematorium as doomed to die.”363
The Sonderkommando prisoners adopted this “cynical attitude” towards the gas
chamber victims based on experience. At one time, they reasoned that they might be able
to stage a revolt with the help of the victims. Echoing Schopenhauer, Müller notes that in
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the face of imminent death “men are determined to do anything and capable of achieving
the impossible, the more so when they reckon that there is a chance of survival.” The
Sonderkommando believed that “in the face of inexorable and brutal death by gassing,
their instinct of self-preservation would make people defend their lives tooth and nail to
their dying breath.”364 Accordingly, when a transport arrived from the Białystok ghetto in
the summer of 1943, one of the members of the Sonderkommando found a woman he
knew and revealed the truth to her. The young woman became hysterical and tried to tell
the others that they were about to be gassed and cremated. At first few people believed
her, thinking she was insane, but gradually her words took effect. The crowd began to
press towards the door of the undressing room. After their initial alarm, the SS regrouped
and calmed the people with lies and a display of weapons and vicious dogs. Müller
reports that this show of force was successful. The people wanted so badly to continue
living that they believed that they were really being sent to work. Out of fear, they were
“willing to do whatever was demanded of them; indeed they would even take that shower
if they must, as long as they were given a pledge that they would stay alive.” 365 Watching
this scene in the undressing room, Müller wondered whether he and his comrades should
have “asked the people to resist and then, together, ended this detestable life
honourably?” He turned to a former Greek army officer, who was also a member of the
Resistance, but the man “rejected my suggestion as utterly absurd, arguing that dying
heroically and honourably together with our fellows would help no one: we must be
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patient and bide our time.” The man’s words “checked my desire for action.” While
Müller sympathized with the victims, he “realized the futility of resistance.” Evidently,
he felt guilty as a bystander, but the sight of “the SS men and their excited dogs” brought
him “back to reality. Of all the places in the whole wide world this must surely be the
very one where any attempt at saving human lives was a senseless undertaking.” 366
The members of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando struggled to resist even when
the lives of their own comrades were at stake. In one of his manuscripts, Zalmen
Gradowski describes the selection that took place on 24 February 1944, which resulted in
the extermination of more than half of the Sonderkommando. At first the prisoners were
united in our fear and trembling…We could feel, could sense that these ﬁfteen
months of living together and this terrible, horrifying, tragic work had bound us
together, molded us into a uniﬁed, closely-knit group of comrades, an inseparable,
indivisible family of brothers. And so we would remain until our ﬁnal moments.
All for one and one for all! Each man feels in his heart and soul our common pain,
our common sorrow. Each man senses the anguish of the suffering to come. 367
Because of this solidarity, Gradowski and his comrades were certain that the selection
“would not go smoothly” for the SS. “At the ﬁrst attempt to break up our family, we, the
brothers of the Sonderkommando would show them what we could do.” Having
witnessed the thousands of laborers deported to Birkenau from the munitions factories,
“we would not be tricked into believing that they were putting us to work at a task that
only we and no one else could accomplish…These bandits, these smooth, experienced
swindlers would never make us believe that we were needed for work elsewhere. No!!
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We would not be tricked.”368 The moment the SS “laid their barbaric hands on our
solidiﬁed organism,” the prisoners “would all rise as one, spring up like a wounded
animal and throw ourselves at them, the murderers and criminals who had massacred our
innocent people. That would be the decisive moment; then we would speak our ﬁnal
word. Like lava erupting from the depths of a seething volcano, our vengeance would
break forth.”369 Gradowski writes that the Sonderkommando prisoners “hoped, deeply
believed” that the threat of imminent death would make them “sober up; that the tragic
reality would show itself in all its naked truth and all our hopes and dreams would be
revealed to have been nothing but empty fantasies, founded on illusions we had willingly
believed in order to avert our eyes from the tragic danger looming over us.” At that
moment, he thought,
The long-amassed rage and hatred would merge with the pain and suffering left
behind by these horrible months of tragic work which had forged the seething
desire for revenge within us. All this, mixed with the pressing threat of losing our
lives and our general desire to wreak revenge and to survive, would inﬂame,
enrage, stir up our very being―and explode. Each of us, without exception,
irrespective of his physical force or individual qualities, would be possessed by
the hellish ﬁre of revenge.370
Thus, “on the brink of our downfall,” the Sonderkommando would finally give their
answer to the question of “why and for what purpose we had lived and existed in the
heart of hell, why we had breathed this air of death and annihilation of own people―this
is what we believed.”371
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However, as the selection progressed, and some were chosen for life and others
for death, the solidarity of the Sonderkommando prisoners began to disintegrate.
“Gradually, invisibly, imperceptibly, the abyss widened between us and them,” writes
Gradowski.
The strands which had bound us together began to unravel. The brotherly thread,
the familial bond was broken. And all the weakness and nakedness of this being
called man began to show. The survival instinct smoldering deep inside each man
was transformed into an opiate which imperceptibly, invisibly took possession of
the human being, the comrade, the brother, banishing all fear and apprehension. 372
Each man who was spared (registered for work in the crematorium) became “intoxicated
by the opium” of separation. “The hope, the certainty that ‘for now’ they were calling a
number that was not his, consoled him, renewed his courage, and a feeling of
estrangement began to grow in the place where love had been. Each number called
became a silent explosive charge, blowing the bridges that connected us.” 373 Gradowski
writes bitterly that the SS were cunning: they “had detected, pinpointed, guessed and
grasped our common thought. They had burrowed into the deepest caverns of our souls
and glimpsed their nudity.” They knew man’s weakness: “the unwillingness to expose
himself to the danger of losing his life, even if it was a dead life.” In this way, the SS
“had torn our family apart, split the common danger and transferred it to a single group,
that of the ‘unregistered.’ And as soon as those registered for the crematorium were given
an opportunity to elude the danger―the threat of their removal from this ostensible and
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temporary ‘safe place’―at that moment, a great rift opened up in our common thoughts
and aspirations.”374
On the one hand, the spared men no longer wanted to fight. “Their ingrained
instinct for survival checked their deep urge for revenge and self-defense.” On the other
hand, they expected the doomed men to be the first to rise up against the SS. “All glances
were fixed on those rows. They had but to make the slightest move, and everyone would
follow their example.”375 Yet the SS had succeeded there as well. It seemed to the
doomed men “as though an iron wall had sprung up between us and them; they felt
abandoned and alone, as if there were nothing binding us anymore. And this mistake
misled us all.” If just one of the Sonderkommando prisoners had “been able to free his
mind from the intoxicating opium of separation with which the bandits had intentionally
inebriated our paralyzed hearts and throw himself into battle, the miracle would have
come to pass. His willpower would have given us wings; his momentum would have
spiraled into a storm, and the deeply smoldering spark which still persisted in all of us
would have burst into an infernal blaze.”376 “There had been a chance,” laments
Gradowski, “there had been a moment, we had felt the labor pains, the pangs of revenge,
the birth pains of a hero,” but instead was born “the child of cowardice.”377
Like their counterparts in Auschwitz, the Sonderkommando prisoners in
Treblinka imagined themselves carrying out heroic acts of resistance but struggled to

374

Ibid., 90-91.
Ibid.
376
Ibid., 92.
377
Ibid.
375

110

overcome the will-to-live. One day, when a Czech transport arrived from Theresienstadt,
an SS officer ordered Richard Glazar to escort an elderly woman to the Lazarett
(“infirmary”), where the old, the sick, and the pregnant women from the transports were
shot into a smoldering pit. Glazar answered the woman’s questions with lies, assuring her
that she would simply receive a physical examination. He loathed having to participate in
this deception and feared the moment when she discovered the truth. “I’ll have to take her
all the way in, and she’ll know what’s going to happen…and she’ll look at me. At the
edge of the pit I’ll have to tear her clothes off, maybe hold her hand, support her.” 378
Then he tried to imagine himself attacking the SS officer inside the Lazarett, grabbing his
pistol and shooting him. But he knew that he would not be able to get close enough; he
would be killed in the attempt. 379 His courage faded. What was the point of resistance if it
simply meant that two would die instead of one? When Glazar and the woman arrived at
the Lazarett, he tried to leave, but she held onto him, “resting on the arm of my fine dark
blue jacket, the one I found this morning and put on immediately. The silk invites her to
hold on more tightly.” He was suddenly ashamed to be wearing a dead man’s clothes.
When the woman said she heard gunshots, Glazar lied again: “No, no, it’s just my friends
throwing the luggage around.”380 He accompanied the woman part of the way into the
narrow alley that led into the Lazarett, but once she turned the corner, he ran out, “as if
seized by some alien force.”381 At that moment he heard a shot from the inside. He tried
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to escape to the sorting barracks, but the guards forced him back out onto the platform to
finish removing the luggage from the train. Glazar cursed himself for his cowardice, for
accommodating himself to the death camp regime and valuing the “privileges” of
Treblinka over resistance:
You have wormed your way out. You fled—from the old woman and from the
action you intended to take. So keep on enjoying what Treblinka has to offer—
grub, whippings, the ‘infirmary’…What did you tell her when she asked for
water? Just wait a little while, and very soon you will…No, I didn’t tell her that.
No, but you thought it. Admit it, it was something like that: In just a little while,
you will have enough of everything. You damned bastard—what would you do if
you had to accompany your own grandmother? Maybe she’s already there, has
already made her way through, already over there, and just now…382
Another time, Glazar imagined himself attacking an SS man but could not bring
himself to go through with it. The SS often came to the sorting barracks where Glazar
worked to pick out something “nice” from the clothing of the murdered Jews. One day,
SS Sergeant Karl Seidel walked in. “If you can come up with a nice winter coat…” he
asked quietly, using informal address in German. Glazar fantasized about attacking
Seidel, but once again decided against it:
Damn it all, why don’t I just kick him in the balls, why don’t I tighten this belt
around his neck until his eyes pop out, just like the two guys who were hauled off
to the mess to be hung upside down by their feet? And what would you achieve
by doing that? What would you be helping? Everyone else would just watch
without moving a muscle. You’d have to finish yourself off too, if you didn’t
want them to get you…So, so fantasize a little more while talking yourself out of
it, dig around in this pile and look. 383
Ashamed of his cowardice, Glazar recalled a Polish Jew named Berliner who had
“gathered everything he still had in him and jumped one of the death’s heads with a
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knife.” It had happened early in the camp’s existence, before Glazar arrived. He
suspected that Berliner was “probably that strong and courageous because he had just
returned to Poland, his home country, after having spent several years abroad.” In other
words, he had not succumbed to the corruption of Treblinka. But what reward did he get
for his heroism? The guards “beat him to death on the spot.” 384
Other “heroes” of Treblinka received similar treatment. When the SS found two
prisoners hidden in the undercarriage of one of the freight cars, they forced them to
undress and then dragged them “by a rope tied around their necks, beating their naked
bodies all the way down to the mess. There the men are hung by their feet, heads down,
from a beam fastened between two trees.” 385 Eating their evening meal, Glazar and the
other prisoners could not ignore the horrible image of the two hanged men, which
“intrude[d]” into the steam rising from their bowls. Suddenly one of the men, still alive,
cried out accusingly, “What do you think you’re doing! Spit that garbage out! Take
revenge!”386 He urged the prisoners to resist the SS instead of being content with
surviving off the transports of murdered Jews, but his comrades were slow to respond.
After two more escapees were discovered and hanged publicly, Glazar’s group began
formulating a plan for a breakout. However, two days later, seven prisoners were shot for
trying to escape. Deputy Commandant Kurt Franz announced a new policy: “From today
on, I am making every Kapo and every foreman directly liable, with their own lives, for
their people. For every one person who escapes, or tries to escape, ten men will be shot—
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for one, ten others!”387 Now resistance would come at a greater cost: a prisoner risked not
just his own life, but the lives of ten of his comrades.
In addition to the faint hope that they might survive, the belief that they could end
their lives at any time prevented many Sonderkommando prisoners from carrying out
seemingly futile acts of resistance. The Auschwitz Sonderkommando was critical not
only of their own hesitancy, but also of the unwillingness of the camp Resistance to
proceed with a general uprising. In his letter of 6 September 1944, Zalmen Gradowski
writes that the men of the Sonderkommando “have long wanted to put an end to the
terrible work forced upon us on pain of death. We wanted to perform a great deed. The
men of the camp, some of them Jews, Russians and Poles, have held us back with all their
might and forced us to postpone the date of the uprising.” 388 Filip Müller recalls that it
was not easy to convince the other prisoners in the camp to rise up “because so far their
lives were not directly threatened while their chance of survival appeared to increase with
every day that passed,” particularly with “the brisk advance of the Red Army.” 389
Likewise, Zalman Lewental criticized the members of the Resistance for not being
prepared to undertake a revolt. What was worse, they were “not even prepared in thought.
They are not capable of grasping these things. Putting it simply, [there is] still a will to
live. To die, he says, I will always have time.” While the Resistance “always claimed that
we are the weak ones, the cowards,” events proved otherwise. 390 The real cowards are
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“Those who fear death, those who long to live another day, those to whom one hour of
life is very important,” who think they have “all the time to wait --- to achieve
something.” Finally, when the Sonderkommando “saw that we had nothing more to
expect, that all the promises they had been giving us all the time were only empty phrases
founded on lies and false[hood], we decided and made up our minds: enough.” Although
the Sonderkommando “may have had a bit of a better chance than others in the camp,
nevertheless they had the courage to go with full consciousness to death.” 391
The Sonderkommando prisoners in Treblinka battled similar illusions. In an
attempt to control their fate, Samuel Willenberg and his friend Alfred Boehm obtained
cyanide capsules from among the pharmaceutical products collected from the gas
chamber victims. Willenberg recalls: “The knowledge that we owned the poison was a
boon to our self-confidence: we could take our lives whenever we chose. The Germans
would not kill us! If ever we reached the conclusion that we had no further chance of
staying alive, we would commit suicide.” 392 However, one of the doctors, a Polish Jew
from Warsaw named Chorążycki, warned Willenberg about the difficulty of putting an
end to one’s own life.
‘You should know that we have cyanide pills which were in the possession of
self-confident, big-mouthed prisoners like you, Katzap. The fact that you can take
the pill out of your pocket and use it whenever you want makes you more selfassured. It’s easier to survive here when you feel you’re in charge of your life.
But you should know that people who had pills like these, and who intended using
them at the critical moment, refused to believe what was waiting them to the very
end. As they ran stark naked down Death Avenue to the gas chambers, with SS-

391
392

Ibid.
Samuel Willenberg, Revolt in Treblinka (Warsaw: Jewish Historical Institute, 2008), 93.

115

men prodding them along, the pills stayed in their clothes in the yard. They didn’t
have the strength–or the courage–to use the poison.’393
Speaking frankly, Dr. Chorążycki admitted that he was unsure if he would “‘have the
strength or the courage to use the poison at the right moment. When I think of myself,
I’m afraid I’ll crack and won’t be able to do it. To swallow poison of your own free will
takes extraordinary courage. You always hope that perhaps, everything notwithstanding,
you’ll survive this hell.’” While Willenberg pondered the doctor’s words, Chorążycki
gazed at him, “as if wishing to reach a final diagnosis in my case, as if wanting to
ascertain the condition of my body and, above all, my soul.”394
For the Sonderkommando prisoners in both Auschwitz and Treblinka, the time
came when their resolve was put to the ultimate test. The selection in February 1944 had
“caused wide-spread alarm” among the members of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando.
They feared they would not live to see liberation. “It stood to reason,” writes Müller,
“that the perpetrators of daily mass murders would not allow a single witness of their
crimes to stay alive and to testify against them. We had therefore come to the conviction
that only a mass escape could save us.” 395 By chance Müller learned that the so-called
Czech family camp in Birkenau would be liquidated in March 1944. He informed his
comrades, who agreed that “we must at all costs warn the people and try to convince

Ibid., 95. Gradowski writes similarly of the victim “who had a dreadful premonition from the outset,”
but “kept those death pills to the last minute, and does not know that he is lost.” Now, Gradowski and his
fellow inmates wish that they had been as clearsighted. “Oh, how good it would be, how happy we would
all feel, if we had such good, precious death pills on us now. We would swallow them greedily, and how
happy we would be to ﬁnd our ﬁnal rest in sweet, eternal sleep, and be borne on waves of wonderful
dreams to the place where our dear families are, and be united with them forever.” Gradowski, From the
Heart of Hell, 63. See also Gradowski, “Writings,” in Mark, The Scrolls of Auschwitz, 200.
394
Willenberg, Revolt in Treblinka, 95.
395
Müller, Eyewitness Auschwitz, 91.
393

116

them that their one chance of survival lay in offering resistance.” 396 The
Sonderkommando would join them in the revolt. Unfortunately, the inmates of the family
camp “did not want to know about the peril in which they found themselves. Since their
arrival in Birkenau they had enjoyed so many privileges that the idea that they might be
gassed seemed absurd.”397 Although they “had seen the crematorium chimneys belching
smoke and fumes day after day after day” for six months, they clung to the belief that the
Nazis would not kill them, if only because they were under the protection of the
International Red Cross.398 Therefore, many thought that the news of the liquidation was
“an unreliable rumour, while others looked upon it as some kind of deliberate attempt to
cause panic, with the aim of getting them involved in a hazardous attempt to escape.” 399
And even if they were to be killed, they preferred to die together in the gas chambers than
to witness the slaughter of their wives and children in a failed revolt. To make matters
worse, the camp Resistance was unwilling to help the Sonderkommando organize an
uprising. The advance of the Red Army “led them to hope, with good reason, that they
had a genuine chance of survival, a chance which was increasing daily.” It seemed
senseless for them to risk their lives in a desperate and perilous struggle for a few
thousand Czech Jews and 200 prisoners of the Sonderkommando.”400 Nevertheless,
Gradowski writes, the Sonderkommando held out hope that the inmates of the family
camp “would raise the ﬂags of battle and together, hand in hand, we would enter this
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unequal battle” and “make a heroic end of this dark life.” However, while the victims
bravely cursed their murderers and sang patriotic songs such as Hatikvah and the Czech
national anthem, they did not rise up. “[I]nstead of throwing themselves at us and them
like wild beasts,” says Gradowski, “most of them descended calmly and sedately from
the trucks; with arms hanging and heads bowed in resignation, they ﬁled silently into the
grave.”401
Watching these “heart-rending” scenes through the half-open door of the
undressing room, Müller felt drawn to the victims through “ties of a common past, a
common language, religion and culture.”402 The bearing of his fellow Czechoslovakians
“seemed an exemplary gesture of national honour and national pride which stirred my
soul. I proudly identified with them.” The way they “walk[ed] into the gas chamber,
brave, proud and determined,” made him realize the senselessness of “clinging to my
hopeless existence.” What was he holding on for? There was little chance of escaping any
time soon, but even “in the unlikely event of my getting out of the camp alive,” what sort
of life would await him? Material possessions were replaceable, “[b]ut who could replace
my parents, my brother, or the rest of my family, of whom I was the sole survivor? And
what of friends, teachers, and the many members of our Jewish community?” Without
them, his hometown of Sered’ would be “soulless and dead.” And what if he ran into the
Hlinka guards or Slovakian SS “who had sucked their Jewish fellow citizens dry before
their deportation and stolen their worldly belongings?” There would be strangers in his
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family’s house and silence in the Jewish school. The synagogue had likely been looted
and turned into a secular building. It would be impossible, he concluded, to “pick up the
threads of my former happy and carefree life.”403
In that moment, the scales fell from Müller’s eyes, and he recognized the
worthlessness of his existence in the death camp. As Schopenhauer notes, such
knowledge has the power to become “a quieter” of the will-to-live, “silencing and
suppressing all willing.”404 One can see its effect in the fact that Müller “felt quite free
from that tormenting fear of death which had often almost overwhelmed me before. I had
never yet contemplated the possibility of taking my own life, but now I was determined
to share the fate of my countrymen.”405 Resolved to die with them, he slipped into the
crowd being driven into gas chamber and hid behind one of the concrete pillars in the
back. “I was overcome by a feeling of indifference: everything had become
meaningless,” Müller recalls. “Even the thought of a painful death from Zyclon B gas
[sic], whose effect I of all people knew only too well, no longer filled me with fear and
horror. I faced my fate with composure.”406 Müller’s experience resembles what
Schopenhauer refers to as the “denial of the will-to-live,” which occurs when an
individual comes to understand the “inner nature” of earthly existence “and finds it
involved in constant passing away, a vain striving, an inward conflict, and a continual
suffering.”407 Confronted with this knowledge, the will-to-live “now turns away from
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life; it shudders at the pleasures in which it recognizes the affirmation of life. Man attains
to the state of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true composure, and complete
willlessness.”408 However, Schopenhauer notes that most people do not reach this state of
complete resignation until they have experienced “the greatest personal suffering” and
are about to die. Only then does the individual “willingly renounce everything he
formerly desired with the greatest vehemence, and gladly welcome death.” 409 Although
Müller did not face imminent execution like the gas chamber victims, the physical and
mental suffering he had experienced during his time in the Sonderkommando evidently
led him to reject the will-to-live.
Müller was not permitted to carry out his act of self-sacrifice. A group of young
Czech girls, “naked and in the full bloom of youth,” approached him in the gas chamber.
One of them said:
‘We understand that you have chosen to die with us of your own free will, and we
have come to tell you that we think your decision pointless: for it helps no one.’
She went on: ‘We must die, but you still have a chance to save your life. You have
to return to the camp and tell everybody about our last hours,’ she commanded.
‘You have to explain to them that they must free themselves from any illusions.
They ought to fight, that’s better than dying here helplessly. It’ll be easier for
them, since they have no children. As for you, perhaps you’ll survive this terrible
tragedy and then you must tell everybody what happened to you.’ 410
The girl’s words caught him off guard. Before he could answer, “the girls took hold of
me and dragged me protesting to the door of the gas chamber. There they gave me a last
push which made me land bang in the middle of the group of SS men.” SS-Sturmmann
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Albert Kurschus beat Müller with his truncheon and then with his fist when he tried to get
up. Finally, he yelled: “‘You bloody shit, get it into your stupid head: we decide how long
you stay alive and when you die, and not you. Now piss off, to the ovens!’ Then he
socked me viciously in the face so that I reeled against the lift door.” 411
Upstairs in the crematorium, Müller’s head was spinning. Kapo Kaminski came in
and “tried to make me understand that my nerves had got the better of me and that
anything like that, even though he had full understanding for it, must not happen again.”
Kaminski told him that he would only “please our tormentors…by dying without putting
up a fight.” He reminded Müller that the Sonderkommando needed him for their
resistance efforts: “‘You are still young: it is vital that you should see everything,
experience everything, go through everything and consciously record everything in your
mind. Maybe you are one of those who one day will be free.’” As he resumed working,
Müller pondered Kaminski’s words, which “had comforted and encouraged me. Once
again I was determined to go on fighting for my life. Perhaps there would be a miracle,
perhaps one day I would be free.”412 He also remembered that he “had promised to obtain
pieces of evidence, such as the labels on the tins containing Zyclon B gas [sic]” for the
men planning an escape. “By now I had come back to reality. I hoped that perhaps I
might be of use to the Resistance, although I was still very young and without much
experience of life. Thus, within a few hours, I had come to the conviction that each
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minute, each hour and each day I could interpose between the day of my death was a gift
from heaven.”413
Although the Auschwitz Sonderkommando had failed so far in most of their
attempts at resistance, the expansion of extermination operations in the spring of 1944
brought them close to the breaking point. In preparation for the extermination of the Jews
of Hungary, the SS conscripted hundreds of prisoners and civilian workers to enlarge the
camp railway system and increase the number and capacity of the gas chambers, ovens,
and cremation pits. Müller writes that the rumors of the impending murder of the
Hungarian Jews “came as a devastating blow” to the Sonderkommando. “Were we once
more to stand by and watch while more hundreds upon thousands were done away with?
Once again we pressed the camp Resistance to give the signal for an uprising. However,
they still refused to run risks.”414 The Resistance urged the Sonderkommando to wait for
the advancing Red Army to come closer to the camp. For the Sonderkommando,
however, waiting meant that “we would yet again be forced to cremate hundreds of
thousands of people.”415 Lewental writes similarly that “We, who had already had
enough, and more than enough, for a long time, our hands would now be forced to be
dipped in the blood of the Jews of Hungary.” This situation was intolerable, and “the
entire commando, regardless of class differences, even the most corrupt of us furiously
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demanded to put an end to this game, to stop this labor and even to end our lives.”416 Yet
the members of the Sonderkommando felt they were too isolated to carry out a revolt on
their own. “Thus,” says Müller, “we had no choice but to grit our teeth and wait for
things to happen.”417 Once again, the Sonderkommando yielded to the will-to-live, which
Müller frames as SS coercion: “we had to yield to force and participate in the building of
places which were to make possible the worst and most cruel mass murder yet at
Auschwitz.”418 Although “steeped in despair and despondency,” “[o]utraged and
depressed,” Müller and his comrades obediently dug five new cremation pits behind
Crematorium V in only one week. Their new master, SS-Hauptscharführer Otto Moll,
“ruled us with a rod of iron.” The prisoners felt “helpless in the face of SS power. Any
refusal to work, even the merest hint, would have meant certain death without the
slightest effect on the course of events.” 419 By the beginning of May 1944, the
extermination facilities at Birkenau were ready to receive the first transports of Jews from
Hungary.
Over the next several weeks, the Sonderkommando prisoners toiled day and night
in the inferno of Birkenau, as hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews were
systematically gassed and cremated. Then, when alarming rumors reached the
Sonderkommando of the liquidation of all prisoners in the event of a surprise offensive
by the Red Army, they joined forces with the Resistance to plan an uprising for mid-June.
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On the day of the revolt, however, the Resistance inexplicably called it off, leaving the
Sonderkommando “absolutely stunned.”420 Meanwhile, Moll moved the
Sonderkommando to quarters inside the crematoria buildings, temporarily cutting off
their contact with the camp Resistance until they could establish new lines of
communication. The Sonderkommando continued to plot their escape even as they were
forced to cremate the bodies not only of Hungarian Jews, but also of Polish and Greek
Jews and of prisoners from the Gypsy Camp. In the midst of this slaughter, the
Sonderkommando received another “severe blow”: the SS shot Kapo Kaminski for
allegedly planning to assassinate SS-Oberscharführer Muhsfeld. The loss of their leader
left the prisoners “[d]azed and panic-stricken,” but they concluded that the SS had not
discovered their escape plans. 421 Time was running out, however. The number of
transports decreased towards the end of summer. Then Moll was transferred, his
“expertise” no longer needed. In late September 1944, the SS carried out a selection of
200 members of the Sonderkommando and, for the first time ever, cremated the corpses
themselves. Facing the end of their usefulness to the SS, the men of the
Sonderkommando were filled with “despair and despondency.”422
The next selection came on 7 October 1944. This time, the SS placed the Kapos in
the “desperate and hopeless position” of deciding life and death. “After prolonged
discussions and a sleepless night,” the Kapos delivered to the SS the list of three hundred
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“workers” for a rubble clearance team in Upper Silesia. 423 However, the selected men
informed the other prisoners that they would not allow themselves to “be slaughtered
without resistance. They thought the time for the planned rebellion was now” and were
determined to rise up, with or without the support of the Sonderkommando and the rest of
the camp. The camp Resistance and the Sonderkommando replied that they would not
participate in any uprising, which “might have disastrous consequences for the whole
camp.”424 In other words, the resistors would have to go it alone. The next day, around
noon, the SS assembled the prisoners for the selection. However, at least a dozen men on
the list did not report when their names were called. When the SS started to look for
them, they were suddenly pelted with stones from the group of selected prisoners. By
then Crematorium IV was on fire, “the roof was blazing in several places, flames leaping
out and clouds of smoke rising into the sky. Within five minutes of the start of the
fighting the camp siren began to wail. Shortly afterwards several trucks arrived, and
steel-helmeted SS guards, many of them still in their vests, spilled out: swiftly they
surrounded the yard and set up their machine-guns.”425 To escape the “shower of bullets,”
Müller hid in the flue leading from the ovens to the chimney in Crematorium IV. The fire
raging in the building would deter any guards from getting too close. There he stayed
until the next morning, when he discovered that 450 of his comrades had perished in the
uprising.426
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It seems that when the prisoners who had not been selected saw the fire and heard
the shots, they too feared for their lives. They also saw this moment as an opportunity to
redeem themselves for their former hesitancy. “We had to make one last attempt,” says
Venezia. “Even if the hope was in vain, we were all convinced that it would be better to
act and get killed rather than die without having made any attempt.” He recalls that they
were hoping “not so much to survive as to do something, to rise up, so as not to keep on
as we were. It was obvious that some of us would perish in the attempt. But whether we
died or not, revolt was imperative. Nobody wondered whether it was really going to work
or not; the important thing was to do something!”427 Although Müller and Venezia did
not take part directly in the uprising, they admired the courage of their comrades who did.
“But these 450 men,” writes Müller, “had fought bravely and died honourably, refusing
to resign themselves meekly to their fate. They had been ready to defend their lives to
their last breath, a unique event in the history of Auschwitz.” 428 Lewental likewise praises
“our heroic brothers,” whom the cowardly SS murdered with machine-guns. “Who can
evaluate the bravery and devotion of the individuals among our comrades, three of whom
remained in the crematorium to blow it up, sacrificing themselves deliberately.” 429
The self-sacrifice of the three men in Crematorium IV seems to have deeply
moved Lewental. As we have seen, he understood human weakness due to the fear of
death. He knew the danger “When [hope] finally steals into the heart” and one begins to
cling to life again. The prisoners feared that “perhaps in spite of everything” the rebels
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would not go through with their plans. Therefore, their actions signify the “deliberate
sacrifice of their lives, with a whole heart, self-sacrifice, for no one forced them at that
moment. Indeed, they could have escaped with everyone else, and yet they did not do so.
On the contrary, who can correctly evaluate the greatness of our comrades, their heroism?
Indeed, the best of us fell there, the best, the dearest, the chosen elements, --- with dignity
to life and to death.”430 For Lewental, these men are noteworthy because they rejected the
privileges of life in the Sonderkommando and in doing so liberated themselves from
enslavement to the will-to-live. “[D]espite the fact that they still had a chance to continue
living and even in good conditions, that there is no lack of food and drink and smoking
necessities --- and nevertheless to decide to put an end to your [own] life with bravery,
that should be commended, noted in our history.” Addressing these “loyal friends worth
their weight in gold, you who are no longer with us, you who have carried out your duty,”
Lewental assures them “that we too, who are still alive, walking over the tragic [grave],”
will not forget their sacrifice. 431 Lewental was likely killed shortly after writing these
words.
Like the Auschwitz Sonderkommando, the Sonderkommando in Treblinka
suffered several setbacks in their plans for an uprising. One of the most significant was
the loss of their leader, Zelo Bloch. One winter day in 1942, SS First Sergeant Küttner
discovered seventy-three bundles of men’s shirts missing from the sorting barracks.
Glazar remarks that hunger and fever likely drove the prisoners to take chances. Since
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few good shirts were coming in due to the decline in transports, some of the prisoners
“started speculating with the ones that had already been sorted. They opened bundles that
had already been processed and traded these goods for an extra portion of bread, or for a
few cubes of sugar from down at the workshops, from the kitchen.” 432 While Glazar
understood the men’s desperation to survive, he worried that their selfishness had ruined
the whole group’s chances to escape. “Idiots,” he thought angrily, “they were waiting for
the next transports to arrive, for new supplies, so they could catch up again and bring
everything back into line. In the meantime they’ve messed up everything, even duping
Zelo and Adasch.”433 As punishment, Küttner transferred Kapo Zelo Bloch, Vorarbeiter
Adasch, and several other prisoners to the extermination area of the camp, where they
would work clearing the gas chambers and transporting corpses to the pits. Losing Zelo
was a cruel blow to the planned uprising. “He’ll be dead to us,” Glazar remembers
thinking. “It’s over for him, for us, for our plan, everything.”434 Watching Küttner
humiliate his leader, Glazar again wanted to rebel and held out a faint hope that his
comrades would take action. “So, now something has to happen. Yell, scream, attack,
everyone—well, then roar and go charging out of the ranks, you first, out front.”435 But
they did nothing.
The next spring, the prisoners lost two more leaders, Dr. Chorążycki and Kapo
Rakowski. Deputy Commandant Kurt Franz, nicknamed “Lalka” (Doll), caught Dr.
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Chorążycki with the 750,000 zlotys the prisoners had given him to buy weapons for the
uprising. But the doctor did not give up without a fight. Although he was twice as old as
the SS man, he threw Franz out of the Revierstube and “pounded Lalka with his fists.
Suddenly the doctor’s body went slack. His hands dropped, his head sagged, his legs
buckled,” and he collapsed at the feet of Franz, who “began to kick him with sadistic
cruelty. But he no longer had an opponent, for the doctor had lost consciousness and lay
on the ground, dead to the world,” recalls Willenberg.436 The Ukrainian guards ran to
fetch pails of water, which Franz poured down the doctor’s throat, while one of the
guards stepped on his stomach. “The physician had obviously taken poison; Lalka was
trying to force him back to consciousness by flushing out his stomach.”437 The guards
delivered the doctor in a bloody bundle to the roll call area. In front of the assembled
prisoners, Franz whipped Dr. Chorążycki almost to death and then ordered him to be
taken to the Lazarett to be shot. Although the prisoners’ plan had failed, “the image of the
magnificent Dr. Chorążycki would live on in our memories forever as a constant source
of inspiration.” Willenberg remembered the doctor’s words: “‘Katzap, don’t think you’re
strong enough just because you have poison. Cyanide in your pocket isn’t enough. Even
then one needs lots of courage to swallow it at the right moment. The people we inherited
it from hadn’t had the strength to use it, and they went to the gas chambers.’ Late that
night I pondered his words. Yes, to his good fortune and ours, our beloved doctor from

Willenberg, Revolt in Treblinka, 173. For Glazar’s account of this incident, see Trap with a Green
Fence, 101.
437
Willenberg, Revolt in Treblinka, 173-174.
436

129

Warsaw had had that courage.”438 Later, the SS shot Kapo Rakowski after finding money
and gold in his bunk. Rakowski’s execution was another hard blow for the prisoners,
recalls Glazar, because “we, in our never-ending game, had pinned many of our hopes on
him.”439 Seeing the bravery of such men, Glazar wondered why he kept working for the
SS instead of taking up arms against them: “How much longer—back and forth—really,
how much longer? Even you are waiting, just waiting. You’re dead anyway, but
somehow you just can’t die. Choronzycki [sic], he was able to die honorably, and the
man who stabbed Max Biala, the SS officer. What are you afraid of anyway? Of the
moment when I am naked. There, you see, you’ve been here too long, you’ve been
waiting too long, seen too much…”440
It took the arrival of a special group of transports in May 1943 to finally spur
Glazar and his comrades into action. At first glance, the transports were extremely
disappointing for the hungry prisoners. “They are the most miserable of all the transports
that have ever arrived in Treblinka,” says Glazar. “No baggage whatsoever. Tatters and
rags instead of clothing. More dead and half dead in the cattle cars than ever before. Only
a few who stir at all.”441 But these cars carried an important legacy: the survivors of the
Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. In spite of the poor condition of the passengers, the SS selected
a few men for the workforce, and the prisoners listened, spellbound, to their tale of
resistance: “The Jews rose up. They all knew they had nothing but Treblinka before them.
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So the few who had escaped from Treblinka had succeeded, at least there, in letting the
world know. In the end the Germans had been forced to bring in tanks and heavy guns to
put down the uprising, which included women, the elderly, and children.” 442 Glazar notes
that these transports brought nothing material that the prisoners could use, but something
much more valuable:
Nothing moved from hand to hand, not one slice of bread, not one pair of pants,
not one chuck of soap. But from mouth to mouth, from one mind to another, the
legacy was passed on: You who are faithful out of conviction as well as practice,
Talmudists as well as nonbelievers, businessmen as well as tradesmen, craftsmen
as well as shopkeepers, brokers, hustlers, crooks, and thieves—each of you, cast
off the last remnants of this life, give up hoping that you will be the last to escape
this naked death. Show the world and yourselves…443
Willenberg likewise recalls that the news of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising “struck our ears
like thunder.”444 Here were Jews “heroically fighting the Germans,” fighting “heroic
battles in which women and children joined.” They were not going passively to their
deaths like sheep to the slaughter. This image “warmed our hearts, infused us with new
strength and led to new decisions. Our spines stiffened; we wanted to act; we would not
let them claim our lives easily…An overwhelming desire to act at any price seized us. As
time passed, the plan began to develop form and substance. We would conquer and
destroy Treblinka in a general mass uprising, weapons in hand, against the German and
Ukrainian murderers.”445
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Finally, on 2 August 1943, the prisoners broke out of the trap of Treblinka. The
revolt took place on a summer day, quivering from the heat and the anticipation. Many of
the SS were on leave that day, recalls Glazar. “And it is very hot. The ground, the grass,
and the trees are parched, and not even the morning brings relief. As the afternoon
progresses and the temperature rises, fatigue settles over the camp. But it is masking an
almost electric tension.”446 Willenberg remembers the second of August as “a singular
and unique day, one which we anticipated and hoped for. Our hearts pounded with the
hope that maybe, just maybe our long-nurtured dream would come true. We harbored no
thoughts of ourselves and our lives. Our only desire was to obliterate the death factory
which had become our home.”447 They got up that morning “excited, tense, anticipating.
Thousands of thoughts raced and collided in our heads.” When the morning sunlight
“revealed the full horror of our humiliation and misery in the depths of the abyss named
Treblinka,” the prisoners did not realize that “that accursed hell, hidden deep within the
wilderness, would present a different face” by the end of the day. “Neither did we
imagine that we were perhaps standing at our last prisoners’ roll call and that we were
about to face our last day of toil and enslavement.”448
The prisoners decided to launch their attack the moment the SS made “the
slightest move” to kill a prisoner in the Lazarett or elsewhere. “Not one more man is
going to die that way,” they resolved. 449 Around four o’clock, word spread that Küttner
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had caught someone and was taking him to the Lazarett. “Out front,” recalls Glazar,
“somewhere in the vicinity of our living quarters, a shot rings out. Afterward silence.
Then the first hand grenade explodes, followed immediately by the second. I see the third
one detonate on the asphalt lane.” The uprising had begun. “‘Hurrah!’ You hear it here
and there, timidly at first. It sticks in my chest and catches in my throat until I can finally
scream: ‘Hurrah!’ The yelling gets louder and rises over the entire Treblinka
complex.”450 Glazar and his friend Karl Unger ran across the camp in the delirium of selfliberation. “We’re both laughing like mad, running next to each other. I scream, and I
hear myself continuing to scream in wild celebration.”451 With comrades running and
falling all around them, they reached the perimeter of the camp and made their way
through the woods, pursued by guards with rifles and barking dogs. They sought shelter
in a small pond and remained there until dawn the next day. As Glazar and Unger
crawled up out of the water, they saw “an immense fire over Treblinka, larger and of a
different color than on all those previous nights when the flames had been fed by the
large incineration grates.”452 Meanwhile, Willenberg’s friend Alfred Boehm fell in the
fighting and Willenberg himself suffered a gunshot wound to the leg. When he reached
the boundary of the camp, he had to climb over “thick masses of human bodies,” many of
which “stood erect like tombstones” against the tank obstacles and the barbed-wire
fences.453 Bleeding from the leg, Willenberg made his away across the railway tracks,
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through forest and swamp. “Hell is burnt to the ground! Hell is burnt to the ground!” he
screamed at a girl from a nearby village, who stared at him as if he were a ghost. 454 With
the help of several Polish peasants, he managed to elude the SS manhunt. He reunited
with his father in Rembertów, where they assumed the identities of Christian Poles, and
later fought in the Warsaw Uprising (August-October 1944). Strangers in Poland, Glazar
and Unger made their way to Mannheim, Germany, where they worked as “Aryan”
Czech laborers in a factory until the end of the war.
While the previous chapter described the relatively “privileged” existence of the
Sonderkommando prisoners in Auschwitz and Treblinka, the present chapter illustrates
the tragic consequences of their accommodation to the death camp regime. The prisoners
discovered that the will-to-live became stronger with every act of self-preservation. The
threat of death rendered it nearly irresistible. Even writing from within the “heart of hell,”
as Lewental and Gradowski did, the prisoners recognized the power of the will-to-live,
which held them back from ending their lives alone or in a collective attack against their
SS masters. Under the illusion that they could give up their lives at any time, the
prisoners allowed many opportunities for resistance to slip through their fingers.
Ashamed, they cursed themselves for their weakness and resolved to seize the next
chance, but they faltered once again in the same uncertainty. Forced to witness the
extermination of hundreds of thousands of their own people, including their fellow
prisoners, the Sonderkommando cherished every second of life. The price of one’s selfpreservation was extremely high, but for a long time the Sonderkommando justified it in
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terms of the small comfort they could bring to the victims and the evidence they could
preserve of the Nazis’ crimes. In quiet moments, however, they had to admit to
themselves with Lewental: “the truth is that you want to live at any price. You desire to
live, because you are alive, because the whole world continues to live, and everything
that is pleasant, everything to which you are attached, is first and foremost attached to life
itself.”455
Filip Müller’s unsuccessful attempt to die with the gas chamber victims represents
one of the few instances of what Schopenhauer calls the “denial of the will-to-live.”
Another is the decision of the three men to sacrifice themselves in the destruction of
Crematorium IV during the uprising. On the whole, however, the Sonderkommando
prisoners struggled to break the bonds of their servitude to the will-to-live, and, as
Müller’s experience shows, unexpected events could quickly bring a prisoner back into
the grip of that will. Although his rescue by the Czech girls inspired Müller to further acts
of resistance, such as helping to supply the evidence for the Wetzler-Vrba report, his
survival meant that he remained enslaved to the will-to-live, dependent on the death of
the gas chamber victims. The uprising did not relieve his predicament; in fact, living
conditions worsened with the decline of extermination operations in Birkenau. Both
Müller and Venezia held on until the evacuation of Auschwitz in January 1945, but, as
we will see in the concluding chapter, their struggles did not abate. After surviving the
perilous journey into the Reich, they encountered the Hobbesian world of the
concentration camps, where hunger, disease, and hard labor reduced the inmates to an
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animal level. With nearly two years of war ahead of them, the survivors of the Treblinka
uprising faced an even greater challenge. While Willenberg found some redemption as a
fighter in the Warsaw Uprising, the memories of his humiliating imprisonment in
Treblinka haunted him for the rest of his life. Likewise, Glazar discovered that physically
escaping from Treblinka did not necessarily result in freedom from the corrupting
mentality of the death camp. Finally, we will conclude our examination of selfpreservation in the Sonderkommando with Schopenhauer’s vision of how one can
liberate oneself from the will-to-live.

CONCLUSION

For the Sonderkommando prisoners in Auschwitz and Treblinka, the day came at
last when they were no longer members of the hated “special squad,” forced to live like
vultures off the material remains of the dead. Many of the Treblinka prisoners gained
temporary freedom in the uprising of 2 August 1943. A few dozen, including Richard
Glazar and Samuel Willenberg, managed to elude the SS manhunt and lived out the rest
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of the war under assumed identities. Fifteen months later, on 18 January 1945, Filip
Müller, Shlomo Venezia, and the other survivors of the Auschwitz Sonderkommando
joined the thousands of inmates being evacuated from the camp. As Geheimnisträger
(“bearers of the secret”), they knew that the SS would not permit them to live. Thus, they
decided to take their chances on the “death march,” slipping into the long columns
heading towards an unknown destination within the Reich. Although they were aware of
the hardships ahead, the survivors of the Sonderkommando felt some relief in sharing the
common suffering of the victims, which might perhaps atone for their formerly
“privileged” existence. They also looked forward to the defeat of the Nazis, which would
mean the end of this seemingly interminable nightmare. To their dismay, however, they
discovered that neither time nor physical distance could completely liberate them from
their enslavement to the will-to-live.
The conditions of the death march quickly reminded the Auschwitz
Sonderkommando survivors of their servitude to self-preservation. “It was midwinter,”
recalls Venezia; “outside, everything was frozen or covered in snow. It was beastly cold.”
Marching in a column of five or six thousand, Venezia walked “for days on end, always
five by five, through that icy cold.” At night, they stopped in a village or cowshed and
slept for a few hours. Many prisoners froze to death during the night or suffered from
frostbite. “We were dragging our feet, we were thirsty, cold, hungry…but we had to
march, march, and keep on marching,” because the SS shot anyone who fell behind.456 At
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Loslau (Wodzisław Śląski), the SS herded the prisoners into open rail cars, in which they
had to stand tightly packed together in the driving snow, without food or water. When the
SS allowed some prisoners to leave the train to relieve themselves, a few attempted to
escape. For Venezia, however, self-preservation was paramount, and an escape attempt
seemed an unnecessary risk. “I didn’t try anything myself,” he says, “since I was
sincerely convinced that they’d leave us out in the open countryside so they could get
away more quickly from the advancing Soviet troops…I didn’t want to risk being shot at
by attempting to escape, and dying before the Germans left us, free.” Unfortunately, he
admits, “that time never came and I spent another four months in the camps.”457 Although
Venezia tried to help others during the journey, the will-to-live continued to govern his
actions. When a Yugoslavian prisoner died standing between Venezia and his brother on
the train, Venezia admits that “My first reflex was to rummage round in his pockets, with
the absurd idea in mind that he might have kept something edible in there. All I found
was a wooden crucifix.” Venezia kept it, thinking that the Christian symbol might help
him to conceal his Jewish identity among the local peasants if he ever escaped. As for the
dead man, Venezia and his brother laid the corpse down on the floor so they could sit on
it.458
After the long train journey, the prisoners arrived at Mauthausen in Lower
Austria, where they were processed before being transferred to the subcamp of Melk.
There, the prisoners lived in conditions resembling the Hobbesian state of nature. Space
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was limited in the barracks. Since none of the current prisoners would agree to share his
place, the new arrivals had to fight for a bed. “You had to find a place somewhere in the
system, even if this meant elbowing your way in,” explains Venezia.459 The struggle
began anew every night after work. “You had to be strong to push others out of the way
and take their place. That’s why I say that solidarity did not exist. We slept on a sort of
straw mattress, without undressing. If we’d taken off any item of clothing whatsoever,
even our shoes, they’d have been stolen. And in order to get them back, we’d have had to
pay a ration of bread.”460 At Melk, the prisoners worked at digging tunnels (Venezia calls
them “galleries”) into the mountains to accommodate local production plants. “The work
was hard and strenuous,” recalls Müller, “and working conditions arduous and fraught
with danger owing to the total absence of safety precautions.” There was also the
problem of insufficient rations. “Day by day I could feel myself growing weaker,” he
writes, “and I worried how much longer I would be able to stand this heavy labour.” 461
Although Müller found easier work as an electrician in a Messerschmidt factory, by April
his hunger was so great that he was “driven to eating lubricating jelly, grass, and even the
heavy, rich soil.”462
Hunger also drove Venezia to commit humiliating acts. One of the worst
memories he had of Melk was the day he lied in order to get an extra ration of soup.
Venezia knew that the Hungarian Kapo “doled out much more soup to his compatriots,”
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so he pretended he was Hungarian. “As I came up, I said to him ‘Magyar!’ ‘Hungarian.’
But he easily recognized from my accent that I was lying. Instead of giving me more, he
served me only water. As I stared into my tin bowl, which contained nothing substantial,
I felt a great anger rising inside myself. ‘How could I have managed to fall so low?’ The
idea of having to wait another twenty-four hours before eating drove me mad.”463 So
Venezia “discreetly tried to slip back into the queue to get another portion.” But the other
prisoners noticed and pointed him out. Another Kapo, an “Aryan” Pole who enjoyed
killing prisoners, grabbed a spade and began to beat Venezia across the shoulders. “I tried
to protect my head with my hands. He gave me another great thwack. If he’d stuck to the
side, he’d have smashed my skull. I was left gasping for breath, filled with both pain and
rage.” When the Kapo lifted the spade to strike him again, Venezia dodged the blow and
ran away as fast as he could. “That day,” Venezia admits, “I wept. I’d never wept in the
Sonderkommando, but all my rage welled up at just this moment. I wasn’t weeping from
pain or sadness (as I did after the war, when I saw my sister again for the first time), but
from anger, bitterness, frustration…”464
Venezia’s struggle with hunger continued at Ebensee, another subcamp of
Mauthausen. One day, he found himself in a group with five Russian prisoners when
bread was being distributed. Although he normally shared the bread “very fairly” with his
brother or his friends, he saw that the Russians intended to cheat him. When there were
two pieces left, one for Venezia and one for his Russian bunkmate, the Russians took
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advantage of a lapse of attention on Venezia’s part and took both pieces. He looked at the
piece of bread in his bunkmate’s hands. “What could I do? Not eating was unbearable.
So, quick as a flash, I took his piece and swallowed it in a mouthful.” Stealing another
prisoner’s bread was a mortal sin according to the camp code. Although the Russians had
stolen Venezia’s bread first, they denounced him to the Kapo, who started to beat him. “I
tried to protect my face, but he hit me all over,” Venezia recalls. “In spite of the force of
his blows, I didn’t feel any pain. My sole thought was for the bit of bread that I’d
managed to get into my belly and that nobody would ever manage to deprive me of! This
idea was enough to lessen the pain of the blows.”465 After the Allies liberated the camp,
the Kapo tried to escape, but some French prisoners caught him and beat him almost to
death. Then one of the Frenchmen stabbed him with a dagger twice in the chest. Venezia
caught the “Aryan” Polish Kapo trying to slip away as well. “When I saw him,” says
Venezia, “the blood rushed to my head. The scene in which he’d almost killed me flashed
before my eyes. I seized a big stick that was lying on the ground and, with my last
remaining strength, I hit him hard on the head. He tried to protect his head with his hands,
as I had done when he hit me.” Some Russian prisoners came over. When Venezia
pointed out the Kapo to them, they jumped on him, beating the man severely. Venezia did
not regret the assault. “He didn’t experience freedom and for me that was a great source
of satisfaction, since he didn’t deserve any better.” 466
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In his memoir, Venezia acknowledges the corrosive effects of the struggle for life
and death in which he participated at Auschwitz and the other camps. He speaks of “a
nagging pain that never leaves me. Everything’s going fine and then, all of a sudden, I’m
in despair. As soon as I feel a little joy, something inside me closes up immediately. It’s
like an inner flaw; I call it ‘the survivors’ disease.’” Unlike an ordinary disease such as
typhus or tuberculosis, this one “gnaws away at us from within and destroys any feeling
of joy. I have been dragging it about with me ever since I spent that time suffering in the
camp. This disease never leaves me a moment of joy or carefree happiness; it’s a mood
that forever erodes my strength.”467 His experience in the Sonderkommando destroyed
“normal life” for Venezia. “I’ve never been able to pretend that everything was all right
and go off dancing, like others, without a care in the world,” he says. “Everything takes
me back to the camp. Whatever I do, whatever I see, my mind keeps harking back to the
same place. It’s as if the ‘work’ I was forced to do there had never really left my
head…Nobody ever really gets out of the Crematorium,” he concludes. 468
Richard Glazar came to a similar realization after his escape from Treblinka.
Posing as “Aryan” Czech laborers, he and his friend Karl Unger made their way across
Poland to Germany, where they found work in a factory in Mannheim. It seemed that
they were safe, but several incidents reminded them of the corrupting power that
Treblinka still held over them. For example, Glazar and Unger initially lived with the
other foreign laborers in a dormitory in the village of Seckenheim, but their friend Otto
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informed them that, as Czechs, they were entitled to private accommodations. “‘Only the
Ukrainians and the Poles, or anyone else from one of the lesser races, are required to live
in the camp,’” he said.469 So Glazar and Unger decided to take advantage of this
“privilege” and rent a room in a house belonging to a German couple. Once again, Glazar
and Unger found themselves elevated to the status of “better guests.” As in Treblinka,
they attempted to justify their preferential treatment: “‘Yes, he’s right,’ we tell ourselves
later. ‘We are loyal Czechs, and we have a right to live on our own and to get our own
food coupons. Good God, we’re not going to let ourselves be suckered. We’re going to
get what we’re entitled to. And women aren’t off limits for loyal Czechs either…’” 470
Although the German civilians he encountered in Mannheim were not victims in
the same sense as the Jews, Glazar’s deception concerning his identity, which resulted in
his undeserved elevation in the Nazi racial hierarchy, reminded him of his position
relative to the deportees in Treblinka. He imagined his landlady, Frau K., in another time
and place: “If her hair were already gray, and what’s even more absurd, if the skin
underneath had turned into dry little scales, then she’d be ready, just like that other one
and…Well, Frau K., why don’t you just take my arm, and I’ll walk with you—to the
doctor, to the infirmary…”471 In this fantasy his guilt for deceiving the elderly Czech
woman in Treblinka mingled with his vengeful desire to make the Germans suffer the
same fate as their Jewish victims. Many months later, when American forces arrived in
Mannheim, a group of German civilians asked Glazar and Unger what would happen to
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them now. Seeing the Germans huddled in a room out of fear of the Americans, Glazar
reflexively thought of telling them the same lies the SS had told the Jews as they sealed
them inside the gas chambers: “So what’s going to happen to them is just what we say is
going to happen: ‘Nothing, nothing is going to happen to you, as long as you sit there
quietly until we say…’ Nothing is going to happen to you, but a little disinfectant will be
sprayed into this chamber through the air vents in the ceiling. That’s the thought that
comes to mind.”472
Another incident confirmed Glazar’s fear that he still acted according to the
mentality of Treblinka. One night, two American soldiers came up to the apartment
where Glazar and Unger were staying with a Czech worker named Heinrich and his
German girlfriend Annemarie. While one of the Americans held the Czechs at gunpoint
in the room, the other raped Annemarie in the stairway. Like so many times before,
Glazar had surrendered to the fear of death and stood by while another human being
suffered. He was ashamed, but Unger was defiant. “‘Well, what did happen?
Nothing…Did anyone cut off her tits, the way they did back there—in the ghettos? Did
they slaughter her mother, father, and brother, one after the other—as they did mine?
Why should I worry about her? Why should I worry about any of them?’”473 Even
Heinrich agreed that it would be “absurd” for (presumably) the only two survivors of
Treblinka to “‘die at the hands of their liberators, trying to defend the honor of a woman
from the enemy camp.’”474
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Like Venezia’s ambivalence concerning his acts of self-preservation and revenge
in Auschwitz and other camps, Glazar’s inability to overcome the mentality of Treblinka
after liberation reflects the fact that the power of the will-to-live extends far beyond the
death camp. Camps such as Auschwitz and Treblinka revealed but did not create the
human enslavement to the will-to-live. Similarly, the survivors found that the survival
strategies they had employed in the camps were inadequate to break the bonds of their
servitude. In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer offers an explanation
for why human beings struggle to liberate themselves from the will-to-live, as well as a
vision for how we might do so.
According to Schopenhauer, our bondage to the will-to-live originates in the
illusion that we are the whole will and that all other things are mere representations of our
will. “Therefore,” writes Schopenhauer, “everyone wants everything for himself, wants to
possess, or at least control, everything, and would like to destroy whatever opposes him.”
The world outside the individual appears to be “dependent on his own inner being and
existence. With his consciousness the world also necessarily ceases to exist for him.” As
the embodiment of the will-to-live, the individual “makes himself the centre of the world,
and considers his own existence and well-being before everything else.” Convinced that
the will itself perishes with the phenomenon (the body), the individual “is ready for this
to sacrifice everything else; he is ready to annihilate the world, in order to maintain his
own self, that drop in the ocean, a little longer. This disposition is egoism, which is
essential to everything in nature.”475 Egoism explains why “Everyone looks on his own
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death as the end of the world, whereas he hears about the death of his acquaintances as a
matter of comparative indifference, unless he is in some way personally concerned in
it.”476 Egoism also accounts for the fact that the “self-affirmation of one’s own
body…very easily goes beyond this affirmation to the denial of the same will appearing
in another individual,” which can be seen in acts of theft, injury, murder, and
enslavement.477 At the same time, such intense willing is “a constant source of suffering,”
because all willing comes from “need, lack, and hence pain, and by its very nature and
origin it is therefore destined to pain.”478 Schopenhauer describes willing as “an
unquenchable thirst,” for every satisfaction of the will “is always merely the startingpoint of a fresh striving”; any gratification “can never be more than deliverance from a
pain, from a want.”479 The endlessness of the will’s striving means that “there is no
measure or end of suffering.” Indeed, Schopenhauer concludes, “all life is suffering.”480 If
the conditions of ordinary life concealed this fact from the Sonderkommando prisoners,
the death camp revealed it with startling clarity.
Schopenhauer believed that we can only break the vicious cycle of willing and
suffering through the knowledge that we are all phenomena of the same will. Failing to
recognize itself in other beings, the will “turns its weapons against itself, and, by seeking
increased well-being in one of its phenomena, imposes the greatest suffering on another.”
Thus, “in the fierceness and intensity of its desire,” the will “buries its teeth in its own
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flesh, not knowing that it always injures only itself.” 481 Even the bad or wicked person
has “the secret presentiment” that “however much time and space separate him from
other individuals and the innumerable miseries they suffer, indeed suffer through him;
however much time and space present these as quite foreign to him, yet…it is the one
will-to-live appearing in them all.”482 The realization that one is “not only the tormentor
but also the tormented” produces “that obscurely felt but inconsolable misery called the
pangs of conscience.”483 Through this knowledge, the individual comes to understand
“the vehemence of his own will,…the strength with which he has grasped life and
attached himself firmly to it, this very life whose terrible side he sees before him in the
misery of those he oppresses, and with which he is nevertheless so firmly entwined that,
precisely in this way, the most terrible things come from himself as a means to the fuller
affirmation of his own will.”484 Although few of the Sonderkommando prisoners can be
called bad or wicked, their testimonies nevertheless reflect an awareness that their
survival came at the expense of their fellow victims.
The knowledge that we are all phenomena of the same will leads not only to a
deeper understanding of oneself and the world, but also to acts of compassion and love,
and ultimately, to the denial of the will-to-live. Schopenhauer notes that the distinction
between oneself and others “is in the eyes of many so great, that the suffering of another
is a direct pleasure for the wicked, and a welcome means to their own wellbeing for the
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unjust. The merely just person is content not to cause it; and generally most people know
and are acquainted with innumerable sufferings of others in their vicinity, but do not
decide to alleviate them, because to do so they would have to undergo some privation.” 485
On the other hand, the truly good person “makes less distinction than is usually made
between himself and others,” because he perceives that this distinction, “which to the
wicked man is so great a gulf, belongs only to a fleeting, deceptive phenomenon. He
recognizes immediately, and without reasons or arguments,” that his own will-to-live is
the same will “which constitutes the inner nature of everything, and lives in all; in fact, he
recognizes that this extends even to the animals and to the whole of nature; he will
therefore not cause suffering even to an animal.” 486 The person in whom this realization
dawns “is now just as little able to let others starve, while he himself has enough and to
spare, as anyone would one day be on short commons, in order on the following day to
have more than he can enjoy.”487 On the contrary, the good person readily “denies
himself pleasures, undergoes privations, in order alleviate another’s suffering.” 488 At the
highest level of goodness and magnanimity, an individual sacrifices their own well-being
and even their life for others. This person “voluntarily and consciously goes to certain
death for his friends, or for his native land,” or “willingly takes suffering and death upon
himself for the maintenance of what conduces and rightfully belongs to the welfare of all
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mankind, in other words, for universal, important truths, and for the eradication of great
errors.”489
The denial of the will-to-live also leads to the quieting of revenge. Schopenhauer
notes how difficult it can be to let go of one’s resentments. From a superficial
perspective, there seems to be no eternal justice in the world. “[T]he wicked man, after
misdeeds and cruelties of every kind,” appears to “live a life of pleasure, and quit the
world undisturbed,” while “the oppressed person drag[s] out to the end a life full of
suffering without the appearance of an avenger of vindicator.” 490 The Sonderkommando
prisoners expressed such a view in their testimonies. They longed for deliverance for
themselves and the innocent people they witnessed being herded into the gas chambers.
They did not understand why the rest of the world allowed the Jews to be slaughtered,
when, as Müller notes, “Hitler and his henchmen had never made a secret of their attitude
to the Jews nor of their avowed intention to exterminate them like vermin. The whole
world knew it, and knowing it remained silent; was not their silence equivalent to
consent?”491 Even with the Red Army only a few hundred kilometers away, the Nazis
continued to transport hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews to the gas chambers and
crematoria of Birkenau. There seemed to be no end to the humiliating existence of the
Sonderkommando.
Understandably, the survivors bore a deep hatred for the entire system that had
persecuted them. They loathed SS men such as Otto Moll and Kurt Franz, who mocked,
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humiliated, and tortured them. They resented prisoner functionaries such as the Kapos,
who terrorized them in the barracks and work squads, and sometimes even regarded the
gas chamber victims as beyond their help and sympathy. Nor did they pity the German
civilians huddling together in the bombed-out cities of the Reich. Like most people who
have suffered, they demanded that the perpetrators “atone for all those sufferings by an
equal amount of pain.”492 Thus, Venezia beat the Kapo who had beaten him, delivering
him up to the wrath of the Russian prisoners, while Glazar fantasized about the deaths of
his German neighbors and did not try to stop the American soldiers who raped
Annemarie. Like their fellow prisoners, Venezia and Glazar did not realize that the
tormented and the tormentor are one, that the same will “suffers both in the oppressed
and in the oppressor.”493 “If the eyes of both were opened,” writes Schopenhauer, “the
inflictor of the suffering would recognize that he lives in everything that suffers pain in
the whole wide world.” Likewise, the victim “would see that all the wickedness that is or
ever was perpetrated in the world proceeds from that will which constitutes also his own
inner being, and appears also in him.”494 If an individual “denies the will that appears in
his own person, he will not resist when another does the same thing, in other words,
inflicts wrong on him.” Such a person “endures such ignominy and suffering with

492

Schopenhauer, Will and Representation, 1: 358. For an alternate view of revenge, see Jean Améry,
“Resentments,” in At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities,
trans. Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella R. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 62-81.
493
Ibid.
494
Ibid., 354.

150

inexhaustible patience and gentleness, returns good for all evil without ostentation, and
allows the fire of anger to rise again with him as little as he does the fire of desires.” 495
Schopenhauer admits that this way of life can go beyond virtue to asceticism,
where an individual no longer finds it sufficient “to love others like himself, and to do as
much for them as for himself,” but develops such an aversion to the will-to-live that he
displays “the greatest indifference to everything,” including his own bodily needs. 496 In
fact, Schopenhauer praises such asceticism as the only path to salvation, that is, the only
means by which the will-to-live can abolish itself and end the suffering of the world.
While we should question the ethicality of showing such indifference to the
suffering of others, especially one’s fellow victims, Schopenhauer’s vision of the
compassionate life nevertheless offers the potential for liberation from the mutually
destructive relationship in which humans often become entangled. For the very virtues
that Schopenhauer attributes to the denial of the will-to-live are the same ones that
Nietzsche and his successors despised as “slave morality.” Of course, Nietzsche’s story
of Christianity as a Jewish plot is a fantasy, as is Hitler’s narrative of Jewish parasitism in
the body of the German nation. Yet Nietzsche was correct on one important point: the
virtues of forgiveness, love, humility, patience, and compassion are definitely subversive

495

Ibid., 382. Both Western and Eastern systems of ethics extol such virtues. For example, the New
Testament in Christianity commands “love for our neighbour as for ourselves, returning of hatred with love
and good actions, patience, meekness, [and] endurance of all possible affronts and injuries without
resistance.” Ibid., 386. Similarly, the religious texts of Hinduism command “love of one’s neighbour with
complete denial of all self-love; love in general, not limited to the human race, but embracing all that lives;
charitableness even to the giving away of one’s hard-won daily earnings; boundless patience towards all
offenders; return of all evil, however bad it may be, with goodness and love; [and] voluntary and cheerful
endurance of every insult and ignominy.” Ibid., 388.
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to power. If he mistook these virtues as the disingenuous devices of the weak to conquer
the strong, it was because he, like Hitler, believed that power is the common denominator
of human relations. Thus, he assumed that even those who claim not to desire power are
deceiving themselves and others. In one sense, Schopenhauer would agree with him, for
he believed that the will-to-live, which Nietzsche called the “will to power,” engages in a
ceaseless striving for higher degrees of objectification. On the other hand, the above
virtues provide a way for human beings to break this cycle of striving. The victim
subverts the will of their oppressor by reducing and even eliminating the vulnerability
which the latter exploits to coerce them: the will-to-live.
Quieting one’s will-to-live challenges the domination of one’s oppressor. Without
the will-to-live of the victims, the death camp would not have functioned with such
horrifying efficiency. The Nazis would still have tried to murder as many Jews and other
“undesirables” as possible, but they would not have been able to depend on the ghetto
leaders to draw up deportation lists; on the Kapos and other prisoner functionaries to
mete out punishments; on the thousands of camp inmates to obey the orders of a few SS
men; or on the Sonderkommando to sort the belongings and cremate the bodies of their
fellow Jews. Likewise, if the victims had not clung so fiercely to life, they would not
have fought each other for every scrap of food and clothing; allowed the SS to select
hundreds or even thousands of their fellow inmates for death; watched their leaders be
beaten and executed; or walked into the gas chambers without protest. In short, they
would have refused to conform to Hitler’s fantasy of the Jews as “rats” fighting amongst
themselves. Yet the fact remains that some victims did suppress their will-to-live long
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enough to give their meager rations to the starving, their precious medicine to the sick,
and their sparse clothing to the naked. A few confronted their fear of death and sacrificed
their lives for the sake of their beliefs in God, freedom, or humanity. This
Schopenhauerian interpretation of the Holocaust offers a sympathetic and hopeful
response to the victims whose voices still cry out from the testimonies in despair and selfreproach. While almost all of the survivors have found liberation by now in death, it
remains for us, the living, to reflect on the will-to-live that made this nightmare possible.
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